How Europe Omits Geopolitics: Toward a New Burden-Sharing in the European Neighborhood

America might be back – but where is Europe? In the past years, Europe was often unable, unwilling, or incoherent when it came to dealing with conflicts and challenges in its neighborhood. From the Western Sahara to Yemen, from Iraq to Eastern Ukraine, Europe’s neighbors are embroiled in turmoil. Frozen and active (internationalized) conflicts, nationwide mobilization, and democratic backsliding are markers of a region the EU once hopefully pictured as its "ring of friends."

Yet, confronted with a myriad of crises, the EU has missed a host of opportunities to show it is willing to "learn the language of power," as Europe’s chief diplomat put it. At the same time, its member states often lacked a common strategic direction. Internal splits on the Libyan civil war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or the Nord Stream 2 pipeline have undermined Europe’s ability to play a visible and credible role in its neighborhood. Military confrontations like the one in Nagorno-Karabakh highlighted once more that Moscow often calls the shots in conflict management – all while Europe is confined to a bystander role.

From today’s vantage point, Europe’s defense capabilities are insufficient to fend off major attacks, as studies suggest. Hence, Europeans are and will be dependent on the US to "lead from behind" to a considerable degree. To complicate matters further, the Covid-19 pandemic exerts extra pressure on national (and defense) budgets, causing doubts about significant leaps in the short and medium term. For instance, the EU budget earmarked for the European Defence Fund was almost halved.

Against this backdrop, the past year has been marked by buzzword battles on "strategic autonomy." Quick fixes dominate while the pursuit of long-term interests remains amiss. But without a joint strategic outlook, it will remain cumbersome for Europe to translate its different visions into political action.

Hopes for a quick change for the better are dim. Germany and France are facing elections in 2021 and 2022, respectively, Brexit continues to create uncertainties, and the post-pandemic recovery is only just beginning, as the "polypandemic" still unravels on many levels. These are ingredients for an inward-looking EU. But unlike the US or some faraway meddlers, fragility in Europe’s backyard profoundly affects its very own interests in security, sustainable development, as well as stable trade and energy flows.

While Europe is searching for its "Strategic Compass", Washington is continuing to look at its transatlantic partner for upped engagement. After four years of strained relations, newly elected President Biden underscored "the goal of a Europe whole, and free, and at peace" at the MSC Special Edition in February 2021, calling NATO’s mutual defense clause an "unshakable vow." But although a new wind is blowing from Washington, the US administration will expect Europe to take more responsibility in a new transatlantic division of labor.

American expectations toward Brussels have obvious roots. Seeking an end to "forever wars" has been the common rhetorical thread of past US administrations, Democratic and Republican alike. Meanwhile, systemic competition with Beijing has become a strategic priority. While troop withdrawals from Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan follow this logic, the US continues its security engagement through more remote forms, i.e. ramped up arms exports, drone warfare, and the support of proxy forces.

Numerous examples from the past four years have highlighted that the US is not only seeking an exit from protracted military missions, but has partially abandoned its hitherto prominent role in conflict management during the Trump presidency. Crises in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, or Libya were left without tangible diplomatic lead from Washington – and Europe was only partially able to fill the gaps. However, the first 100 days of President Biden have indicated an ostensible return of the US. Yet, Europe is expected "to take much more of the burden of [its] own protection," as French President Macron put it at the MSC Special Edition.

Europe’s inertia and the inward turn of the United States during the Trump years were not without consequences: Regional and international spoilers filled the void – with lasting consequences for Europe’s "ring of fire." External actors keep conflicts simmering by providing financial resources, military equipment, and personnel. In Libya alone, a report by the US Africa Command found, there were around "10,000 foreign mercenaries and proxy forces" in late 2020.

Russia and Turkey have left their marks on conflicts ranging from the Southern Caucasus to the Maghreb, while regional powers including but not limited to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran are shaping the dynamics in the MENA region. What is more, the global ascent of China does also not go unnoticed in Europe’s neighborhood, where Beijing has been active in areas such as infrastructure development, connectivity investments, and vaccine diplomacy.

But there is hope. For one, Europe has levers at its disposal that it can put to good use. The EU as an economic giant and prime global provider of ODA can create inroads for a more effective pursuit of its own interests. The EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement stated bluntly with regards to the southern neighbors: "We are the biggest traders and investors, but our presence and priorities are not seen, felt, observed, and delivered."

In addition, as exclusive survey data from the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) shows, European attempts to shape events in its eastern neighborhood can indeed be tangible. The imposition of sanctions on Belarusian officials following fraudulent elections has been welcomed by the majority of Belarus’s population. Although Russian influence now prevails, this shows that Europe’s determination in external action, however limited, is felt and even favored.

A Europe that is "weltpolitikfähig" – that is, capable of world politics – will need to readjust. Without finding ways to increase the cost of the veto, Europe’s disunity dilemma will continue. Finding flexible pathways towards a new mode of decision-making and collective action will be a core imperative for the future. Enhanced visibility of Europe’s engagement will be just as vital.

A transatlantic recalibration is necessary, in which the US and the EU find a "new normal" of cooperation. The partners need to brace for a security environment which is shaped by competing visions on regional and international order. Readying Europe for the challenges in its surroundings and carving out a new transatlantic division of labor are no separate endeavours, but "two sides of the same coin," as the Foreign Ministers of Germany and France wrote. Dependencies, especially in the realm of collective defense, will remain. But Washington will expect more credible European signals that the latter is able, willing, and united enough to take on more responsibility and address the most pressing security challenges in its vicinity.

Ultimately, while the American fixation on Asia has become a common theme in academia and policy cycles, the EU’s neighborhood will remain significant for the US. Not least because of Russia’s assertive foreign policy in and China’s pivots to Eastern Europe and the MENA region, the region will remain an important arena for Washington’s interests. Strategic competition is not limited to the Indo-Pacific. It happens right on the EU’s doorstep.

Luca Miehe is a Researcher with the Munich Security Conference (MSC). Before joining the MSC, he was Research Assistant in the Middle East and Africa Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. He studied Political Science in Berlin and Cairo. During his studies, he gained work experience in, amongst others, the German Bundestag, the Federal Foreign Office, and the International Organization for Migration. Added to recent MSC releases, his latest publications cover Algeria, Egypt, and the conflict in the Nile basin.