Zeitenwende for the G7

Insights From the Munich Security Index Special G7 Edition

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Summary

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has rewritten Germany’s agenda for its G7 presidency, which was already full of pressing global challenges. As our Munich Security Index special edition shows, people in G7 countries perceive Moscow’s war as a “Zeitenwende” – marked by the return of traditional security threats to the top of the agenda.

As revealed by public opinion data from our new Munich Security Index, the sense of having arrived at a historical turning point is a global G7 phenomenon. The war in Ukraine has radically altered risk perceptions in G7 societies, triggering a profound reassessment of the threat posed by Russia and, to a certain degree, China. It has also raised awareness of a range of issue-specific risks, the use of weapons of mass destruction chief among them. The most effective response to these threats has come, and will need to come, from formats involving democratic states, with the G7 front and center. Russia’s full-blown aggression against Ukraine has not only galvanized G7 countries and their allies into delivering a surprisingly decisive response – strongly supported by G7 public opinion; it has also provoked a remarkable convergence in G7 societies’ views of both Moscow and Beijing.

Yet, the determination and unity that like-minded democracies have mustered in the face of Russia’s war do not yet extend to the many other global challenges on the G7 agenda. This is despite the fact that non-traditional threats do not become less imminent in the face of wars of aggression. Climate change, rising inequality, and other global threats remain key concerns in most G7 countries. Moreover, the repercussions of the war, including rising food and energy prices, are already making existing crises worse. And while the new security environment demands a strengthening of values-based cooperation, formats like the G7 are clearly not enough. If it wishes to tackle urgent global threats and defend the basic norms of the post-war international order, the G7 needs partners among the wider international community. At their summit in Elmau, G7 countries will thus have to reconcile the demands of a “Zeitenwende” with the requirements of persistent global threats and the lasting need for broad-based cooperation.
Zeitenwende for the G7

When the German government announced the policy priorities for its presidency of the Group of Seven (G7) just a few months ago, many of the most important long-term global challenges were on the top of its agenda. From tackling the climate crisis and addressing growing socio-economic disparities in and beyond G7 societies to strengthening the international health architecture, Germany wanted to use its G7 presidency to advance collaborative solutions to a plethora of shared global risks. In selecting these topics, the German government was not only building on the priorities of previous G7 presidencies; it was also reflecting core concerns among G7 societies at the time the agenda was devised. At that time, according to public opinion survey data from November 2021 compiled for the Munich Security Index, G7 populations were highly concerned about climate change, environmental destruction, and extreme weather events, as well as about pandemics, rising inequality, and specific threats to democratic societies like disinformation campaigns.¹

Since February 24 at the very latest, efforts to advance the many pressing issues on the G7 agenda have been overshadowed by another major crisis: Russia’s war against Ukraine. Just a few days after transatlantic leaders had used the Munich Security Conference 2022 to urge Moscow to de-escalate and seek a diplomatic resolution,³ Russia launched an all-out war against its neighbor. While Vladimir Putin’s decision to use force may not have been surprising,⁴ the sheer scale of Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine, including the attempt to seize Kyiv, shocked observers everywhere. For many Europeans, the brutal attempt to conquer a neighboring country – something considered illegal, irrational, immoral, and perhaps even inconceivable in the 21st century – represented an uncomfortable wake-up call. A full-blown interstate war was once again taking place within Europe – with heavy tanks, tens of thousands of troops, massive military and civilian casualties, the destruction of entire cities, and countless violations of humanitarian law and human decency.

Against that backdrop, the success of the G7 – and the German presidency – will not only be judged by the group’s ability to achieve “progress towards an equitable world,” the overarching goal for 2022; it will also be intimately linked to G7 leaders’ capacity to coordinate a decisive response to Russia’s aggression among themselves and with their partners within the EU and

“We have woken up in a different world today.”²

Annalena Baerbock, German Foreign Minister, statement following the meeting of the Federal Government’s crisis unit, February 24, 2022
NATO. Yet, the war in Ukraine is not simply overshadowing the original G7 agenda. It is amplifying broader challenges to global problem-solving in an era of increasing competition between democracies and autocracies – challenges that G7 heads of state and government will have to address when they meet for the G7 Summit in Schloss Elmau from June 26 to 28, 2022.

A New Security Environment: Changing Public Risk Perceptions in the G7 Countries

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, traditional security threats that have long seemed rather remote to much of the population of the G7 countries have become frontpage news again – every single day. Instead of focusing on the most promising avenues to tackle climate change or prepare for the next pandemic, many politicians and societies in the G7 countries are now caught up in debates about the delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine, skyrocketing energy prices, or the risks of nuclear escalation. At the same time, critics have already pointed out that some of the most important long-term threats to humanity are falling by the wayside. They worry that the renewed focus on defense and deterrence will divert funding and attention from other key challenges.5

The results of a special edition of our Munich Security Index, based on public opinion surveys conducted in all G7 countries in May 2022, illustrate how radically risk perceptions in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States have changed in recent months. Risks related to Russia, to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as nuclear or chemical weapons, or to the direct consequences of the war such as food shortages or energy supply disruptions have shot up in the ranking of 32 risks (Figure 3). At the same time, many of the risks that have dominated previous editions of the Munich Security Index, most notably environmental risks associated with climate change, remain key concerns in most G7 countries. Very few risks, among them the Covid-19 pandemic and future pandemics, receive lower scores than in November 2021.
Munich Security Index
Special G7 Edition 2022

The Munich Security Conference (MSC) and Kekst CNC have together built a new data set to answer core questions that help understand citizens’ risk perceptions: do people think that the world is becoming a riskier place? Is there a global consensus on some of the grave risks that humanity is facing today? And how prepared do societies feel to tackle these various threats?

Index components

The index combines five metrics: overall risk, potential damage, expected trajectory, perceived imminence, and feelings of preparedness.

**Question 1 – How great is the overall risk to your country?**
For each of the following, please say how great a risk it poses to your country.
- Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the lowest and 10 the greatest risk]

**Question 2 – Will the risk increase or decrease over the next twelve months?**
Please say for each of the following whether you think the risk posed in your country will increase, decrease, or stay the same in the next year.
- Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the strongest decrease, 5 no change, and 10 the strongest increase]

**Question 3 – How severe would the damage be if it happened?**
For each of the following, please say how bad you think the damage would be in your country if it were to happen or become a major risk.
- Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 very low and 10 very severe damage]

**Question 4 – How imminent is the risk?**
For each of the following, please say how imminent a threat you think it is.
- Answer scale 1 – 8 [with 1 “now or in the next few months” and 8 “never”]
- Rescaled to 0 – 10 and reversed1

**Question 5 – How prepared is your country?**
For each of the following, please say how prepared your country is to deal with this threat.
- Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the least and 10 the most prepared]
- Reversed2
Index scores

To produce the final risk index score for each risk in each country, we add the mean scores for all five of the inputs above – overall risk, trajectory, severity, imminence, and preparedness. The resulting total is then rescaled to run from 0 to 100 for ease of interpretation. The final risk index score is an absolute figure (with 100 the highest and 0 the lowest possible score) that can be compared between demographics, countries, and over time.

Besides a risk heatmap (see page 8) that features all seven countries surveyed and how they score on each of the 32 risks covered, the Munich Security Index Special G7 Edition 2022 also includes an overview of how risk perceptions have changed since the most recent edition, the Munich Security Index 2022, was published (see pages 9–10).

Methodology

The special G7 edition of the index is based on representative samples of 1,000 people from each G7 country (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US), amounting to a total sample of 7,000 people. Samples were collected using online panels, with stratified quotas and weights to gender, age, and region to ensure representativeness. Questions were asked in accordance with Market Research Society guidelines. The survey was conducted from May 10−22, 2022.
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In the United States, citizens were not asked to assess the risk from their own country.
Figure 2
The change heatmap, May 2022, change in index score since November 2021

Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference
Figure 3 The risk bump chart, ranking of risks by the G7, November 2021 and May 2022

Data and Illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference
While Russia was not seen as one of the top five risks in any of the G7 countries in November 2021, it is now viewed as the top risk in all seven countries, except for Italy. Compared to its ranking in the previous survey, Russia as a risk concern has moved up 22 places in France, 17 places in Germany, 16 places in Canada, 15 places in Italy, 13 places in the United States, nine places in Japan, and seven places in the UK. It is also the risk that has moved up the most, especially in Germany and France, where its overall risk score has increased by 28 points, an extraordinary shift.

Against the backdrop of the unfolding war on Ukraine and speculation about Russia's readiness to use chemical or nuclear weapons, respondents in the G7 countries have also expressed greater concerns about the use of WMDs. The use of nuclear weapons is now seen as a top 15 risk in all G7 countries, with risk scores having increased significantly. Similarly, people now also worry more about the use of chemical and biological weapons. For obvious reasons, energy supply disruption, a new risk added in this survey wave, is also among the top risks across the G7. Moreover, respondents clearly see the increased risk of food shortages – one of the most obvious global ripple effects of the war against Ukraine (Figures 1–3).

Strikingly, the increase in “traditional” security risks related to great-power competition and military threats has not come at the expense of “non-traditional” security concerns such as climate change. While environmental risks have been overtaken by the Russia threat in the ranking, their status as top risks has not changed in most countries surveyed. Environmental risk scores remain very high. Climate change, extreme weather and forest fires, and the destruction of natural habitats are still among the top five risks in France, Germany, Italy, and Canada. We are thus not observing a general reshuffling of risks, where traditional threats are pushing non-traditional risks aside. Rather, the overall risk level, which was already high, has increased even further. Today, almost half of the population in the G7 countries thinks the world is “very unsafe.” In Germany, 56 percent of respondents believe so. In short, the public’s perception of the new security environment, as reflected in the Munich Security Index special edition, is characterized by the co-existence of traditional and non-traditional security risks, with both types of risks generating serious concern.
A Global “Zeitenwende”?
Given the massive changes in the Munich Security Index in a comparatively short time, one might be tempted to think that public risk perceptions in the G7 might also quickly return to previous levels. This, however, seems unlikely. First, some of the top risks have consistently received high ratings in previous surveys. Given the long-term nature of the threat posed by climate change, it would be surprising if respondents were to change their assessments of climate-related risks at least as long as there is no convincing political response to the threat. Second, respondents in the G7 have seemingly become increasingly aware of the implications of the return of revisionist authoritarian great powers and growing systemic competition that analysts have warned of for many years. This challenge – and all the risks associated with it – will not go away quickly either. While it is the task of politicians to mitigate the consequences of great-power competition and ideological confrontation, several G7 leaders have expressed their belief that we are not just witnessing a temporary worsening of the relationship with Russia (and China) but a clear rupture with long-term consequences – not just bad weather but climate change, as a popular analogy has it. When US President Joe Biden spoke in Warsaw in late March, he came “with a clear and determined message for NATO, for the G7, for the European Union, for all freedom-loving nations: We must commit now to be in this fight for the long haul. We must remain unified today, and tomorrow, and the day after, and for the years and decades to come.”

Countries across the world have begun to adapt to the new security environment, which has been emerging for a while but is now taking more concrete shape. Among the G7 members, Germany has arguably been the most deeply shocked by the war. A few days after the invasion, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed the German Bundestag to announce a series of policy decisions that abruptly put an end to some long-standing debates in Germany. “We are living through a watershed era,” Scholz said: “And that means that the world afterwards will no longer be the same as the world before.” The German word he used, “Zeitenwende,” encapsulates the ground-shifting rupture experienced by many Germans, for whom Russia’s “war of aggression in cold blood” was almost inconceivable.

Having neglected the erosion of several geopolitical certainties for too long, Germans were in for a particularly rough encounter with the new realities. As data from the Munich Security Index special edition underscores, more than two-thirds of Germans agree with the statement that the invasion of

“The world has come to the first turning point since the end of the Cold War at the end of the 20th century. […] Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which started on February 24, made such a shift to a new age clear to all people.”

Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japanese Foreign Minister, 2022 CJEB Annual Tokyo Conference, May 25, 2022
Ukraine is a turning point for their country’s foreign and security policy – the highest number of any G7 society. Yet, other G7 societies are also experiencing the invasion as a turning point. In all G7 countries apart from Canada, absolute majorities think the invasion of Ukraine represents a turning point for their country’s foreign and security policy (Figure 4).

**Figure 4**

Citizens’ views on the invasion of Ukraine as a turning point for their country’s foreign and security policy, May 2022, percent

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither/don’t know</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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Differences between European and non-European G7 member states are shrinking with regard to whether this is a turning point in world politics in general. Between 60 and 70 percent of respondents agree with the abstract statement that “this is a turning point in world politics” (Figure 5). Minor differences notwithstanding, the experience of a “Zeitenwende” seems to be a global G7 phenomenon.

There seems to be a clear sense among the G7 leaders and societies that a comparatively peaceful era has come to an end. As UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson noted, “we’ve seen the end of the post-Cold War period, and the invasion of Ukraine sadly has opened a new chapter.” According to Japan's recent Diplomatic Bluebook, “Russia’s ongoing military invasion of Ukraine has brutally undermined the foundation of an international order built over the past 100 years.” As the findings of the Munich Security Index special
edition indicate, the public in the G7 countries seems to agree with assessments that stress a fundamental rupture. Absolute majorities in all G7 countries believe that “we are entering a new Cold War with Russia.” There is no country in which more than one-tenth of the population disagrees with this statement.17

Threats and Allies
Russia’s blunt attack against Ukraine has also triggered major shifts in how people in the G7 look at other countries (Figures 6 and 7). This is true, first and foremost, for how Russia is perceived. It is now the country most viewed as a threat in all G7 countries. Since November 2021, there has been a huge decrease in Russia’s net score, which is calculated by subtracting the share of people saying Russia is a threat from the share of people saying Russia is an ally. Russia’s net score decreased by double digits in all countries surveyed, most markedly in France (-42) and Italy (-50).

In contrast to Russia, Ukraine is now decisively viewed as an ally in each G7 country, with double digits increases in all countries. The largest increases were recorded in the UK (+43) and Canada (+36). While political elites disagree about the EU’s future relationship with Ukraine,18 public opinion in the G7 countries strongly supports Ukraine becoming a member state of the

Figure 5
Citizens’ views on the invasion of Ukraine as a turning point in world politics, May 2022, percent

Do you agree or disagree that the invasion of Ukraine is a turning point in world politics?

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Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference
European Union. The net scores are positive in all countries surveyed, though clearly more positive in the non-EU members of the G7. In France, support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU is the least pronounced, but supporters still outnumber opponents by a decisive margin (+23). A similar pattern emerges regarding Ukraine’s potential NATO membership. While net scores are generally a little lower than in the case of EU membership, supporters outnumber opponents in each G7 country. However, there is a clear divergence between continental Europeans and other G7 countries, as net scores in Italy (+14), Germany (+16), and France (+28) are significantly lower than net scores in the US (+44), the United Kingdom (+44), Canada (+58), or non-NATO member Japan (+67).
Figure 7
Citizens’ perceptions of other countries, share saying country is an ally minus share saying country is a threat, May 2022, percent

Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference
Moreover, Russia’s attack has also prompted an increase in G7 public support for geographically exposed countries that feel pressured or potentially threatened by Moscow. Finland, Sweden, Poland, Estonia, and Georgia are viewed positively by respondents in G7 countries – though to different degrees (Figure 7). In all G7 countries, the results indicate overwhelming support for Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Net scores in each NATO country surveyed are very positive – from Italy (+44) to Canada (+65). While widening the divide between the G7 and Russia, the war seems to have further aligned the G7 with those countries who feel the most threatened by Moscow.

Last but certainly not least, Russia’s attack on the core values of the democratic world and the concerted effort to oppose it seem to have solidified how G7 countries view each other, with substantial increases in the extent to which they view each other as allies (Figure 7).

The Comeback of the G7: Values-Based Cooperation Among the World’s Leading Democracies
In recent months, close cooperation among the world’s leading democracies – and the G7 as their “steering committee” – has seen a striking comeback. Taking into account the recent history of the G7, the rejuvenation of this framework is a remarkable feat. After all, the G7’s star had been fading for a long time; for many, it was a moribund framework with no clear purpose and increasingly out of sync with the times. Instead of the G7, the G20 had become, in the eyes of many, the “premier forum for international economic cooperation.” The latter did not only include the G7 but also major non-Western emerging economies, with China being chief among them. While these countries are not necessarily democratic, their cooperation was considered critical to managing core global challenges like the financial crisis in 2008. Other critics, who favored values-based cooperation among the world’s major democracies, maintained that the G7 format was “heavily weighted towards the transatlantic,” reflected the world of yesteryear, and should be reformed to include additional democracies in other parts of the world. Some called for the establishment of a D10, a grouping of ten democracies that would bring in the EU, South Korea, and Australia – and perhaps also India. In short, it seemed increasingly questionable whether the G7 format was the appropriate global governance framework for the world of today and tomorrow.
Even more importantly, the governments of the G7 states themselves seemed unable to make proper use of the G7 framework for several years. During the Trump presidency, internal divisions clearly weakened the group. “[R]iven with transatlantic differences,” including on issues like trade and climate change, the G7 struggled to play a decisive role. After Donald Trump had tried to withdraw his signature from a G7 declaration on the flight back from the G7 Summit in Québec in 2018, the French hosts of the 2019 G7 Summit recognized early on that a substantive policy statement would not be possible. The Biarritz Summit produced just a meagre leaders’ statement of little more than 250 words. In 2020, when Trump was due to be the host, the G7 Summit was first postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and, after German then-Chancellor Angela Merkel declined the invitation to a summit in June due to the ongoing pandemic, it was cancelled and later adjourned to an unspecified date after the US presidential elections. The sorry state of the G7 at the time reflected a world shaped by “Westlessness.” It just was not clear anymore whether there was still enough common ground and willingness among the major liberal democracies to act in concert.

While many believed that it would be easy to revitalize transatlantic cooperation and agree on a new agenda for the world’s leading democracies after Trump was voted out of office, in the early months of the Biden administration, the United States and Europe continued to adopt different approaches. The transatlantic renewal that many had hoped for was damaged by the handling of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the tensions around the defense deal between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), which included the cancellation of a major Australian submarine contract with France.

While the G7 took up Biden’s goal of conducting a “foreign policy for the middle class,” refocused its actions around making sure “that economic growth is green and inclusive,” and codified it in the Cornwell Consensus, the world’s major democracies were still far from a consensus on how to respond to the “inflection point” described by President Biden at the MSC Special Edition in February 2021. As he put it then, “we must prepare together for a long-term strategic competition with China” and “meet the threat from Russia.” In contrast, continental Europeans appeared wary of speaking of a new systemic competition between democracies and autocracies. French President Emmanuel Macron and then-Chancellor Angela Merkel repeatedly cautioned against building a united front against autocratic states, fearing that such a focus on cooperation among
like-minded democracies would heighten tensions with non-democracies and damage efforts to solve global problems. However, even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this debate had begun to shift. For instance, in its coalition agreement, the new German traffic-light coalition, which entered government in late 2021, emphasized the importance of “multilateral cooperation in the world, especially in close connection with those states that share our democratic values,” referring to “systemic competition with authoritarian states and strategic solidarity with our democratic partners.”

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, abstract concerns about autocratic revisionism have become palpable. As G7 leaders have highlighted, the war is not only an attack on the principles of sovereignty and non-aggression, but also an assault on freedom and democracy. Putin has attacked his neighbor “for one reason alone,” Olaf Scholz highlighted in his “Zeitenwende” speech, namely because “the freedom of the Ukrainian people calls his own oppressive regime into question.” By attacking “the values that form the pillars of all democracies,” as Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau put it, Vladimir Putin has not only triggered a fundamental reevaluation of the G7 countries’ Russia policies. He has also provoked a strong response from the G7, together with the world’s democracies, to defend core liberal-democratic values. As US President Joe Biden said in Warsaw: “The gravity of the threat is why the response of the West has been so swift and so powerful and so unified, unprecedented, and overwhelming.”

Responding to the Russia Challenge

Just a few months ago, views on Russia diverged considerably between continental Europeans and the other G7 societies. When asked what their country should do in response to Russia, people in France, Germany, and Italy were less willing to oppose Russia economically and militarily. Since November 2021, differences in public opinion have sharply declined or even disappeared. While respondents in all G7 countries have become more willing to oppose Russia economically and militarily, the changes have been most pronounced in continental Europe. And although Italy may be a little less supportive than the others, the public in Italy in May 2022 is evidently more willing to oppose Russia than the UK public was in November 2021, when the UK was the most “hawkish” country among the G7 (Figure 8).

Consistent with public opinion in their countries, governments in the G7, NATO, and the EU have demonstrated their willingness to vigorously and
immediately respond to Vladimir Putin’s transgressions. As Annalena Baerbock noted, “we are all shocked, but we are not helpless.” On the day of the invasion, G7 leaders quickly issued a strong statement condemning the “unprovoked and completely unjustified attack on the democratic state of Ukraine.” Since then, the German G7 presidency has coordinated a large number of measures in support of Ukraine, including humanitarian aid, weapons deliveries, and “the most comprehensive sanctions aimed at a major economy […] in more than 70 years.”

**Figure 8**

Citizens’ preferences for their country’s response to Russia, share saying that their country should oppose Russia minus share saying that their country should cooperate with Russia, May 2022, percent

Many of these decisions, including sanctions against Russia’s central bank or the delivery of heavy weapons from across the NATO alliance to Ukraine,
were almost inconceivable just a few months ago. In a sense, Russia’s invasion has instilled a new raison d’être into democratic formats more generally and the G7 in particular. As other organizations and formats – including the G20 and the UN – seemed paralyzed in the face of Russia’s military aggression, it was up to the G7, NATO, and the EU – all formats made up of (mostly) democratic countries – to closely coordinate the military, economic, and humanitarian response to the crisis in Eastern Europe.

In general, these decisions receive broad public support. Respondents generally give very positive assessments of their own government’s and their allies’ responses to the Russian invasion (Figure 9) – individually and as part of the EU, NATO and the G7. This support contrasts with fairly critical views among G7 societies of the responses of countries like China or India. With an average net rating of +24, the United Kingdom stands out as the country that people in other G7 countries think has done best, followed by the United States (+22) and France (+21). The net negative ratings for most countries registered in Italy, a clear outlier, are likely because many Italian respondents are critical of weapons deliveries to Ukraine and thus oppose their allies’ responses. Despite the critical discussion of Germany’s contribution in the international media and strategic community, with some calling it “the weakest link in the democratic world’s response to Russian aggression,” Berlin’s response to the Russian invasion still receives clearly positive net ratings – again with Italy being the exception. Interestingly, respondents in Germany rate their own country’s performance positively (+15) but believe that most of their allies are doing better. While the Italians (-7) and the Japanese are critical of their own governments’ policies (-11), people in Canada (+37), the UK (+44), and the US (+37) believe their own governments have performed best, respectively.

These generally very positive mutual assessments do not mean that disagreements among the G7, let alone NATO and EU members, are a thing of the past. Differences in public opinion remain – as do different assessments among governments. While the G7, NATO, and the EU have made far-reaching decisions that have gone well beyond anything that seemed likely a few months ago, governments continue to disagree about specific policies – from the decision about a gas embargo to the escalation risks involved in the delivery of different types of weapons. National differences are partly reflected in public opinion, too (Figure 10). People in all the G7 countries are supportive of increased humanitarian aid and stronger
sanctions. There is also strong support for increasing defense spending even if differences are visible here – with Italy being a clear outlier. In general, in all G7 countries apart from Italy, the number of respondents who think their country should do more to support Ukraine with weapons is greater than those who think their country should do less. But there are important differences here, as people in the Anglosphere are significantly more supportive than those in continental Europe and Japan. When the question asked is about the provision of heavy weapons, the same pattern emerges in the responses, just on a slightly lower level. Still, considering that the delivery of weapons to conflict zones used to be almost a taboo in Germany and Japan, the broad support for such a policy is remarkable.

The public, it seems, is less concerned with escalation risks than parts of the elites. Relative majorities in Italy (38 percent), Germany (44 percent), France (48 percent), and the United Kingdom (50 percent), as well as absolute majorities in Canada (51 percent), and the United States and Japan (both 53
Figure 10
Citizens’ views on specific policies in support of Ukraine, May 2022, percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanctioning Russia</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
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<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing defence spending</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing heavy weapons to Ukraine</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increasing defence spending</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do you think your country should be doing more or less of the following in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

Data: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference.
Illustration: Munich Security Conference
percent) agree with the statement that “NATO members should push back harder against Russia even if the risk of military escalation between NATO and Russia increases.” The only countries in which more than a quarter of respondents disagree are Italy (27 percent) and Germany (26 percent).

At its Madrid Summit, NATO will not only present a new strategic concept but is also expected to announce significant changes to its strategic posture on the Eastern flank. While NATO has already taken various measures to heighten readiness and strengthen its presence on the eastern flank, one of the key questions is whether NATO members will agree on a significant increase of their forward presence. Four of the G7 members, Canada, Germany, the UK, and the US, are lead nations for the multinational battalions that ensure NATO’s persistent presence in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and will be expected to step up. While a considerable part of the public in the NATO member states surveyed is undecided (from 31 percent in Germany to 41 percent in Canada and Italy), relative majorities in Canada (43 percent), France and the UK (both 46 percent), Germany (48 percent), and the US (49 percent) think that their country “should massively increase its military presence at NATO’s eastern border.” Again, respondents in Italy are the exception. Only 28 percent support this statement, while 31 percent disagree with it. The numbers for those who oppose a massive increase of forces are markedly lower in Germany (21 percent), Canada and France (both 16 percent), the US (14 percent), and the UK (13 percent). Politicians in these states can thus build on general support for a major change in NATO’s strategic posture. Notwithstanding some disagreements, the publics in the countries surveyed seem to have internalized the idea that we have reached a historical turning point and are ready to support measures that go beyond the policy framework that long guided the Western approach toward Russia.

Responding to the China Challenge
Russia, though, is clearly not the only competitor to worry about. While Russia clearly represents the most immediate threat, the broader and more comprehensive challenge facing the world’s liberal democracies will likely come from China. There is now a clear sense – shared by elites and publics alike – that a failure to respond adequately to the Russian invasion could set a precedent for other countries, China chief among them, to engage in aggression. In Japan, for instance, the war in Eastern Europe has triggered an ongoing reassessment of Japan’s strategic posture – not unlike the rethink that has been underway in Germany. As Prime Minister Fumio
In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, do you agree or disagree that if we do not stand up to Russia, this increases the risk that China will invade other countries some day?

Kishida concluded, “Ukraine may be East Asia tomorrow.” Absolute majorities in all G7 countries, except for Italy, agree that “if we do not stand up to Russia, this increases the risk that China will invade other countries some day” (Figure 11).

**Figure 11**

Citizens’ assessments of the link between the response to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the likelihood of China also invading a state, May 2022, percent

![Bar chart showing percentages of agreement, neither/don't know, and disagreement across G7 countries.](Image)

- **Italy:** 47% Agree, 37% Neither/don't know, 16% Disagree
- **France:** 53% Agree, 36% Neither/don't know, 11% Disagree
- **Germany:** 55% Agree, 30% Neither/don't know, 15% Disagree
- **Canada:** 57% Agree, 33% Neither/don't know, 10% Disagree
- **Japan:** 59% Agree, 34% Neither/don't know, 8% Disagree
- **US:** 60% Agree, 33% Neither/don't know, 8% Disagree
- **UK:** 63% Agree, 31% Neither/don't know, 7% Disagree

Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference

At the very least, China’s response to the war has further amplified concerns that democracies have to brace for growing headwinds as the world enters a new stage of systemic competition. In the capitals of G7 countries, it has prompted a hardening of views on China and has accelerated the debate about the need to “treat China and Russia as interchangeable enemies.”

Initially, European G7 members – but not so much their American counterparts – still hoped that China would weigh in on Russia, helping to end the war in Ukraine. Yet, these hopes were “shattered.” Beijing not only refused to condemn the invasion but also emphasized that even in light of recent developments, the China-Russia friendship remained “iron clad.” What is more, since the start of the war, the Chinese media has been echoing Moscow’s propaganda, intent on “shrouding the Russian regime’s culpability for this war,” as G7 leaders have put it. While China has not (yet) openly violated Western sanctions against Russia, its candid support for Moscow
leaves little doubt that Beijing sees the war “through the lens” of geopolitical competition and its “global rivalry with the US.”51 Sharing Russia’s desire to resist what both Beijing and Moscow perceive as Western attempts to contain them,52 China now appears much more willing to accept tensions with the West – even at the risk of damaging its trade relationships with Europe, Japan, and the US.

In G7 capitals, European ones in particular, this “has triggered a profound reassessment” of individual members’ bilateral and multilateral relations with Beijing.53 In fact, while an EU strategic document from 2019 gave a mixed impression, describing China as simultaneously a negotiating partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival,54 the speech European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gave after the EU-China Summit this April mostly conveyed a view of China as a rival.55 In addition, China’s failure to condemn a crystal-clear act of aggression has not gone unnotice by citizens in the G7 countries. More people now see China as a threat than did so in November 2021. In Italy (-21) and Germany (-12), the deterioration of views has been most dramatic. Majorities in all G7 countries say they have become more wary of China’s own ambitions due to China’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine (Figure 12).

Figure 12
Citizens’ wariness of China in light of Beijing’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, May 2022, percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither/don’t know</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>58</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Faced with an apparent move by China and Russia to join forces against liberal democratic states, European countries feel compelled to reconsider their previous strategies and assumptions. In this regard, it does not seem viable to either compartmentalize the risks posed by Russia and China or to “maintain equal distance from the United States and China,” which some Europeans had still preferred.

Yet, despite these changes in both public opinion and official statements, the debate on a new China policy has only just begun. And while among G7 societies, there has been a convergence in views on the right way to deal with China (Figure 13), agreement is not as far-reaching as it is in the case of

**Figure 13**
Citizens’ preferences for their country’s response to the rise of China, share saying that their country should oppose China minus share saying that their country should cooperate with China, May 2022, percent

- Size of circles = size of population
- Survey values from November 2021
Russia. In the European G7 countries, people are still far less convinced their countries should oppose China economically than in the other G7 states. While neither the war in Ukraine nor policies towards China are an official topic on the agenda at Elmau, G7 leaders need to coordinate their approaches to China. First of all, they should not wait for China to increase its support for Moscow before debating adequate responses. Instead, G7 leaders should now develop a clear view of the type of Chinese actions – including diplomatic backing, economic assistance, or military support of Russia – that would trigger a certain type of joint sanctions.59

But the G7 format is not just useful in addressing this immediate question – its capacities go far beyond it. Uniting key democracies from North America, Europe, and Asia, it is uniquely equipped to discuss what recent developments in Ukraine mean specifically for democratic states’ China policies and what they mean for a joint response to autocratic revisionism more broadly. The illusion that economic interdependence would avert conflict has clearly been shattered. Close economic ties with autocratic regimes are now increasingly perceived as significant liabilities, too. Against that backdrop, G7 leaders should not only speed up their efforts to reduce their (energy) dependence on Russia, but also need to comprehensively reevaluate their economic ties with Beijing. To avoid repeating the mistake made with Russia “with another authoritarian regime,”60 they should closely examine areas where their dependency on China is especially pronounced, namely in green energy technology and materials, especially rare earth elements.61

And if the threats posed by China and Russia are inseparably linked, G7 leaders also need to debate what form a joint response that connects the European and the Indo-Pacific arenas could take. Beijing, so is the impression in G7 capitals, is closely watching the West’s reaction to the Russian attack. The way the G7 and its partners counter Russia’s invasion will thus shape relations with China for many years to come.

The Original G7 Agenda: Reconciling the Response to Interstate War With That to Other Urgent Threats

While media coverage and political discussions have understandably been dominated by the war in Ukraine, evidence abounds that the original G7 focus has lost none of its relevance. Clearly, non-traditional threats do not become less imminent in the face of wars of aggression. The latest findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change emphasize the urgent need to achieve net-zero climate targets, arguing that “[t]otal

"[The war in Ukraine] must not lead us as the G7 to neglect our responsibilities in the face of global challenges such as the climate crisis and the pandemic [...]. On the contrary: many of the goals we set ourselves at the beginning of the year have become even more pressing as a result of the change in the global situation."66

Olaf Scholz, German Chancellor, Global Solution Summit, March 28, 2022
greenhouse-gas emissions must peak by 2025 if we are to avoid a catastrophic increase in global temperatures.” The coronavirus pandemic is far from over and its human and economic costs continue to be significant. The WHO has recently pointed to nearly 15 million excess deaths worldwide associated with the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and 2021. And although the Chinese authorities have taken draconian measures to combat the omicron variant, these seem unable to contain it. All the while, global disparities appear to be growing.

Even without the war in Ukraine, the challenges on the G7 agenda would have thus remained acute. With the invasion, these issues have become yet more pressing. The fallout from the Russia crisis will likely amplify many, if not all, of these threats, with particularly harmful effects for developing states. Rising prices for food and energy are already being felt across the world, making existing crises even worse. At the same time, insufficient efforts to counter non-traditional threats to people’s well-being and livelihoods compromise countries’ capacities to cope with the repercussions of war, again rendering new conflicts more likely in the long run.

Hence, the Russia crisis has highlighted the need to reconcile efforts to deal with the return of interstate war on the European continent with the fight against persistent non-traditional threats. Alas, global efforts to address issues like climate, health, or food security are still lacking the same level of commitment and urgency that has characterized the response to Russia’s attack – even if G7 leaders continue to stress that these themes will remain a priority.

Clearly, resources are limited. Observers worry that the war in Ukraine will divert resources away from “soft” security threats that are particularly important to developing states. They fear that the finances available for the energy transition, fighting food insecurity, or improving global health might even experience a “period of triage.” To low-income countries, this is particularly worrisome. Equally bad, policies may detract from one another. Efforts to deprive Putin of his energy revenues by diversifying fossil fuel imports, for instance, may well encourage backsliding on the path to net-zero – just as efforts to support Ukraine by targeting Russia with hart-hitting sanctions may undermine sustainable and inclusive global growth.
The G7 countries thus need to outline how they will link their support for Ukraine with progress on the other key items on the summit’s agenda – and how they will reach out to the wider world in this effort. Transparency about potential trade-offs and a clear outlook on how these tensions can be addressed are central to this effort. If they successfully link a decisive response to the war in Ukraine with concrete steps to achieve “progress towards an equitable world,” the G7 can prove that their solidarity is not limited to the victims of military aggression on the European continent; but that they are willing to muster the same amount of solidarity when it comes to other urgent global threats.

**Climate Security**

Before Russia invaded Ukraine, climate change was the top priority on the agenda of the German G7 Summit. Together with its G7 partners, Germany wanted to use the summit to advance efforts in the fight against climate change, in protecting the environment and biodiversity, and in speeding up the global energy transition. In this regard, a core aim is to establish a global alliance for climate protection, a “climate club,” meant to accelerate the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement by uniting countries that are willing to commit to ambitious net-zero targets.68

Russia’s aggression and its repercussions for global energy prices have further highlighted the security risks that come with a dependence on fossil fuels.70 It has added a strong “geostrategic” imperative to the “planetary rationale” for transitioning to a low-carbon economy.71 While climate change and environmental threats are still central to the risk perceptions of G7 societies (Figures 1 and 3), they are no longer the only security liability for fossil-fuel-dependent economies. As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, relying on autocratic regimes for the provision of oil, gas, and coal is another major strategic vulnerability of fossil-fuel-powered economies. Russia’s aggression has not only seen global energy prices soar, leaving those who depend on oil and gas imports in limbo; moreover, by halting gas exports to European countries and companies, Putin has also once again demonstrated his willingness to use energy as a weapon.72

While highlighting that a speedy transition to renewable energies is the best way to boost countries’ energy security, the Russia crisis has raised considerable fears that European countries’ current efforts to cushion rising energy prices and diversify their fossil fuel supply will ultimately come at the cost of ambitious climate action. Some fear that energy security and the energy
transition might not be as compatible as hoped for – at least not in the short term. As European countries strive to replace Russian energy imports by purchasing liquified natural gas (LNG) from the US and other parts of the world and by more heavily relying on coal, a short-term increase of fossil fuels in G7 countries’ energy mixes seems almost inevitable.\footnote{This is a reference to a footnote that is not visible in the image.} When it comes to reducing dependence on fossil fuels from Russia, the figures show a more uniform response across the countries, with the majority opting for more action to reduce dependence. The data indicates a clear public sentiment towards reducing reliance on Russian energy sources, with the US showing the highest percentage favoring more action (63%), followed by Italy (66%), and Germany (67%).

**Figure 14**
Citizens’ views on the need to reduce dependence on fossil fuels from Russia, May 2022, percent

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Do you think your country should be doing more or less to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels from Russia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Do less</th>
<th>Do more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
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</tbody>
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Do you think your country should be doing more or less to reduce the amount of fossil fuels used?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
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Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference.
to reducing fossil fuel dependence from Russia, our Munich Security Index special edition shows, respondents see a greater need to do more than when it comes to reducing their country’s overall reliance on fossil fuels (Figure 14).

At the G7 Summit, leaders will have to outline how they plan to balance their desire to wean themselves off Russian imports of oil, gas, and coal on one side with the Paris goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degree on the other. First and foremost, they need to ensure that the construction of new fossil fuel infrastructure (like LNG terminals) does not come at the cost of urgently needed investments in renewable energy. But they also need to guarantee that short-term measures to diversify their energy imports do not lock in long-term fossil fuel dependencies. After all, the long-term consequences of continuing on carbon-intensive pathways will be far more costly and damaging than the short-term costs of buffering soaring energy prices.

Moreover, moving away from climate targets – even in the short term – could already send a deleterious global signal that threatens to undermine net-zero commitments in other parts of the world. If the G7 wants to avoid the perception that the fight against climate change is taking a "back seat" to their energy security, G7 leaders need to be as clear and transparent as possible about potential trade-offs and how they seek to resolve them. They also need to stress their conviction that energy security is best served by accelerating the move toward clean energy and enhanced energy efficiency.

Respondents inside the G7 countries clearly seem to agree. With the notable exception of the French (32 percent), who rely on nuclear power to an extraordinary degree, absolute majorities in Canada (60 percent), the US (61 percent), Japan (65 percent), the UK (67 percent), Germany (71 percent), and Italy (73 percent) agree “that we have to build enough renewable energy projects here so that we can be free from dependence on other countries.”

Yet, the green energy transition itself comes with dependencies and risks that need to be anticipated and collectively mitigated in order to truly strengthen energy security in and beyond G7 states. While Europe’s dependence on Russian energy is the most evident risk, Europe’s exposure to China for green energy technologies is equally alarming. In renewable energy technologies, China is a key player – controlling, for instance, “nearly all stages of photovoltaics manufacturing.” China is also a key producer of many of the critical minerals needed for clean energy technologies. If European countries’ efforts to reduce their overreliance on one autocrat are not to increase their dependency on another, they would be well advised to...
discuss how to bolster the resilience of their green energy supply chains, including by “selectively reduc[ing] their China exposure.” Given that this goal is only achievable if like-minded partners work closely together, the G7 format is the perfect context to push forward the debate.

The double goal of energy and climate security cannot be met without active outreach to developing and emerging economies. In its policy priorities for the G7 presidency, Germany has already highlighted the importance of a “just global transition toward sustainable and climateneutral societies.” A globally uneven energy transition, so the underlying assumption goes, is a massive liability for the global fight against climate change. However, as Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated, it is also a massive liability for energy security in many parts of the world. Here, the G7 urgently needs to adopt a more global perspective. While G7 countries have acknowledged that the price hikes produced by Russia’s war were “felt most acutely” in low-income countries that depend on fossil fuel imports, they have done far too little to mitigate the detrimental effects. They have also paid insufficient attention to the knock-on effects of their own quest for new fossil fuel supplies. LNG prices in particular have spiked in reaction to the “uncoordinated LNG shopping spree” by some European states.

In Elmau, the G7 will have to present a more global perspective on how to balance energy security and the energy transition. This includes a stronger commitment to support developing countries in grappling with elevated energy prices. But it also includes enhanced efforts to foster net zero development trajectories through “just energy-transition partnerships” – the best long-term investment in energy security. A failure to do so will not only harm global climate action and energy security, it will also undermine G7 efforts to isolate Russia on global energy markets. Cutting Russia off from hydrocarbon revenues will hardly be feasible if the Global South still depends on fossil fuel imports and willingly buys Moscow’s oil and gas.

Health Security
Progress on improving global health is yet another item on the German G7 agenda that has been affected by Russia’s military aggression. On the one hand, the invasion is “sapping money” available for the fight against various transnational threats and has certainly withdrawn attention away from the risks posed by pandemics. Among all risks covered in the Munich Security Index special edition, the risks posed by the ongoing pandemic and by future pandemics have seen the steepest overall declines in risk.
perception among publics in G7 countries (Figures 2 and 15). On the other hand, the war’s repercussions have further highlighted the urgent need to globally defeat Covid-19 and strengthen global health. Plainly, the fact that many developing countries were already “battered” by the “polypandemic” has exacerbated the damage done by Putin’s war and its global ripple effects. In light of the excess vulnerability to various kinds of shocks that accompany global health crises, it is good news that the fight against the coronavirus pandemic and efforts to improve pandemic preparedness, especially in low- and middle-income countries, continue to be a top priority on the G7 agenda. It is good news for global health security as much as it is for global solidarity.

**Figure 15**

**Citizens’ views of the risk posed by the coronavirus pandemic, score**

Despite “Covid fatigue” growing in and beyond G7 societies – with a drop in vaccinations and testing in many parts of the world – the G7 foreign ministers have rightly argued that “[t]he fight against Covid-19 and its global consequences is far from over.” Until the virus is defeated everywhere, it continues to be a threat for everyone. China’s ongoing struggle against the omicron outbreak is a strong case in point. Should Beijing be unable to contain the virus, this would not only present an enormous risk to China; given the threat of new mutations emerging among its huge population of 1.4 billion people, it would also represent a massive risk for the world.
And while the threat of another deadly coronavirus variant remains significant, experts highlight that the peril of new pandemics itself seems to be growing. Germany’s Minister for Health Karl Lauterbach warned that “we have to reckon with a constantly increasing threat of pandemics in the next decades.” Climate change in particular appears to be “speeding up the cycle of pandemics,” highlighting the need to jointly address the different topics on the G7 agenda. By destroying habitats and altering land use, climate change appears to be increasing viral transmission among animal species and raising the risk of viruses spilling over from animals to humans. In low-income countries, Bill Gates has highlighted, this risk is particularly pronounced, as the boundary between humans and animals is often lower.

It is thus in the G7’s own interest to adopt an inclusive approach to fighting the pandemic and to advance global pandemic preparedness. Yet, it is also an indispensable signal of solidarity towards the Global South at a time when powerful countries seek to portray the G7 countries as mostly looking after themselves. With a strong commitment to addressing the gaps in the global vaccination campaign and to furthering an inclusive global economic recovery from the “polypandemic,” the G7 and its partners can demonstrate that they are not only willing to show solidarity in the face of a military aggression but also in the face of threats to global health. Moreover, by boosting their efforts to improve pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response in countries of the Global South, the G7 members can demonstrate that they truly regard health resilience as a global public good.

The fact that efforts to advance health security are less closely linked to responses to the Russia crisis than other policy issues should simplify leaders’ efforts to this end. Yet, it would be wrong to assume that the harmful effects of accelerated systemic competition would spare the global health agenda. In fact, its rivalry with the West is at least partly to blame for Beijing’s reluctance to import more effective mRNA vaccines from Europe and the US. Just as the US-China rivalry has stymied global cooperation at the outset of the coronavirus pandemic, it continues to stifle the fight against Covid-19 now. The G7 countries will thus not only have to convince their own publics of the continuing need to step up global vaccination efforts and to boost pandemic preparedness; their attempts to strengthen global health security will also have to occur under the adverse conditions of growing geopolitical competition.
Food Security

In a similar vein, the G7 must double down on their efforts to promote global food security. Even before the Russian attack against Ukraine, progress toward “Zero Hunger” by 2030 had stalled. As the authors of the 2021 Global Hunger Index warned, the world was already “dangerously off track,” as food security was “under assault on multiple fronts,” suffering from the effects of climate change, the Covid-19 pandemic, and violent conflict. An Oxfam report referred to these factors of the “three lethal Cs.”

The war in Ukraine has made things far worse, threatening to create a “perfect storm” for countries of the Global South. There are several reasons. First, both Russia and Ukraine are important exporting countries for agricultural products, supplying “28 percent of globally traded wheat, 29 percent of the barley, 15 percent of the maize, and 75 percent of the sunflower oil.” According to The Economist, “Ukraine’s food exports provide the calories to feed 400m people.” Given Russia’s Black Sea blockade, ships are now unable to enter Ukrainian harbors, preventing them from loading and transporting products such as corn and wheat to places where they are badly needed. The war and the decrease of supply from Ukraine has also contributed to the sharp increase in prices for food, fertilizers, and fuel. Rising interest rates and inflation are further worsening the situation, in particular for developing countries that are highly indebted and are dependent on imports. In March 2022, the Food Price Index of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reached an all-time high, meaning fewer and fewer people will be able to afford the food they need.

Against this background, the world’s aid organizations have rung the alarm bell. In early April, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for instance, warned that more than a quarter of the population in Africa was facing a food security crisis. According to UN Secretary General António Guterres, the invasion “threatens to tip tens of millions of people over the edge into food insecurity, followed by malnutrition, mass hunger and famine, in a crisis that could last for years.” The G7 member states, too, have expressed their grave concern about “the global impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on the rise of hunger and malnutrition, poverty and other inequalities within and beyond the region.” Upon the initiative of the German presidency, the G7 agreed on a “Global Alliance for Food Security,” launched by the G7 development ministers at their meeting in Berlin on May 19. They now must fill it with life.
At a recent Roundtable on Food Security, co-hosted by the MSC and the Rockefeller Foundation on the margins of the Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC, participants highlighted Russia’s use of food insecurity as a political instrument, which is putting millions of people at risk of starvation, and China’s implicit support. Geopolitical tensions, they said, had a dramatic impact on the very institutions created to tackle these challenges. They urged the international community to act quickly and decisively to address the unfolding food security emergency. As the co-chair’s statement, published by the Rockefeller Foundation, concluded, “leadership by the G7 is vital” to tackle this emergency. Praising the announcement of the plans to establish an alliance for food security, the participants called on the G7 and its partners to “act in a coordinated, quick and far-sighted manner.”

According to data from the Munich Security Index, people in the G7 countries are aware of the threat posed by hunger, as food shortages are seen as an increasingly tangible risk (Figures 1–3). G7 publics also believe that their countries should do more to help developing countries weather the impact of the Russian war (Figure 16).

**Figure 16**

Citizens’ views on the need to help developing countries deal with rising food prices as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, May 2022, percent

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>14</td>
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Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference

At a recent Roundtable on Food Security, co-hosted by the MSC and the Rockefeller Foundation on the margins of the Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC, participants highlighted Russia’s use of food insecurity as a political instrument, which is putting millions of people at risk of starvation, and China’s implicit support. Geopolitical tensions, they said, had a dramatic impact on the very institutions created to tackle these challenges. They urged the international community to act quickly and decisively to address the unfolding food security emergency. As the co-chair’s statement, published by the Rockefeller Foundation, concluded, “leadership by the G7 is vital” to tackle this emergency. Praising the announcement of the plans to establish an alliance for food security, the participants called on the G7 and its partners to “act in a coordinated, quick and far-sighted manner.”
Yet, here again, great-power competition is already affecting the necessary cooperation to help the world’s poorest people. As participants at the Munich Leaders Meeting also noted, many international organizations are suffering from political pressure, including the FAO, which is now led by a Chinese director and is apparently unable to even name Russia as the aggressor when discussing the ongoing crisis. The world’s most vulnerable are at risk, as hunger is used as a political weapon in great-power competition.

If they fail to address the food security crisis, the global reputation of the G7 will likely suffer. If autocratic governments succeed in blaming the G7 and partners for the ripple effects of the war, pointing to Western double-standards or to the sanctions as the real source for rising food prices, there is a risk that the most important supporters of liberal-democratic values will have less global influence in the long run. Observers like David Miliband already warn that in many parts of the world, “more people are blaming the sanctions for rising food prices than are blaming the invasion.”

In addition, the relationship between violent conflict and hunger is a two-way street. Not only does conflict have multiple effects on food security, with implications for every aspect from production to consumption; food insecurity also makes violent conflict more likely, endangering sustainable peace and development in the long run. As UN Secretary General António Guterres has succinctly put it: “If we do not feed people, we feed conflict.”

The Road Ahead for the G7

For the members of the G7, the specific consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have brought to the fore the manifold dimensions of a broader global turning point. Rather than being the single cause of a broader realignment, the invasion can be thought of as a catalyst, reinforcing existing trends that cannot longer be ignored. It has driven home the message that the world is, indeed, living through a “watershed era,” as Chancellor Scholz put it. But while it seems clear that the core certainties of the post-Cold War era no longer hold, it is less clear what the emerging order will look like.

For the G7, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not only amplified the need to reconcile their response to pressing, non-traditional security threats with their efforts to counter military aggression. The Russian invasion, combined with China’s support for it, also seems to have accelerated competition
between democratic and autocratic systems of rule, forcing the G7 to do two things at once: effectively “competing against the illiberal tide,” while also “cooperating with challengers” where shared threats demand it.\footnote{122}

Against that backdrop, the G7 has been reinvigorated as a values-based framework for the world’s leading democracies and market economies. While the G7 members today are less powerful than they used to be, there is no other group of countries that can wield a similar amount of global influence. As the “beating heart” of the world’s liberal democracies, it can still serve as an avant-garde, paving the way for important global initiatives. Its main advantage, the ability to agree on ambitious goals among powerful, but generally like-minded partners, points to an in-built weakness – and a major inroad for external criticism. While the G7 format may be effective and produce ambitious results, it is not inclusive.

However, it is difficult to remedy this situation. With the G20, there has already been an attempt to broaden regional participation and increase regional legitimacy, without compromising on effectiveness. But the performance of the G20 also clearly demonstrates the disadvantages of a more heterogeneous group of countries. Many fear that, in the future, multilateral structures in which either Russia or China is a member will become increasingly dysfunctional – they will likely experience polarization and frequent internal rifts.\footnote{123} The fact that the G20 cannot even agree on how to describe Russia’s role in Ukraine is an obvious case in point.\footnote{124} Against that backdrop, G7 leaders and their allies urgently need a strategy that allows them to address transnational threats even if great-power competition prevails.\footnote{125}

Of course, one solution is to pave the way for an institutionalized framework for cooperation among the world’s democracies – an idea that has found more support as the autocratic challenge has become more visible.\footnote{126} Asked whether democracies should build a global alliance of democracies to protect themselves against autocratic challengers, absolute majorities in all countries surveyed – from the UK (53 percent), France (53 percent), Japan (54 percent), and the US (55 percent) to Canada (55 percent), Italy (58 percent), and Germany (60 percent) – agreed.\footnote{127} Yet, as the difficulties with the guest list for the Summit for Democracy have shown, it is hard to draw the line between those who should be allowed to participate and those who should not.\footnote{128} Moreover, if institutionalized, such a global organization would potentially rival the United Nations and exclude other countries whose cooperation might be needed for issues of global concern. At the same time,
it would be so broad that it might also be difficult to come to meaningful agreements.

Even if a slightly broader format of leading democratic states was the goal, practical matters would make an expansion difficult. As the debates about the creation of a D10 or just the invitation of guests to G7 Summits have shown, it is hard for the core group to agree on who else should be included. For instance, Australia and South Korea would be obvious candidates for an expanded G7, as they would bring in additional voices from the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, ongoing tensions between Japan and South Korea mean that the inclusion of Seoul is not as straightforward as it seems. While South Korea is seen positively in all other G7 countries, it receives a negative net score in Japan (Figure 7). Other candidates, like India, come with dented democratic credentials or have lost standing among the G7 due to their neutral stance in the Russia crisis (Figures 7 and 9). An enlarged group of democracies may be more inclusive, but it would likely lose its main advantage. For the time being, the G7 format may thus remain a sensible compromise. As the past few months have shown, it has a crucial role to play.

Yet, given the obvious limits of the format, it is even more important for G7 leaders to reach out to others by opening up their framework in different ways. Obviously, the G7 should continue to invest and perhaps strengthen engagement with civil society, think tanks, or youth representatives. And they should be open to perspectives from other regions. As the example of the “Global Alliance for Food Security” demonstrates, the G7 format is flexible enough to include additional stakeholders. The alliance not only involves foreign, development, and agricultural ministers from the G7 but also ministers from African countries and representatives of relevant international organizations.129

The G7 should continue to invite guests to the leaders’ summits, still the most visible element of each presidency. Last year, India and South Africa attended the G7 Summit in Cornwall and signed an “Open Societies Statement” with the G7 that reaffirmed their “shared belief in open societies, democratic values and multilateralism as foundations for dignity, opportunity and prosperity for all and for the responsible stewardship of our planet.”130 Like Indonesia and Senegal, two of the other guests invited to Schloss Elmau this year, India and South Africa have refrained from endorsing the G7 positions regarding Ukraine and Russia and instead opted for a position of neutrality, reportedly causing Berlin to reconsider the
planned invitation. Yet, their presence should be seen as an opportunity to discuss a common approach for the upcoming G20 meeting in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{131}

In any case, the G7 must be mindful of global perceptions. If vast parts of the world concluded that the G7 members were only concerned with their own narrow interests and only cared about others when their own fate was affected, it would undermine the most positive global agenda. Moreover, by relying on overly harsh criteria for choosing partners, the G7 might not be helping their cause. As MSC Chairman Christoph Heusgen summarized the debates of the recent Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC, “transatlantic unity is key, but it is not enough”\textsuperscript{133} in the face of mounting global threats. This is evident both when it comes to effectively countering Russia’s aggression and when it comes to solving the many other global problems on the G7 agenda, among them climate change, pandemics, and food crises. Wolfgang Schmidt, the head of the Federal Chancellery, even warned of the emergence of a new division of world politics, in which the G7 and the broader West had to face a “BRICS plus,”\textsuperscript{134} potentially driving away a considerable number of states that could be partners in the defense of the basic norms of the post-World War II international order, based on the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Of course, the fact that 141 states in the General Assembly supported a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression sent a clear signal that the “court of world opinion” was on the victim’s side. The resolution, adopted at a rare emergency session and demanding “that the Russian Federation immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders,”\textsuperscript{135} was important in its own right. As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted after the vote: “As 141 member states of the United Nations know, more is at stake, even, than the conflict in Ukraine itself and the freedom and security of Ukraine and its people. This is a threat to stability in Europe, and to the entire rules-based order […].”\textsuperscript{136}

Yet only a fraction of these 141 states have materially supported the victim of the aggression, Ukraine, either by providing military aid, by accepting Ukrainian refugees, by introducing sanctions against the aggressor, or by supplying humanitarian or economic aid.\textsuperscript{137} Several countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America are reluctant to isolate Russia diplomatically, let alone sanction it. According to critics, Western leaders’ attempts to
describe the Russian aggression as an attack on the “rules-based order” have already triggered “an allergic reaction,” as many in the Global South do not believe the West is living up to these purportedly universal rules itself: “The West’s messaging on Ukraine has taken its tone-deafness to a whole new level, and it is unlikely to win over the support of countries that have often experienced the worse sides of the international order.”

Autocratic competitors are already trying to exploit anti-Western sentiments and are actively spreading disinformation. Strategic blunders such as the Iraq war continue to weigh heavy, making it easy for Putin and others to engage in “what-aboutism” and pointing to what critics call Western double-standards. Yet, the US interventions in Latin America that critics often refer to happened decades ago, and in recent history, no G7 country has attacked another country to annex its territory. As Tanisha Fazal rightly notes: “The absence of territorial aims does not make one violation of sovereignty better or worse than another, but it does represent an important difference.” Russia’s attempts to redraw the recognized borders of Ukraine clearly represent a qualitatively different threat, as it calls into question the territorial integrity of states, a core norm of the post-World War II international order.

At the G7 Summit and beyond, leaders must actively counter the impression that their agenda is selfish and myopic – that they only take action when their own interests are affected or when the victims happen to be white Christians in Europe. They need to highlight, as Annalena Baerbock has recently done, that while this war is Putin’s war, the G7 countries and their partners “have global responsibility” when it comes to mitigating its many effects. Just as they ask the wider world for “solidarity in times of aggression,” the G7, too, must be willing to listen and respond to the concerns of third countries. This includes the many countries sitting on the fence – like the five guests invited to the G7 Summit.

Moreover, if the war in Ukraine has further bifurcated countries along the lines of regime type, the G7 has to discuss the implications for global problem-solving. In fact, all the items on the agenda of the G7 Summit require buy-in from powerful authoritarian regimes rather than from democratic states alone. They demand potent multilateral structures rather than formats that are paralyzed by a democratic-autocratic rift. And they require engagement from the wider world to solve them, not a “hedging middle” that stands by idly, fearing that its actions could antagonize either

“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused a paradigm shift in geopolitics. It has strengthened the ties between the European Union and the United States, isolated Moscow, raised deep questions for China. These changes are still ongoing – but one thing is certain: they are bound to stay with us for a long, long time.”

Mario Draghi, Italian Prime Minister, Atlantic Council’s Distinguished Leadership Awards, May 11, 2022
the US and its allies or China and its peers. The G7 states, and the
democratic world more broadly, must do more to convince those sitting on
the fence to join in and actively defend the achievements of the liberal
international order. The lack of “a strategy to address transnational threats
under the conditions of great-power competition,” which Thomas Wright
already lamented in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, has only
become more obvious with the war in Ukraine. At their summit, G7 leaders
need to provide a first glimpse of what such a strategy could look like.
Key Points

1. People in G7 countries widely perceive Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a turning point in world politics. The war is a catalyst, reinforcing existing trends that cannot be ignored anymore.

2. The G7 and like-minded partners have to adapt to a more challenging security environment that is characterized both by the return of traditional security threats to the top of the agenda and by the enduring high level of risk perceptions of non-traditional security risks.

3. Russia’s full-blown aggression against Ukraine has galvanized the world’s democracies into delivering a decisive response – with strong support from public opinion in the G7 countries. The G7 and partners have implemented unprecedented measures to oppose Russian aggression and support Ukraine. They now need to muster similar unity and resolve when it comes to addressing other global risks.

4. Like-minded democracies urgently need a strategy that allows them to address global threats even if great-power competition prevails. This requires both strengthening values-based cooperation, including by swaying those who now prefer to stay neutral, and reaching out to countries that do not necessarily share liberal-democratic values.
Endnotes


4 For an overview of the debate about Russia’s motifs in the months leading up to the invasion see Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2022,” chapter on Eastern Europe.


7 One might debate whether it still makes sense to distinguish between traditional and non-traditional security issues. While the study of security initially almost exclusively focused on military issues, since the 1980s, the notion of security has been “widened” and “deepened” considerably to take into account a different set of actors and include non-military issues that have been “securitized.” For an overview see Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge [UK]/New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1017/BO978051177762.


9 In other countries, the numbers are slightly lower. In Japan, 47 percent say the world is “very unsafe,” compared to 45 percent in the UK, 44 percent in France and the US, 43 percent in Italy, and 39 percent in Canada.


14 On the erosion of Germany’s key foreign policy beliefs in recent years and the mounting pressure to adapt to a changing security environment see in
https://perma.cc/CT6W-M64B; “Trump Says He Is Inclined to Host G7 Meeting After the November 3 Election,”
*Reuter*s, August 11, 2020, https://perma.cc/3Q34-BMPT.


34 The coalition partners also pledged to “support and strengthen initiatives such as the Alliance of Democracies, and we are continuing to develop the Alliance for Multilateralism. We are also working to strengthen multilateralism through our G7 chairmanship.” See


36 Scholz, “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag, 27 February 2022 in Berlin.”


38 Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on the United Efforts of the Free World to Support the People of Ukraine.”


40 Baerbock, “Statement by Foreign Minister Baerbock Following the Meeting of the Federal Government’s Crisis Unit at the Federal Foreign Office on the Russian Attack Against Ukraine.”


43 Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on the United Efforts of the Free World to Support the People of Ukraine.”


51 Oertel, “Cold Reality.”


55 European Commission President in statement after EU-China Summit in April, see Ursula von der Leyen, “Statement by President von der Leyen at the Joint Press Conference with President Michel Following the EU-China Summit via Videoconference,” Brussels: European Commission, April 1, 2022, https://perma.cc/8NXV-RY2K; also see Jonas Parello-Plesner, “The War in Ukraine Turns the EU toward Rivalry with China,” Brussels: German Marshall Fund, April 13, 2022,

Glaser, “Chinese Support for a Russian Attack on Ukraine Cannot be Cost-Free.”


Crawford, Murphy, and Nardelli, “Alarmed by Russia’s Invasion, Europe Rethinks its China Ties.”


Christian Lindner, “Rede des Bundesministers der Finanzen, Christian Lindner, in der Sondersitzung zum Krieg gegen die Ukraine vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 27. Februar 2022 in Berlin,” Berlin: German
77 Schirwon, Kornhuber, and Vinke, “Energie- und Klimapolitik im Kontext von Russlands Krieg.”  
80 Cohen, “Climate Fears on Back Burner as Fuel Costs Soar and Russia Crisis Deepens.”  
82 Interestingly, France is also the only country where a significant part of the population, 31 percent, disagrees with the statement. In all other countries, only between 5 and 10 percent disagree.  
90 Pastukhova, “Europe’s Energy Diplomacy in Times of Crises.”  
Diplomacy in Times of Crises.”
96 Gay, “At Biden’s Summit, Other Nations Pledge Billions to Bolster Pandemic Response.”
97 Gay, “At Biden’s Summit, Other Nations Pledge Billions to Bolster Pandemic Response.”
110 “The Coming Food Catastrophe,” The Economist.
111 An estimate of The Economist underscores the dimension: “Roughly 25m tonnes of corn and wheat, equivalent to the annual consumption
of all the world’s least developed economies, is trapped in Ukraine.” See “The Coming Food Catastrophe,” The Economist.


119 Cited by Carr and Hammelehle, “Building a Transatlantic To-Do List,” 12.

120 Guterres, “Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Global Food Security Call to Action Ministerial.”


125 Wright, “The Center Cannot Hold.”


127 While a significant part of the population, a bit more than a third in most countries, is undecided, only between 6 percent (in the UK) and 10
percent (in France) oppose the idea.


129 Svenja Schulze, “Chair’s Summary – Session 5 ‘Response to Multiple Crises on the African Continent – Focusing on Food Security’,” Berlin: G7 Germany 2022, May 19, 2022, https://perma.cc/Z29B-WHLD.


131 Brozus, “G7: International Solidarity with Ukraine in Times of Aggression.”

132 Trudeau, “Prime Minister’s Remarks for the International Security Event in Berlin.”

133 Carr and Hammelehle, “Building a Transatlantic To-Do List,” 14.


137 Consequentially, the "Ukraine Support Tracker," a database compiled by researchers at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, covers just 37 countries, "specifically the EU member states, other members of the G7, as well as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, New Zealand, and Switzerland." See Kiel Institute for the World Economy, "Ukraine Support Tracker," Kiel: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, May 18, 2022, https://perma.cc/S572-AS9G.


143 Ratz and Irish, “G7 to Continue Economic Pressure on Russia, Tackle ‘Wheat war’.”
144 Beisheim et al., “The G7 and Multilateralism in Times of Aggression.”
147 Wright, “The Center Cannot Hold.”
148 Wright, “The Center Cannot Hold.”
List of Figures

Possible deviations from a total of 100 percent in visualized data result from rounding.

Munich Security Index Special G7 Edition 2022
All illustrations and data in this section are based on the survey conducted by Kekst CNC. For the detailed method underpinning the index, see pages 6–7.

1. The answer scale is reversed to account for the natural direction of time. More imminent being sooner is closer on our answer scale and less imminent being later is further away on our answer scale, but we in fact want to give a higher score to risks that are more imminent – hence we reverse.

2. The answer scale is reversed because higher answer scores for each of the five inputs should be associated with more serious risk. Without rescaling, it is exactly the reverse: high answer scores are associated with high risk preparedness and thus with less serious risk.

4 Citizens’ views on the invasion of Ukraine as a turning point for their country’s foreign and security policy, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “Do you agree or disagree with the following in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? – The invasion of Ukraine is a turning point for my country’s foreign and security policy.” Respondents were given the following options: “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses agreeing and disagreeing, with the gray area representing the rest.

5 Citizens’ views on the invasion of Ukraine as a turning point in world politics, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “Do you agree or disagree with the following in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? – This is a turning point in world politics.” Respondents were given the following options: “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses agreeing and disagreeing, with the gray area representing the rest.

6 G7 perceptions of other countries as threats or allies, change between November 2021 and May 2022
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “For each country/jurisdiction below, please say whether you
think they pose a threat or are an ally to your country or neither [0-10, where 0 is ‘threat,’ 5 is neither and 10 is ‘ally’].” Fieldwork for the previous Munich Security Index, published in the Munich Security Report 2022 and used as a reference point here, took place between November 6 and 29, 2021.

7 Citizens’ perceptions of other countries, share saying country is an ally minus share saying country is a threat, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “For each country/jurisdiction below, please say whether you think they pose a threat or are an ally to your country or neither [0-10, where 0 is ‘threat,’ 5 is neither and 10 is ‘ally’].” The scores run from a potential -100 (if 100 percent of a population said that x was a threat) to +100 (if 100 percent of a population said that x was an ally).

8 Citizens’ preferences for their country’s response to Russia, share saying that their country should oppose Russia minus share saying that their country should cooperate with Russia, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “What do you think your country should do in response to Russia as a military and economic power?” Respondents were given the following options: “fully cooperate with Russia,” “somewhat cooperate with Russia,” “stay neutral,” “somewhat oppose Russia,” “fully oppose Russia,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown are the net of the total percentage for “oppose” minus the total percentage for “cooperate.”

9 Citizens’ evaluation of the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by different countries and organizations, share saying the entity has “done well” minus share saying the entity has “done badly,” May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “Thinking about the response to Russia invading Ukraine how do you think the following countries and organizations have done in their response to Russia?” Respondents were given the following options: “very well,” “quite well,” “neither well nor badly,” “quite badly,” “very badly,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown are the net of the total percentage for “well” minus the total percentage for “badly.”

10 Citizens’ views on specific policies in support of Ukraine, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “Thinking about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, do you think your country should be doing more or less of the following than it is already doing? Respondents were given the following options: “much more,” “some more,” “neither more nor less,” “some less,” “much less,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses saying more and saying less, with the gray area representing the rest.
11 Citizens’ assessments of the link between the response to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the likelihood of China also invading a state, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC.
In answer to the question “Do you agree or disagree with the following in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? – If we do not stand up to Russia, this increases the risk that China will invade other countries some day.” Respondents were given the following options: “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses agreeing and disagreeing, with the gray area representing the rest.

12 Citizens’ wariness of China in light of Beijing’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC.
In answer to the question “Do you agree or disagree with the following in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? – China’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine has made me wary / more skeptical of China’s own ambitions.” Respondents were given the following options: “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses agreeing and disagreeing, with the gray area representing the rest.

13 Citizens’ preferences for their country’s response to the rise of China, share saying that their country should oppose China minus share saying that their country should cooperate with China, May 2022, percent
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “What do you think your country should do in response to the rise of China as a military and economic power?” Respondents were given the following options: “fully cooperate with China,” “somewhat cooperate with China,” “stay neutral,” “somewhat oppose China,” “fully oppose China,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown are the net of the total percentage for “oppose” minus the total percentage for “cooperate.”

14 Citizens’ views on the need to reduce dependence on fossil fuels from Russia, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC.
In answer to the question “Thinking about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, do you think your country should be doing more or less of the following than it is already doing? – Reducing its dependence on fossil fuels from Russia.” Respondents were given the following options: “much more,” “some more,” “neither more nor less,” “some less,” “much less,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses saying more and saying less, with the gray area representing the rest.

Citizens’ views on the need to reduce the use of fossil fuels, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC.
In answer to the question “Again thinking about the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
do you think your country should be doing more or less of the following than it is already doing? – Reducing the amount of fossil fuels we use.” Respondents were given the following options: “much more,” “some more,” “neither more nor less,” “some less,” “much less,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses saying more and saying less, with the gray area representing the rest.

15 Citizens’ views of the risk posed by the coronavirus pandemic, score

16 Citizens’ views on the need to help developing countries deal with rising food prices as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, May 2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “Thinking about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, do you think your country should be doing more or less of the following than it is already doing? – Helping developing countries around the world with the increased food prices as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.” Respondents were given the following options: “much more,” “some more,” “neither more nor less,” “some less,” “much less,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses saying more and saying less, with the gray area representing the rest.

Image Sources

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