"Germany, France, and nuclear deterrence" — Op-ed by Wolfgang Ischinger for Welt am Sonntag

This opinion piece, written by Wolfgang Ischinger, was initially published in German in the Welt am Sonntag. 

Autumn 1972, shortly after the signing of Salt 1, the first US-Soviet arms control agreement on nuclear weapons: in the strategy seminar at Harvard University, we discuss terms such as “counter-force” or CEP - “circular error probable”. This refers to the probability that a nuclear warhead will miss its target by no more than, say, 500 meters after a ballistic flight of thousands of kilometers. The lower the CEP, the more credible a deterrence would be, which would not reduce entire cities to ashes and rubble, as it did Hiroshima, but could precisely destroy enemy military targets — in other words, “counter force”.

At universities in non-nuclear Germany, such topics were largely taboo for a long time. Perhaps this is one reason why we are having such a hard time in the debate that has now been initiated regarding French President Macron's offer to extend the French nuclear umbrella to European partners. There is still a widespread lack of basic understanding for the very complex interrelationships.

In that respect, let me make the following points:

1. The option of a “German nuclear weapon”

This option does not exist, and we should bury the discussion about it before it spreads and stirs up completely unnecessary fears in other countries. Germany has twice renounced nuclear weapons under international law, in 1975 in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and again in 1990 in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty. The number of states with nuclear weapons has only increased marginally in these five decades — only India, Pakistan, and North Korea have joined, apart from Israel. Even more importantly: NATO itself has proven to be an extremely successful instrument of non-proliferation policy. Why do you think that Turkey, for example, has been able to refrain from developing its own nuclear weapons to date? Because it had the option of invoking Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Today, Poland and the Baltic states feel particularly threatened. However, nothing would be more damaging to the global non-proliferation regime than a breakout of European NATO members. This would encourage Tehran, Saudi Arabia, and others. The world would become even more dangerous than it already is, and we would have to assume a considerable degree of responsibility for it. For this reason alone, everything should be done on both sides of the Atlantic to avoid further undermining the credibility of Article 5.

2. Regarding the role of France

More than 50 years ago, in the 1974 Ottawa Declaration, NATO emphasized the contribution of France and Great Britain to the Alliance's common deterrence. Today, 50 years later, it would be entirely appropriate to further strengthen the European components of the deterrence alliance — not as a replacement, but as a supplement to the existing NATO mechanism. Macron has repeatedly pointed out that the French nuclear strategy already has a European component.

Therefore, there is every reason, absolutely every reason, for Germany and other partners to take up the French offer of entering talks on future joint options. The argument that such a step would risk angering Washington is a specious one: Of course, one can explain to the American partner in advance that such considerations are intended to further strengthen European defense capabilities, as expressis verbis requested by Washington.

The second argument — Paris would not be willing to share the decision-making authority to use French nuclear potential — is just as unreasonable. For 70 years, we have unquestioningly accepted that the American president has sole decision-making authority over the use of all US nuclear weapons, including those stationed in Germany with “dual key”. Now, the American president is a 9-hour flight away from Berlin, while the French president is only 2 hours away. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a nuclear threat to its eastern neighbors would affect France's interests even more immediately than those of the United States. Furthermore, the credibility of any nuclear deterrence requires that the decision to use it remains in the hands of one person. A decision by committee would hardly be credible in a crisis.

3. Strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and their significance

First of all, deterrence as a means of preventing war only works if the opponent believes that the threat of using nuclear weapons is credible. It is therefore not only a matter of functional weapons systems, but also of perceptions. The French nuclear doctrine therefore relies on “strategic ambiguity”: keeping the opponent in the dark about whether and how one would act or react, if necessary. On the US side, greater credibility of "extended deterrence" was achieved by stationing nuclear weapons directly in European partner countries with nuclear sharing and by sharing the risk.

Sceptics like to point out that France only has strategic nuclear weapons that are intended to deter an attack on French territory. Therefore, French “extended deterrence” is not credible if Paris wants to use it to prevent a Russian invasion of Estonia, for example. France would not want to — “mourir pour Dantzig” — defend Tallinn at the risk of destroying Paris.

First: France not only has four submarines with intercontinental missiles, but also air-based nuclear-capable cruise missiles that can be deployed from Rafale aircraft. Perhaps in the future, such systems could be stationed not only in France, as has been the case so far, but also in Poland or Germany, on a rotating or even permanent basis. Yes, one could even consider replicating the US model of nuclear sharing, whereby these weapons could be launched from suitable partner aircrafts. There should be no thought boundaries here. One thing is clear: such options not only cost a lot of money, which would have to be raised by France's partners, but are also not rapidly available. It would take years — which makes it all the more important to hold on to the existing US NATO nuclear umbrella, that is, to nuclear sharing with the help of the already-ordered F-35s, as firmly as possible and for as long as possible. The keyword here is multiple insurance.

Moreover, in view of technological advances and target accuracy, not every nuclear escalation threat from Moscow has to be answered with a nuclear response. After the INF Treaty was terminated, the United States did not make any proposals to deploy new nuclear short- or medium-range systems in Europe, but conventional systems instead. In the event of a Russian nuclear attack, for example in Ukraine, a massive response with precise cruise missiles or future hypersonic weapons could follow instead of nuclear weapons.

4. The task for the future

The strategic task ahead for Germany, France, and their European partners is becoming clear: the use of a French nuclear capability, to be expanded, hopefully in close cooperation with London, to deter a nuclear attack on our territories. At the same time, a massive expansion of all elements of a credible modern conventional deterrence, including AI, hypersonic development, and satellite reconnaissance. Of course: this will be expensive and will take time.

But this is how it can be done: we, together with our European partners, provide the conventional component, France together with the UK the nuclear component of a credible deterrence continuum, in addition to the hopefully continuing US umbrella. This would not give the wrong impression to either Washington or Moscow and could at the same time become a central building block at the core of a European Defence Union.