Towards a Stronger Europe at a Time of Geopolitical Upheaval — Op-ed by Wolfgang Ischinger and Julia Hammelehle

This article has originally been published in the Diplomacy Journal of the Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute.

Europe was already gravely "in danger"¹ before February 24, 2022. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed in a special address to the German Bundestag on February 27 that the Russian war against Ukraine constitutes a Zeitenwende – a watershed moment – for German, European, and international security.² But as glaring as the breach of international norms and principles by Russia was, the war against Ukraine mirrors broader trends that have been visible before. Referring to the term “Zeitenwende” already in 2020, the Munich Security Conference (MSC) argued in a Special Edition of the Munich Security Report that Germany and its partner countries are confronted with the erosion of fundamental foreign policy certainties.³ We live in a "world shaped by raw power politics"⁴ – as European Union High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Josep Borrell put it – characterized by the dissolution of international norms and principles, rising geopolitical tensions, and growing illiberalism. Globally, authoritarianism is on the rise, as demonstrated by the 2022 report by Freedom House. It shows a decline in liberal democratic freedoms for the 16th year in a row.⁵ Within Europe, anti-liberal, Eurosceptic forces have gained ground, making up nearly a third of the members of the European Parliament. In its neighborhood, Europe is confronted with mounting instability and conflicts, facing a "ring of fire" to its east and south. To say nothing of the tide of global challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and technological disruptions – and the diminishing ability of democratic partners and international institutions to tackle them.

Responding to Russia's war against Ukraine, the EU mustered an unprecedented level of joint action – both in speed and scope – prompting the HR/VP to conclude that "Putin's war has given birth to geopolitical Europe."⁶ Just days after the Russian invasion, the EU took major economic, military, and humanitarian steps. Since February, it has introduced seven sanctions packages encompassing previously unthinkable measures, including blocking Russia's central bank from using its foreign reserves, excluding top Russian banks from the interbank messaging system SWIFT, and targeting Kremlinlinked individuals and companies. For the first time, the EU has agreed to facilitate the supply of military equipment, including lethal material, providing €1.5 billion to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces.⁷ In total, the EU has mobilized around €4.1 billion for Ukraine, including over €240 million in humanitarian aid.⁸ Moreover, it has — also for the first time — activated the Temporary Protection Directive, which grants millions of Ukrainian refugees temporary protection in the EU and rights including access to employment, social welfare, medical care, and education.

However, the Russian aggression has also showed the limits and constraints of the European response. First, it has exposed the great reliance on the US when it comes to European security and defense. Stressing the need to "defend each and every inch"⁹ of the alliance, the Biden administration showed extraordinary commitment to transatlantic coordination and staunch support for Ukraine and NATO. The $40 billion military and economic aid package of May 19, which dwarfs the aid from any European country, passed by a clear bipartisan majority. But US willingness and ability to contribute the lion’s share of aid for Ukraine may run out at some point.

Second, the Russian aggression has also demonstrated profound weak spots in other areas, most notably energy security, corruption, and the information space. These vulnerabilities have hampered the EU's response, in particular its sanctions policy, leading to the third point: crumbling EU unity.

Russia's indiscriminate attacks and increasingly evident war crimes raise the pressure on the EU to expand its sanctions package to include energy imports from Russia. But so far, the EU has been unable to implement an oil embargo. Hungary continues to block the Commission's proposal. As the ripple effects of sanctions are increasingly felt by European citizens, including in the form of soaring energy prices, concerns about possible shifts in public opinion, opposing further measures, are rising. Stepping up EU action might therefore become even harder to realize in the coming weeks and months.

As the war in Ukraine rages on, it will be key to maintain unity. Yet, in light of the tide of international challenges, unity of purpose and speed of action must endure beyond the current crisis situation. To stay a "power among powers,"¹⁰ as Chancellor Olaf Scholz put it at the Munich Security Conference in February, EU member states need to close ranks and further strengthen the international role of the EU. This requires reforms at the level of common strategic understanding, institutions and processes, and capabilities.¹¹

The very basis for joint EU action is a shared understanding of the geopolitical challenges Europe is facing and, based on that, the instruments to prepare for and respond to them. The EU's Strategic Compass, which builds on a comprehensive joint threat assessment and intense structured dialogues between EU member states, EU institutions, and experts, is a good starting point. There is criticism from some sides that the Compass is already obsolete since it has "simply been overtaken by events."¹² This goes too far, but the changes to the initial draft following the Russian invasion certainly are not sufficient to reflect the major strategic challenges resulting from the prospect of a protracted war in Ukraine and the reality of a deeply hostile Russian neighbor for years to come. It is positive that the Compass envisages regular reviews of the Joint Threat Analysis, the first to be conducted by the end of this year, and after that "at least every 3 years or sooner." However, these reviews must then lead to an adaptation of the Compass itself. To foster the common understanding of the EU's strategic challenges and set forward-looking priorities, a regular strategic review process on the premises and implementation of the Compass, including the way it is embedded in the broader EU foreign policy, is needed. One way to ensure such a review process would be an annual meeting of the European Council dedicated to security.

In order to enhance the legitimacy of the EU's foreign and security policy, EU citizens should be represented in the process through the European Parliament and national parliaments. These should be included early and throughout the process. To foster an EU-wide debate, the review reports by the HR/VP should be debated in both the European and the national parliaments.

Building on the Compass, the European Council should adopt issue- or regionspecific strategies to further operationalize and specify the strategic reviews. First, this would help unify positions of EU member states in key areas, such as the relationship with China. Second, it could also facilitate the practice of qualified majority voting (QMV) in foreign and security policy — which leads to the second area of reform: institutions and processes.

As the EU requires unanimous votes on foreign and security policy decisions, it needs the support of the EU27 to act on the international scene. The prompt response of the EU to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a positive outlier in a history of belated, tedious decision-making in numerous instances before, for example in the case of sanctions on Belarus after the crackdown on protesters in summer 2020. The unanimity rule not only delays decisions and waters down proposals, it also provides an avenue for third countries to exploit specific member states to undermine EU action. This is also currently illustrated by the EU, so far, failing to get Hungarian support for a ban on Russian oil.

Calls to abandon unanimity — including from the German government — have been numerous. Yet, it often remains unclear how this could be achieved. As the path towards treaty changes codifying qualified majority voting in common foreign and security policy will be long, the focus should be on making stronger use of the existing options in the EU Treaties. This includes the gradual expansion of QMV to sub-areas (passerelle clause) or the use of QMV in predefined cases, namely the implementation of unanimous decisions by the European Council or Council of Ministers (enabling clause). Moreover, rather than blocking decisions altogether, member states should give up their veto voluntarily (constructive abstention). For instance, Austria, Ireland, and Malta recently did so to allow for the financing of lethal weapons for Ukraine through the EU.

Expanding the use of majority voting will facilitate joint EU action, but initiatives by sub-groups of member states will remain important. Given the member states' individual bilateral relationships with third countries, their competency and bonds can provide an added value to Europe's foreign policy capacities and diplomatic initiatives. However, to improve the legitimacy of such bilateral or "minilateral" initiatives, member states should include the HR/VP or other high-level EU representatives and should engage in close consultations with other EU member states throughout the process.

The position of the EU's Ambassadors would also benefit if the EU and member states would better match their foreign policy resources. Member states should include EU Ambassadors in their meetings with foreign governments to make better use of their knowledge and expertise and demonstrate EU foreign policy coordination abroad

All efforts to promote a common strategic understanding and enhance institutional processes will miss the mark if they are not backed up by stronger foreign and security capabilities. To address today’s highly complex international challenges and build "une Europe qui protège,"¹⁴ a broad toolbox of civilian and military instruments will be needed — as well as the ability to combine them effectively.

One component of the EU's international strength is undoubtedly its economic weight. Recent steps by the EU to make greater use of its economic power are promising, most notably the EU's Global Gateway Initiative and the Anti-Coercion Instrument. While moving ahead in the economic field, in defense the EU continues to lag behind its ambitions. With much ink spilled on concepts like "strategic autonomy" or "sovereignty" and calls for a "European Army" highly present in the public discussion, European defense is nowhere near that. The idea of a European Defense Union, deepening military cooperation, jointly investing in defense, and pooling and sharing capabilities, is not new. Since 2016, a number of initiatives have been launched, including PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defense) and the EDF (European Defense Fund). However, so far, the results have been weak, with little headway made towards deeper integration and stronger military capabilities. In contrast to the stated objectives, the share of joint defense procurement and collaborative investment in research and technology have even dwindled in the past years.¹⁵ As defense budgets are now set to rise considerably, this trend of uncoordinated spending must be reversed. The instruments to better align defense spending and facilitate cooperation are already there – and have been further strengthened by measures proposed by the Strategic Compass. They must now be used by the EU member states.

As NATO remains the foundation for collective defense, deepening EU security and defense capabilities must always gear towards coherence, complementarity, and interoperability with NATO. The parallel strategic reviews of NATO and the EU should be used to further operationalize EU-NATO cooperation and specify how to design future-proof transatlantic burden-sharing — both in terms of regional and functional responsibilities. Clearer than any US administration before, the Biden administration has highlighted its support of the EU's objective to build up stronger military capabilities.¹⁶ It is now time for Europe to move ahead.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU demonstrated an unprecedented level of joint action and resolve. It is now up to the EU member states to build on this momentum to pursue and further advance the objectives introduced with the Strategic Compass. As one of Europe's most powerful countries and economic heavyweights, this effort must be led and enabled by strong German action. The platform of a "European foreign policy" that the German government ran on must be translated into action. The re-election of Emmanuel Macron provides the necessary condition to revive the French-German engine that has for too long been sputtering and move the EU forward. The words of the former Belgian foreign minister and staunch supporter of EU integration, Paul-Henri Spaak, have never been more relevant than today: "In Europe there are only two types of states: small states and small states that have not yet understood that they are small." Let's hope that the current crisis is a lesson for the second type.

This article has been written by Wolfgang Ischinger, President of the Foundation Council of the Munich Security Conference Foundation, and Julia Hammelehle, Policy Advisor with the Munich Security Conference (MSC).