“MSC Nightcap on National Security Strategies”

May 3, 2021 | Event Transcript

Background

On May 3, 2021, the Munich Security Conference hosted a Nightcap on national security strategies at the German Forum on Security Policy. Boris Ruge, Vice Chairman of the MSC, discussed UK and US strategy documents with Nadia Schadlow and Angus Lapsley and what Germany might learn from them. The transcript has been adapted for the purpose of clarity.

Speaker

Angus Lapsley – Director General Strategy and International, UK Ministry of Defence

Nadia Schadlow – Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; former US Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy

Moderator

Ambassador Boris Ruge – Vice Chairman, Munich Security Conference

Ruge

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, on behalf of the Munich Security Conference, welcome to this nightcap, which is part of a series of events today in Berlin organized by the Federal Academy for Security Policy. My name is Boris Ruge and I’m Vice Chairman at the Munich Security Conference. I’m delighted to welcome Nadia Schadlow and Angus Lapsley as our guests tonight. Nadia is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. She served on the US National Security Council in 2017. Angus is Director General Strategy and International at the UK Ministry of Defence. Our topic today is US and UK approaches to strategy documents and what Germany might learn from their experience. Both Nadia and Angus are uniquely placed to talk to these issues because they were both closely involved with the drafting of the US National Security Strategy in 2017 and the recently published UK Integrated Review. We have a great audience across the German government, the Bundestag, think tanks, the media, and some international guests (...)

A few quick points to frame our conversation. The closest thing Germany has to a national security strategy is our 2016 White Paper. Since the end of the Cold War, we’ve done roughly one of those per decade with a heavy emphasis on the armed forces and our Ministry of Defence leading the process.

While the 2016 White Paper is a solid document, since 2016, the strategic environment has changed dramatically and the way we understand it has also changed dramatically. Five years ago, China, great power competition, climate change, pandemics, and tech were not top of the agenda. But now they are.

So the world around us has changed, and Germany is also changing. We don’t know what the outcome of our national elections in September will be, but we know that Angela Merkel is stepping down after sixteen years as chancellor.

Last year, we at the Munich Security Conference put out a report on German foreign policy and argued that our “business model” was obsolete and in urgent need of an update. And in that
Thank you so much, Boris. It’s a pleasure to see you again, and it’s a privilege to be here on this panel with Angus.

I’ll begin with just a brief recap, a mini history, knowing that Boris is a historian. And then get into answering specifically your question.

First, the US National Security Act of 1947 actually mandated that administrations start with the National Security Strategy. President Truman issued the first one in 1955. President Nixon would issue what they called a “State of the World” every year. They’re actually quite well written.

And then fast forward to the Goldwater Nichols act in 1986. That was an act that Angus and probably others know was designed to help the Department of Defense work together more effectively by getting the services to cooperate more effectively. That was one of the rationales for it. I’m not sure whether it worked, but nonetheless, that act was key for national security strategies, too, because that Act formally required one of each administration. President Reagan issued his first in 1987 and then fast forward to 2017 when I became involved in this process.

I think formal national security strategies are important. I don’t think they’re just bureaucratic exercises. I mean, I’d like to hear what Angus has to say, given the new UK Integrated Review. And why are they important? Because they set a strategic direction for a country. The 2017 U.S.

national security strategy described the world as it is - not as we wish it to be in a straightforward way.

Second, in a democracy, they transmit the strategic direction to the citizens, to the people. That’s the primary audience, in my view, although we can discuss that because many on the call might have different views. When I was working on the document in 2017, I was often asked, well, who’s your audience, Nadia? And I said, well the American people. But others said: What about allies? What about partners? What about the bureaucracy? I think it’s the people.

Third, the process of strategy formulation itself is very important for coalition building. It is through that mechanism of strategy making that you get the coalition building. And Eisenhower has that famous quote that I always misquote, but I think some of you will know what I mean. The process is important because of the coalition building, not only just in our executive branch or the equivalent of in your countries, but also among our Congress, your parliaments. And this coalition building is very important because that in turn is linked to implementation (…). The White House has no implementation authorities, it has no money, it has no appropriations for any of those things. So in order to get anything done, we depend on our executive branch, on the agencies and departments. If they’re not involved in that coalition building of developing the strategy, it’s very hard later to get that strategy implemented – to create an implementation process, in my view.

Fourth with integrated plans which are separate from the strategy (integrated plans on various regions like the Indo-Pacific, which was declassified as the Trump administration left, or plans for functional areas) you create a connective tissue to that broader document.

So the National Security Strategy Document is an umbrella document. I don’t think it should be incredibly long. You need to balance that out because what’s equally important then are the
implementation plans and those are done by the functional or regional or country experts. So I think for all those reasons, strategy documents like this are important. Of course, it depends on the administration. It depends on a lot of other things as to whether or not they’ll actually be implemented.

But I think they’re important. I don’t think they need to be done every year. That mystifies me. If your strategy is changing every year, it’s probably flawed to start with. But perhaps every three years or you’re looking more at the implementation, it’s adapting. Strategy is not static. It’s always adapting as you all know. So I’ll leave it there. I can say more about the specific document, but I’d like to give you all a chance. Thanks.

Ruge

So Angus, what’s your take? Why go through the trouble? And what are your top three reasons for doing this?

Lapsley

First of all, thank you for having me on this evening, Boris (...) And so I would say to the top three reasons for us:

Firstly, and Nadia touched on this, it’s an opportunity to signal, it’s an opportunity to set out your broad direction, as Nadia says, partly for your own people, for parliament. But I also think internally in a big complex government systems, being able to say, look, here is the direction, here is the cap, as the French would say. I think that’s really important, actually. And so I think signaling is important, is also important to adversaries and allies. And I probably spent more time thinking about that external signaling in this review than I did on probably any other aspect of it. I think it’s also an opportunity to signal when you think something has changed and to tell a story. So, for example, we tried very hard in our integrated review to get across this point that actually we have to face up to the fact we were in a more competitive age, in a more difficult age or contested age, and that you therefore kind of had to tool up it for our age. We also wanted to kind of capture messages like actually science has become a lot more important to how you work your way through those challenges. So that’s my first point about signaling.

I think secondly, it’s about re-coalescing. It’s about dealing with the problems of centrifugal force. So anyone who’s worked in an administration, whether it’s British or German or American, knows that. You can set a direction, but then every agency, every government, department and ministry after a while will start going off in its own direction. That’s just the way bureaucracies work. People have ambitions, they have agendas. They pursue those. And every so often you need to bring them back. Every so often you need to re-coalesce and say to a big, complex system, actually, this is where we’re going collectively. And if you don’t, you just end up with your foreign ministry, defense ministry, development ministry or centre, all pursuing different agendas. So it’s a really important moment by refocusing.

And then I think the third point for me is it allows you to put decisions into a broader context. You know, especially regarding defence reviews, there’s a certain kind of commentator who just goes straight to the back and looks for the annex to see what you’re investing in and what you’re cutting. All I want to know is how many tanks, how many planes, how many ships. And you know, how many embassies, how much development spending or whatever. And those are always the difficult bits in any strategic review. So this gives you an opportunity to bring them together to put these decisions into context. You know, if you’re having more tanks or less tanks, it allows you to put that into a much broader context and explain some of the tougher decisions that you might be taking.

So I think those are my three things: one, signaling two coherence and coalescing; and three, context for the decisions that are on their own would be would be very difficult to explain.
Ruge: One follow up question for you: With the integrated review you went to a new format, so could you tell us something about that and what makes it “integrated”?

Lapsley: Yes, so we've been on a journey actually in the UK on this, so if you go back certainly 15, 20 years, we used to have a defence white paper. And normally every parliament - I mean, in our in our political cycle, each government, each parliament generally wants to do one. About 10, 15 years ago, we started moving to an integrated defence and national security strategy. And that was I think, you know, as much as anything in response to the age of terrorism and an age in which it became so obvious that what we were doing with our defence and our foreign policy was intimately linked to what we were doing domestically or our national security strategy, a kind of post-9/11 mindset. I think what we the reason we took a step further and deliberately included into this review of trade policy, development policy, international economic policy, science policy. I think it flowed from that central analysis that we were in a much more competitive world and that contest was being fought in multiple different ways. And you actually couldn’t separate out intellectually and analytically the different aspects of that competition or indeed the cooperation that you needed to then respond to it. So, yes, we've deliberately taken quite a broad brush in this. And it flowed from our analysis of the way the world is developing It’s not easy. And it was a real struggle at times to stop it becoming too big and too broad. And you don't want it to be a sort of theory of everything. But in a sense, everything that was looking onwards, everything that was international and how that related to our domestic agenda and national resilience, national strength, etc, that's the scope that we tried to get.

Ruge: I think it's a very impressive document. Nadia if we look at the 2017 US National Security Strategy, would you say that that there's a similar trend in the U.S. where this type of document becomes broader in terms of scope? If you look at the 2017 NSS there's a lot on rebuilding the American economy, making America competitive in science and technology, and so on. Is that different from previous national security strategies?

Schadlow: Yes and no, I think previous national security strategies have always addressed the economic component of security. But I think what was different about the 2017 one was, to Angus’s point, the issues were so intertwined today in such a fundamentally different way, vis-à-vis China than they were during the Soviet Union, that it really required this overarching sense that you can’t just solve the problems in one sector without looking at these other sectors. The economic competition is linked to the military competition. The technological one is linked to all of them. And all of that accelerates elements of the political competition. So they're all very intertwined.
And I think, the 2017 strategy tried to explain that. It was quite clear in saying competition is taking place. The United States needs to compete better. Allies and partners need to compete better. It really rested on four fundamental assumptions. One, that China had not abided by what we had thought it would do in 2001, that is, to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. So that was the overarching theme. A second main theme was that political liberalization had not really tempered rivalries, that we were not all converging toward democracy. - there was a lot happening in that space. Third, that globalization was not an unmitigated good. It basically said that globalization had generated unanticipated inequalities. It had created a lot of problems, for instance, as manufacturing declined in key sectors. And
fourth, to Angus’s point on technology. It discussed how the hopes of digital technologies maybe had not been realized - there had been a hopefulness during the Clinton and Bush administrations that these would be helpful for democracies. But actually, they’ve become very powerful for the surveillance state and authoritarian actors. So, all of those areas require changes and policies. Changes in trade policy, changes in military policy, changes in tech policy, thinking about things differently. So I completely agree with Angus that you have to explain all of that to say, given this now, here are some policy shifts that are required and we really need your help. Different departments, different ministries, people, private sector to get there.

Ruge

Thanks, Nadia. Let’s talk about the science and technology piece, Angus, because it’s really striking in the Integrated Review how much space that takes up and without making a judgment about our White Paper, it is much more in a kind of traditional vein with a much stronger emphasis on military power and the armed forces. Half of our white paper is devoted to the outlook for the armed forces. But if we look at the Integrated Review, science and technology is a huge piece of that. So talk to that, if you would.

Lapsley

(...I’m studying at the moment, the Atlantic Charter, which Roosevelt and Churchill signed back in 1941 because the 80th anniversary is coming up. What’s really interesting when you go back to that is that they instinctively saw that bigger, rounded picture. The Atlantic Charter is as much about economic and social regeneration and post-war as it is about geopolitical, military. And I think part of what we’re trying to do with these strategies at the moment is to get back to that bigger picture, because bureaucracies like the one I work in, in defence (...) they want to specialize. If you leave defense people to their own, they will write brilliantly, a coherent defence policy, but it will be disconnected from everything else. So there’s something here about forcing our bureaucracies to think in a holistic way. And I think what we started that process by doing quite a lot of analysis. So our intelligence community, our diplomats, our defence people and our interior people got together and did some sort of a long period of analysis. And what that showed over and over again was that advances in science and technology were driving change. They were driving change to the internal security situation, to the way in which threat evolved to the way in which you might respond to it. They were driving changes to hard defence, to how you make a military effective(...) They were also driving changes to the way in which you generate prosperity and the way trade works. And it just kind of leapt out from the page, actually, over and over again that science really mattered. Technology really mattered. And it was changing in many ways much faster than the politics and the economics. And I think we also reached the conclusion, well, actually, here was an area that Britain is good at. And, you know, we have an amazing science base in Britain. And if you are looking for a way of giving yourself a natural advantage and resilience and something that you could bring to coalitions and cooperation, actually this was something that was worth doubling down on. But it was really driven by that analysis that wherever you looked, you could see technology changing things very fast and therefore you just can’t write it out of a national security narrative.

Schadow

Could I make a point, Boris?

Ruge

Please!
Schadlow  Why I think it's so important that you addressed it that way is that it reminds us that technology is in the service of different things, of politics, of economics, of defense. It doesn't just exist as a stand-alone entity. And that's why it also creates tough choices for all of us as well. It's not about the shiny gadgets. It's all about how they're used. And I think that you did a really good job, Angus, of explaining that.

Ruge  Can I ask you Nadia on the process. Describe the process for us in the US system. Obviously, your job as a Senior Director and then Deputy National Security Adviser was to lead this from the National Security Council. How do you bring departments on board? Obviously, they have strong views, they have a certain perspective on issues. They have budgets they need to look after. They have long term projects. How do you bring that together?

Schadlow  Well, in our system, we have a process at the National Security Council, which brings together at the working level, they're called policy coordinating committees. The Biden administration has a different name from them. Every administration comes in and changes the name of them, but they are nonetheless the same. They're sort of the working level meetings on substantive issues. We structured ours as around a series of themes. Because I knew that coming in there would be some more controversial aspects that needed to be introduced to the bureaucracy. And so we structured them around some of the themes that you would later see in the document. Obviously China would be a theme, there was a series of meetings, soliciting input from others. I think it's overall very important to listen, to invite as many stakeholders as you can around the table. The more the better in a way. Running an inclusive process was important to me. But the other themes included the effects of globalization, trade policy tools, topics such as sovereignty, which again, was one that was going to make people, especially at the State Department, very nervous. So we kind of had to say, how do you think about this topic? So decide at the outset how you want to structure meetings. And we decided on key themes.

And then a second big issue was how to organize the document itself. Anyone who's a writer, whether in academia or in the policy world, you have to take a decision. You can always organize something differently that at some point you haveto make a choice. We decided to focus it on four vital American interests, not that they change over time. Every president wants to protect the homeland. Every president wants to grow the economy, to have a strong military, but use that for peaceful purposes to deter, and every president wants to advance the influence of their country. So we decided to focus it specifically on those four national interests.

The difference in any administration is the how - how you do things. That's where you're going to have the arguments and the disagreements within and between administrations. The third point was who's actually going to write it, draft it? How are you going to get the words on paper? (...) I think it was a balance between centralization and inclusivity. Many people contributed to the draft, wrote parts of it. We integrated it in my small office, gave it coherence, decided on the tone. But the information came from all of the different departments and agencies and other actors out there (...) There are different perspectives and you want to balance all those perspectives.

Ruge  As a follow-up, Nadia: The strategy was published in December of 2017. So I guess 11 months into the Trump administration, which is a fairly short time frame for this kind of exercise. Was that challenging?

Schadlow  It was challenging and I would say that it was even less than 11 months because we didn't get there until about March, April, so we really didn't start until fully in April, the deep dive and what
I just described to you. Yes, it’s challenging, but I think sometimes you can get more done with a small team than with a large sprawling team. Because you can just see the end state. You can organize yourself better. So while it was challenging, it wasn’t impossible. And it also suggests that you have to make decisions about how long you’re going to let conversations go on. Which is a challenge in any bureaucracy. How many meetings can you have on a topic before you decide that you’re going to take a decision? And so we know, we didn’t let things go on interminably. We started to draft really early on and then updated throughout and integrated throughout as needed. But we didn’t wait until the very end to draft in the last month. Of course, the last month, in any process like this, it’s more stressful and intensive. But we were drafting all along as well, filling in the structure of the document as we were having the discussions (...) 

Ruge  
Angus I’d be interested in several points. One is what drove the timing of the integrated review. Was it defining a UK position in the world after Brexit? How much time did you have for the process? And obviously you have a parliamentary system, which is a different logic to the American one. Can you tell us about that?

Lapsley  
In many ways, our process had a lot in common with what Nadia has just described. I wasn’t part of the central team. I was the lead for one of the big departments. And I totally agree with Nadia. You need that core central team who ultimately make the big decisions about how to organize things, how to write it. And look, our process overall took 16 months, but that is massively distorted by what happened with Covid, because in practice, although all the work carried on at working level, it meant that our senior ministers and the prime minister, they were not able to engage with it in the way that they wanted to. And we kept pushing it back in order to allow that senior political engagement. Because it critical that your ministers or secretaries around the National Security Council table have got to own this every bit as much as officials, more so, really. It took us a long time (...) But it did allow us to test things, though. We did quite a lot of red teaming, quite a lot of talking to academia, to think tanks and testing ideas on them. We had some quite lively debates about how to organise things and whether to organise it around themes, around geography, around departmental responsibilities. And you can sort of sense there was a bit of a compromise in the end. There are four themes. One of them more or less maps to the defence community, one of them more or less maps to the foreign policy community, and so on. I don’t know what the ideal time is. I think 16 months was too long and it’s not what we would have chosen. And I think, as you imply, ideally, you know, this government would have come in and produced this within a year or so of coming into power. And as you say, with Brexit happening at the same time, it would have been a logical time to do it. But Covid was such a huge shock to all of our governments. It did take longer.

Ruge  
So I'm not quite sure Nadia, what U.S. legislation requires on paper. I think on paper it requires one national security strategy per year, which I think no one has delivered in a in a long time. But what was interesting to see was that the Biden administration came in and within six weeks they put on the table something called “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” which I thought was very interesting A kind of “pre-NSS”, setting a general direction. I’m sure you’ve looked at it closely. What’s your take on it? Do you think this is something that will take hold in the American system?

Schadlow  
Well, first, I thought it was very interesting bureaucratically and quite smart, actually. Because it provides the administration with the ability to see where the critics will be and where the positive
views will be. So I thought that was smart. It allows you to probe to see where your strengths and weaknesses and vulnerabilities are, and then go back. I think also it’s a more - I don’t mean this in a judgmental way - a more bureaucratic organization and that it’s fully staffed in many areas. And so I think it’s going to be a harder process of bringing people together. And this is one way to help move that along process-wise in terms of substance. Would you like me to talk about that a little bit or about the similarities and differences?

Ruge

I think it’s successful from an alliance point of view. You have a new administration coming in and within a very short period of time, it’s not just speeches by the President and the Secretary of State (we had a very important speech by President Biden at the special edition of the Munich Security Conference in mid-February). But you have a 20 page paper on the table that sets out in a somewhat different way what the priorities are, what the philosophy is (...) To me, it was well-written and it was interesting as an exercise leading up to a national security strategy, which the administration, I imagine, will produce before the end of the year. But I’d be interested in your take.

Schadlow

So I think there are some areas of similarity, which I think are interesting in and of itself, because people often like to point out the dramatic differences. First, both documents discuss China in the same way in very strong language. And in fact, if you put both down and ask someone to choose, which is which, they wouldn't be able to. Second on trade. Both documents talk about trade in very much the same way, standing up for American workers, small and medium-sized businesses, making sure the rules of the international economy are not tilted against the United States. This is language that could have been written by President Trump’s speechwriters. Confronting unfair and illegal trade practices. So I think the trade area is also and that link to that, the domestic economic developments and international ones, both making the case that this unlevel playing field, the problems of globalization, had created disproportionate effects on many American workers. It’s also interesting that the Biden interim strategy does not even mention the word globalization. It’s pretty interesting if you compare that to previous NSS’s.

I don’t have to go through everything, but of course there are differences as well. Some of the ones that I saw are obviously much more of an emphasis on multilateral institutions. So that’s there throughout using words like collective action. That’s not in the Trump document. There’s also a tendency to mention transnational threats but to avoid ascribing key threats to actors. That’s a problem that I’ve observed even as an academic or policy wonk before getting into government. There’s virtually no threat out there that is not driven by an actor. Actors drive threats. And so talking about things in the passive (...) means that you’re not giving agency to who’s driving them. And that makes it harder to identify what you have to do about them, what actors you have to look at with cyber threats for example. These are state-based threats. They don’t just happen. So not ascribing them to the realm of great power competition, I think, is a mistake.

Second, this is an area which, again, will be a little bit more controversial. But in the spirit of discussing things, I completely agree with the Biden document’s discussion of how it’s key that democracies need to work and show that they can work effectively; it’s part of this long term competition. But the default then, in the interim document, is to work with highly bureaucratized institutions that don’t actually produce results for people. That’s going to create a disconnect. And so they’re going to have to reconcile that disconnect.

Third, cooperation with China will be harder than the Biden administration thinks. The climate discussion has been taken out of the competitive realm. In my view, it is in the competitive realm.
Again, this will be controversial, but China will not compartmentalize climate. It’s a part of the broader competition and play. And I think that that will be an issue to watch as well. And fourth, not completely, but there’s a sort of a de-linking of military power from the other elements of power. I mean, there’s an explicit discussion of diplomacy, elevating diplomacy as our tool of first resort. That was the phrase. Of course, everyone wants diplomacy first. No one wants war. But to me, it suggests a de-linking. All three - economic, military and political power - work together best when they’re intertwined. And so I think there’s less emphasis on that aspect. And so those are some of the differences. There’s also specific differences on nuclear modernization, arms control, other areas.

Ruge

Super, thanks. We have we have some excellent questions in the chat. I'll read one, which is from Dan Fried, excellent colleague, 40 years at the US State Department. And he says, “I think Angus’s recalling of the Atlantic Charter is spot on. FDR, and perhaps more reluctantly Churchill, understood that security depended on a sustainable economic and social as well as military security foundation.”

And I think that this is a key point. But I think in the case of many strategy documents across NATO in the past, you would have had more of a focus on military power, certainly in the Cold War. That was sort of the chief area of competition with the Soviet Union. And what is really striking is how broad these documents are that both of you have been involved in. If I can ask you, Angus, climate is an important element of your Integrated Review. So how does one approach climate as a security challenge? And this sort of gets us into the area of implementation as well. So once you’ve written an integrated review or a national security strategy, how do you go on to spell out the detail? On climate, will there be a document from the British government articulating how it wants to tackle the climate crisis in its various aspects?

Lapsley

Just to pick up on that point on that Nadia made about the relative balance of, say, diplomacy and defence. I think it’s worth noting that every country has these reviews against the backdrop of a slightly different context and in America defense spending has been very strong now for a couple of years. It didn’t dip that much after 2010 and the financial crisis, whereas Britain, like most other European countries, let defense spending drop quite considerably in that period. And therefore, for us, one of the imperatives in this Integrated Review was to get defence spending back into a place where we were credible and could do what we felt we needed to do. And it doesn’t mean that there’s a perfect balance between defence and diplomacy that we’ve all got to get to. It just means we were in a different place. And when Germany does its review, no doubt you’ll be in a in a different place, too.

On climate: I’m not a climate policy expert, but I certainly feel that my government at the moment feels that there is still potential for cooperation on climate internationally, with COP 26 this year. And I don’t think we for a moment underestimate how difficult that is going to be. But we feel that even with China, this is one of those areas where there is potential for cooperation. It will not be disentangled from the broader geopolitical cooperation, I think, which is maybe the point that Nadia is making. But we certainly feel climate is an area where cooperation is still possible.

But you’re right, there are security implications to it as well, where climate change is likely to drive environmental degradation and that will cause tensions over land or water. It’s changing the way our militaries operate. And indeed, we now have a climate team established within the Ministry of Defence and are appointing a director for climate change in the next couple of weeks. Because we recognise that for defence it’s become a strategic issue.
So what I am saying is both approaches are possible. You can still see climate as essentially a moral issue, an environmental issue, an economic issue, whilst also recognising that it increasingly has security components. But I think the reason it’s so prominent in our integrated review is that for a country like Britain, which like Germany and America, regards itself as a kind of burden-sharing nation, willing to take on some of the kind of global leadership role, it’s almost unimaginable you wouldn’t try and lead on climate at the moment because it’s such an important challenge to the world as a whole.

Ruge

Thanks, Angus. One question, Nadia, that comes up quite a lot in the German debate is about how does the German perspective relate to what we do at the level of NATO or the European Union. And specifically, a question that is asked is why should we produce a German national security strategy if we have these strategy documents at the EU level, aren’t we duplicating? How would you respond to that?

Schadlow

Germany as a country makes contributions to those entities. So Germany is a sovereign state which provides financial and military and other support to these multilateral institutions such as NATO and the EU. And to do that, you’re asking German citizens to de facto make those contributions or understand why Germany, why the German government is making those contributions.

I think it’s important for the citizens of a country to understand where their money is going, what their policymakers are thinking, and why. So I think it’s actually quite important to do that. And then we’ll have to reconcile whether or not those institutions come up with documents that are that are disconnected from the German document. But I certainly think it makes sense.

Ruge

Angus, anything you’d like to add to that point? And by the way, it was Tyson Barker who is with the German Council on Foreign Relations, who was asking about that connection.

Lapsley

Germany is hugely important to European security and in many ways, you’re the pivot power in European security, because of your geography and your weight and importance as a country. You’re both a really key, important member of NATO and you’re also part of the European Union and the European Union’s defense role. I think the balance you strike between those is critical for Europe. To some extent, Britain will always pull at one end of the rope and France will always pull at the other end of the rope. But NATO doesn’t work without Germany being the full and active participant that it is.

And, you know, when your new government is formed later this year, we obviously hope that’s one of the things that you’re going to commit to very strongly (...) Explaining to the German public why those contributions are important and why they matter is hugely important. And I think allies like Britain and France and America are very willing to work with you to help explain

Ruge

Rainer Meyer zum Felde, General retired, asks us: In case of a coalition government, what would you do to forge a sustained consensus (...) on appropriate long term resource allocations that, in essence, is the problem in Germany?

What is interesting about the Integrated Review, Angus, is that you have a list of spending indications on where the government is going to put its resources. I think that’s quite remarkable. Can you talk to that?
Lapsley

I asked some of the people involved in the review in the center earlier today what they thought really mattered, and they had a number of points that we've touched on today. One was about having somebody in the center who was organizing things bureaucratically, but also somebody who really understood what was in the mind of the Prime Minister or in your case, the Chancellor. For us, it was it was an historian, John Bew (...) and he really understood where Boris Johnson was coming from and helped shape things as a result.

But the other thing I think we felt was critical was there had to be a connection between the direction we were setting in, the priorities we were setting. And the money can work where you are actually going to allocate resources within government. Now, the enormous economic shock of covid meant that the in the end, we were not able to align the integrated review with a comprehensive spending review, which is an internal budgetary process. We go through every four to five years normally, and which sets overall spending direction. And so that didn’t quite happen. But what we did was we brought forward some key spending decisions that we knew would be critical to the credibility of the integrated review. So the almost 10 percent increase in the defence budget the biggest of those. But there were also, as you say, commitments on spending, on science and cyber, resilience, and things like that. So a little bit of a compromise in the end. Ideally, we would have had this coming out at the same time as a comprehensive spending review and that the whole picture would have been out there and it didn’t quite work like that. But we were able to bring out the essentials.

The third thing you really need is a structure that allows you to drive at implementing this and making sure that you do actually do the things and spend the money in the way that was intended, and you know we have a National Security Council in Britain. In some ways, it’s modelled on the American system. That's always slightly different. But having that structure that was responsible for running this review in the first place and will now be responsible for implementing it, I think is absolutely critical.

Ruge

So there's some commentary in the chat about the absence of an NSC-type structure in the German system. And, of course, that's a subject of debate as well.

Gerrit Kurz, who is also with the German Council on Foreign Relations, has a question that I'll ask you to comment on, Nadia What is the impact of a national security strategy/integrated review on the bureaucracy exactly? Can you give an example of how it influences day to day decisions at the working level? Which ties into implementation, which Angus just touched on.

Schadlow

I think it depends on the on the department. So in the US system, the bureaucracy had been working toward, but immediately became even more energized toward ensuring that legislation that related to foreign ownership of strategic assets than the United States was strengthened. This was called CFIUS ((Committee on Foreign Investments in the US)) or FIRMA ((Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act)), I'll throw out these acronyms(...) In our case, the bureaucracy also began to look around the country and identify Confucius Institutes that the State Department believed were part of China's ideological, political campaign against the United States and began to shut them down, and created different designations for them. The government also began to use sanctions in different ways or so. I mean, lots of bureaucratic things were happening. The Department of Justice increased its investigations of individuals that they felt were here for the theft of intellectual property. So I think there were lots of specific measures that resulted from the new strategy. There was an organization called OHC that went away and became Development Finance Corporation. Now, that was also Congress supporting it, but there were a lot of bureaucratic
activities associated with that, too. So I think there were many things that were implemented and that the Biden administration will continue to implement, and continue to strengthen, and then do other things as well. But the point of that question is that you do need people at the National Security Council level to be able to understand what’s happening at the agency level, to have some form of reporting on implementation.

Ruge

And before we let you go Nadia, obviously in the U.S. system, you have a whole a whole series of strategy documents that relate to the national security strategy, right? Things such as the Nuclear Posture Review and other documents always relate to the National Security Strategy.

Schadlow

So in 2017, it was clear that we wanted the National Security Strategy to come out first as the umbrella document, the National Defense Strategy followed shortly after in January of 2018. Of course, the entire time our team was talking very closely and often to the DOD team so there wouldn’t be disconnect. So the language and the approach is very much the same. But naturally, those sub-strategy documents are going to focus on their problems at their functional area, their department. So those are helpful in also getting DOD ((Department of Defense)) to really focus on what it needs to do to fulfill the part of the NSS. The State Department, I don’t think has something similar (...) Secretary Mattis wanted to be sure that the NSC document came out first, DOD second, and that was important because DOD had a lot more people working on it. So if they wanted to beat me to the punch, they could have.

Ruge

Nadia, thanks a lot for joining us. We’ll let you go.

Schadlow

Alright! Thank you so much. It was wonderful to see everyone.

Ruge

Angus, one question here from Sergey Alpin: What’s the place of advanced technology in European security? Do we need to pay more attention to this? (...) So I imagine the departments in charge of those issues played quite an important role in putting together the document.

Lapsley

They did (...) This is probably true for Germany and America, too: What do we spend most science money on as a government? It’s a combination of health and defense. Those tend to be the kind of big science budgets. But if you look at the economy as a whole, there’s a much more diversified picture, so we needed of bring that together in one place and map out a strategy for science and technology in the UK, which is partly about what we do in defence, for example, where we know we have a number of challenges around things like directed energy weapons, hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, space, and cyber, five big areas where technology is changing very fast. Sometimes just for the better. For example, you can do so much more in space now with much smaller satellites for much less money than you could 10 years ago. Sometimes in rather more disturbing ways. So for defence, it’s a fairly kind of clear agenda that we have to to pick up. But I think the interesting thing we tried to get at it in the Integrated Review was what could government do to encourage a broader ecosystem of science in the UK? So we don’t just look at government spending. We look at, for example, how do you attract people to come and work in the UK on science. And how do you make sure that the bright ideas that are happening in universities and in research institutes, they actually get pulled through into either the economy or into health or into defence. So we’ve looked at quite a few of those areas. One of the novelties of this integrated review was that sometimes the people in the room were boring old “secureaucrats” like me, but actually a lot of the time the people in the room were quite funky scientists who were
probably not used to being part of an integrated review before. And I think that was one of the quite exciting parts of this review. Actually, the very last chapter of our review looks at implementation. And one of things it brings out is that we actually need a slightly different cast of people and skills to implement this. So we need more diverse national security personnel, if you like, and diverse in different ways, different skills, but also people who represent modern Britain in a better way. So that development of a more diverse national security community, if you like, is one of the things that we’re now looking at quite hard.

Ruge

Nadia talked about the need to engage public opinion and to make the case for national security policy. Tell us about what did the government do in terms of going to the parliament, going to broader public opinion and explaining this?

Lapsley

Some parts of this just happened naturally, you know. There are certain rituals in in British democracy, like the prime minister making a statement to parliament and foreign secretary and the defence secretary and other senior ministers doing likewise. So to some extent, that happens organically. But there was also a pretty massive communications effort around the Integrated Review. In defence, for example, we spend quite a lot of time trying to bring to life for people, how defence was changing, for example, what will cyber look like, and how that might work, and why the balance of the army was changing, for example, and what that might look like, what new technology being used in the military sphere might look like. And then we also spent quite a lot of time engaging what you might call the commentariat, engaging think tanks and others trying to explain to them where we were coming from and why. And, you know, I wouldn’t claim that we had huge resonance with the British public, especially in the middle of a pandemic where they have other things on their mind. But I think we have got across more broadly what we’re trying to do, certainly to the media and to parliament. Not everybody’s liked it, but lots of people have welcomed it.

Ruge

Many thanks, Angus, it was a real pleasure having you on this evening. The traditional attitude in Germany might be summarized as something like “No strategy please, we’re German”. But perhaps we’re evolving as we move along. We have an opportunity after the upcoming election to review some of these things. My hope is certainly that we would move away from an approach that is overly focused on military power and that we go to something that is more in line with what you’ve been doing or what the Americans have been doing. And that takes a broader look at a national strategy, the challenges, the instruments at our disposal. And I think this has been a very, very helpful, very interesting conversation. We’re grateful for your time. Many thanks to the audience as well.