"What Germany's New Foreign Policy Must Look Like" – Op-ed from Christoph Heusgen for Der Spiegel

Putin's invasion of Ukraine marks a turning point. A turning point for Russia, which will not be able to return to the community of civilized nations until the end of Putin’s dictatorship. For NATO, whose primary task of territorial defense, neglected since 1989, has found renewed relevance. And a turning point for Germany — at least it should be.

The Federal Republic is about to be reset for the third time. The first reset began in 1949: establishment of democracy, economic upswing, and integration into the Western alliances. In 1989, Germany’s reunification rang in the second phase. Germany’s influence grew, but it was satisfied with a relatively passive role in foreign policy, even though it benefited from globalization more than almost any other country. Russia supplied cheap energy resources, Western economies imported our products, and China became first our “work bench” and then a huge market. “Wandel durch Handel” (“change through trade”) continued to be our motto, and we became the second-largest donor country to the United Nations. However, regarding foreign policy challenges, the first question was always, “What are the others doing?” If possible, let’s not mess with anyone, we said, not with the US, nor with Russia or China. The sudden end of this political mindset in the face of Putin’s breach of civilization marks the beginning of the third phase.

At the Munich Security Conference 2014, former German President Joachim Gauck already urged that Germany must assume greater responsibility on the global stage. Now, Putin’s aggression in Ukraine leaves no room for hesitation. The international landscape has already changed, not only in Eastern Europe. We must also keep our eyes on China, the United States, Africa, and Latin America.

At the onset of the Russian invasion, many had hoped – in vain – for China to distance itself from President Putin. China needs Russia as a supplier for raw materials and as a like-minded undemocratic and illiberal partner. Its support now is meant to secure Russian allegiance later on – perhaps when China makes a move for Taiwan. Like Putin in Russia, Xi Jinping runs a totalitarian state apparatus. But unlike in Russia, a significant decline in economic prosperity would cause an uproar in China’s middle class. Eager to replace the United States as the global leader, Beijing needs Germany for its economic ambitions. That is one asset Germany could build on.

Economic ties with China run deep. Even if the pandemic has taught us that Europe may have become too reliant on others, it will be impossible to untangle these webs in the foreseeable future. China is a strategic competitor — but its interests differ from Russia’s.

The United States assumed its traditional role in the Ukraine war. President Biden, who had hoped he could focus on domestic issues as well as the systemic competition with China, had to return to Europe to take the lead in the fight against a revisionist, aggressive Russia. Without American weapons, Ukraine would be a lost cause. Although transatlantic unity has never been more visible than at the Munich Security Conference in February, the US, in the long run, will prioritize domestic challenges and the Pacific region in the future.

This is the world we’re looking at. Germany has a choice to make: it can passively resign itself to the fate of a regional power dependent on external developments – or it can shape these developments actively. As the fourth-strongest economic power globally, Germany has the means, and its global standing would allow it to. In fact, our history and our geographical position even obligate us to do so. However, nothing will happen by itself. Taking responsibility cannot mean always doing the absolute minimum at the very last minute. It means defining one’s interests — and asserting them.

As German Ambassador to the United Nations and, for a time, Chairman of the UN Security Council, I heard one sentence repeatedly: please take the lead! An ambassador of an influential Asian country asked for greater German involvement against the mounting pressure from China. An African ambassador said, “Help us get the 1,000-pound gorilla off our backs!”

Money is not the issue; we need the political will to lead. There have been a few first steps, such as the 2014 establishment of the Normandy format during the first Russian war against Ukraine, the Berlin Process to improve ties between the Balkan states and Europe, and the Berlin Conference on stabilization in Libya. Yet today, we find ourselves chasing events. Since German Chancellor Scholz proclaimed a Zeitenwende in his remarkable speech in the Bundestag, little has followed.

The guiding principle of our foreign policy must be what has given Germany and Europe their longest periods of peace: the rule of law. Just like the “Grundgesetz” in Germany and the EU treaties in Europe are the basis of all action and just like the Federal Constitutional Court or the European Court of Justice are the highest judiciary bodies, the order of international law based on the UN Charter must also be the basis of our global efforts.

To enforce this, we should massively increase our staff at German missions outside the European Union. Chinese embassies usually have multiple times the staff we do. As ambassador to the United Nations, I experienced how tough the fight for votes is. We are one of the largest donors, but we fail to use our money strategically.

The separation of the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation is no longer appropriate. If we do not pool our resources, we will not be able to prevent more and more developing countries from falling under the influence of China.

This concerns not just Africa. The donor conference for the Republic of Moldova organized by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock was an excellent initiative that put “taking responsibility” into practice. Moldova currently needs budget support to cushion the impact of the Russian war; Europe’s poorest country cannot shoulder the burden of hundreds of thousands of refugees and rising energy prices alone. Moldova has been see-sawing between pro-Russian and pro-European governments for years. The conference results were sobering: limited budget support stood against hundreds of millions in low-interest loans from the Ministry for Economic Cooperation. What sounds good at first glance does not help the country in the short term and may compromise its debt sustainability and thus its ability to take out IMF loans. A joint policy could have made a decisive difference here. Russia has already indirectly announced the “annexation” of part of Moldova, namely Transnistria. If that does not set of the alarms, then what will?

The German government urgently needs to establish a “National Security Council.” Such a council would bring together the issues relevant to our security: foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, supply, critical infrastructure protection, and dealing with cyber-attacks. So far, the fear of losing competencies and the traditional deference in German government to ministers’ responsibility in their respective policy fields have prevented the establishment of such a body for decades. Almost all our major partners have one. If not now, while the Russian war requires all these issues to be considered in context, then when?

We will be able to address the China challenge only if we team up with partners. We should focus on countries that share our approach, countries that try to uphold the rule of law and hold regular elections. These countries should receive budget support and support in strengthening state institutions, fighting corruption, financing infrastructure projects, creating jobs, and enabling organized immigration.

If faced with strong opposition, it is not impossible that China will conform. Partnerships and joint projects would be conceivable. However, this will only work if China comes under massive pressure. One example: in the context of the Winter Olympics, the China was criticized all around the globe for its Uyghur policies. At a recent meeting, the president of the World Uyghur Congress, Dolkun Isa, told me that this pressure had brought about some results. For example, he said, the number of checkpoints in the Xinjiang province had been massively reduced, and the Uyghurs could move around more freely. That does not change the fact of their fundamental discrimination. But it shows: sticking to principles, cohesion, and pressure on our part are paying off.

We should also try to convince the Americans of the advantages of a rules-based international order. They may be among the founders of the United Nations, but the historic principle of “American exceptionalism” still shapes US foreign policy. We should still not give up on persuading them to commit more strongly to international law. It would strengthen, not weaken, their claim to global leadership. This way, we might steer them away from their polarizing focus on China and “decoupling,” a policy that is also being pursued on the Chinese side. Americans respect determination. If we fail to convey ours, the good talk will be of no use.

The German government should also urgently organize a Balkans conference. The Balkans have been ravaged by civil war once before in the 1990s, and cracks in their security architecture are resurfacing once again. In addition, the Central Asian states and Mongolia, the ASEAN alliance, and many Latin American countries also wish for a partner who can help them free themselves from the grip of Russia and China.

NATO and the European Union remain our natural allies. The EU is the incarnation of the principle of the strength of law, the antidote to the law of the strongest. Within the framework of the EU, we should help ensure that all states who are committed to the rules-based order receive the support they need.

The world is changing at great speed. It is not enough to stand by, hoping that the storm will pass. Germany must and can take responsibility. This is in Germany's immediate interest.

This article was originally published in German language in DER SPIEGEL 18/2022 as well as on spiegel.de.