Momentum or Mirage?

For the second time this year, the Munich Security Conference (MSC) brought together high-level government officials and experts at a Munich Leaders Meeting (MLM) to discuss regional security issues and their global implications. Following an MLM in May 2025 in Washington, DC, the meeting in Saudi Arabia was one of a series of MSC engagements in the Middle East – in Amman, Cairo, Doha, Dubai, and Tehran. The MLM also built on the work of the Middle East Consultation Group (MECG), which was launched in December 2024 with the aim of fostering dialogue on peace, security, and cooperation among various regional stakeholders. Members of the initiative have previously met in Doha, Amman, and Cairo.

This MLM in the oasis town of AlUla could not have been timelier. It took place just one week after the eventful UN General Assembly High-Level Week, where several additional countries recognized Palestine, and only a day after the US administration unveiled its 20-point plan for Gaza. These developments set the tone for highly relevant discussions. Prominent topics included the contours of the US plan, regional efforts toward a sustainable ceasefire in Gaza, and the prospects for ending Israel’s offensive in Gaza. Other issues, such as the reimposition of sanctions on Iran by the US and the EU, the regional security architecture, and opportunities for increased EU–Middle East cooperation, were also on the agenda.

One development that contributed to the sense of momentum at the MLM was the US-proposed plan for Gaza, which participants welcomed. Many argued that if the plan can help end the Israeli offensive, establish an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, enable the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian aid, alleviate the immense suffering of the Palestinian civilian population, and ensure the release of the remaining Israeli hostages, it deserves support. They also praised the plan for its rejection of the forced displacement of Palestinians and the annexation of Gaza by Israel as well as its acknowledgement of the crucial role of international aid organizations. Two years after Hamas’s terror attack on Israel and the start of Israel’s military offensive in Gaza – which the UN Human Rights Council’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel has declared a genocide – many viewed the proposal as a sign of essential US commitment to peace in the region.^[1]

At the same time, in a show of hands, a majority of participants expressed doubt over the plan’s chances of success, fearing that it might ultimately turn out to be a mirage. Several speakers argued that the “devil is in the detail” and that many aspects of the plan remain unclear. Examples included the timing of the Israel Defense Forces’ withdrawal, the mandate and composition of a potential international stabilization force, and the role of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Regarding the stabilization force, speakers emphasized the need to clearly define its structure, role, and mandate, noting that many Arab states would be unwilling to deploy troops to Gaza. They also underlined the importance of establishing a Palestinian police force that would take responsibility for Gaza’s internal security in a post-ceasefire scenario, given the importance of local ownership and the risk of backlash against external forces. Jordan and Egypt are reportedly already training Palestinian police units for this purpose.^[2]

Yet, the most contentious question concerned the prospects for a Palestinian state. The US plan recognizes the Palestinian people’s aspirations to statehood and notes that Gaza’s redevelopment and a reform of the PA may allow for it.^[3] However, speakers noted the risk of different actors advancing their own interpretations of the plan’s elements. Some pointed to statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who – despite agreeing to the US plan – reaffirmed his opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state on September 30, 2025.^[4] One day before, eight Arab and Muslim-majority countries had issued a joint statement welcoming the plan but reiterating their commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state.^[5] Hence, the prospects for Palestinian statehood under this plan remain unclear. Many regional participants emphasized the importance of developing Palestinian governance mechanisms. They emphasized that PA reform must be supported and urged the international community not to overlook the deteriorating situation in the West Bank. They also stressed the need for integration between the West Bank and Gaza in any eventual governance structures.

Overall, the discussions in AlUla embodied a spirit of pragmatism. Acknowledging that the “plan is not perfect,” many participants called for constructive efforts to make the most of it. One repeatedly highlighted point was that the US-led plan can only provide a broad framework or set of principles. However, UN experts have warned that elements of the US 20-point plan are inconsistent with international law.^[6] As such, the plan’s principles should initiate a process that will require continuous monitoring and consultation with affected stakeholders. Looking ahead, one speaker described the New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution – which was endorsed by 142 countries and led by Saudi Arabia and France – as a “consensus on the day after.”^[7] The speaker expressed hope that the declaration can be used to clarify outstanding ambiguities in the US-led plan. It was also noted that the US plan references the New York Declaration, signaling the potential to engage the US on the document, even though the US administration opposed it in the UN vote.

A great many MLM participants recognized the momentum towards political stabilization and economic recovery in Lebanon and Syria while acknowledging the risks from internal and external spoilers. There was optimism that the current Lebanese leadership is well placed to set the country on a path to reform. But some expressed concern over the potential reemergence of “old bad habits” and a prioritization of narrow interests. The need to strengthen state and institutional capacity was also highlighted – be it the capacity to provide trust-building public services such as electricity or to increase support to the Lebanese armed forces.

On Syria, discussions centered on the potential for a “new beginning,” though many noted the challenges the new leadership faces in confronting and addressing the legacy of the Assad regime. Priorities included attracting investment, supporting the return of Syrians, and engaging the “untapped potential” of the diaspora. The linkage between inclusion and stability was also emphasized, with one participant stating that one should not come at the expense of the other. Several speakers underscored the risk that external interference poses to the fragile transitions in Syria and Lebanon. Specifically, they argued that Israel’s military actions in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere across the Middle East are jeopardizing regional stability. Three weeks after Israel’s attack on Qatar, several regional participants questioned whether Israel was seeking security through cooperation and regional integration or through hegemony and chaos.

Other core questions for MLM participants were the implications of the breakdown of nuclear talks with Iran and the impact of sanctions snapback. Discussions revealed conflicting views on whether the 12-day war had mitigated risks of a regional nuclear proliferation cascade or – on the contrary – could trigger this very outcome. Some participants suggested that the door was still open to reviving diplomacy on a nuclear deal with Iran, while others were less optimistic. In the session on the regional nuclear order, the recent Saudi–Pakistani defense pact was described as the culmination of a long-term strategic relationship. The timing of the announcement, which came shortly after the Israeli attack on Qatar, was also noted as a sign that regional actors are seeking to diversify their defensive partnerships.

The MLM also addressed the complexities of cross-border conflicts and the interlinkages between actors in the Red Sea region, highlighting the need for a new security architecture and more robust de-escalation mechanisms. The global-security implications of instability in one of the world’s most important waterways for freedom of navigation, supply chains, economy, and tourism were discussed. Participants raised the importance of addressing the Red Sea region as a whole – rather than simply individual crises – when formulating policy responses, whether on Yemen, Sudan, or Somalia or with respect to tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia. They also discussed the most effective ways to mitigate threats from the Houthis. There were diverging views on whether to designate the Houthis as a terrorist organization. In fact, in the week of the MLM, the Netherlands called for the Houthis to be listed as such after they assumed responsibility for an attack against a Dutch-flagged vessel, raising the issue on the EU front.^[8] However, this move requires unanimity in the EU. Meanwhile, there was speculation by some at the MLM over whether Iran’s weakened position in the wake of the 12-day war could eventually move the Houthis to a less confrontational posture in the Red Sea.

The Night Cap session, which took place in front of AlUla’s famous Elephant Rock, turned the spotlight on Europe. The panel reflected on the significance of Russia’s war against Ukraine for Europe and the Middle East. For Europe, speakers remarked, this war constitutes a Zeitenwende – a key turning point – that has had a fundamental impact on the continent’s security architecture. This has been illustrated by the significant hikes in defense spending across Europe since 2022 despite fiscal constraints. Yet, for the Middle East, the discussion revealed that the war is a more distant affair. Although many countries are indirectly affected by it – for example, through rising prices for grain imports from Ukraine, Russia, or both – it is not seen as a central security threat.^[9] As one speaker noted, countries in the region generally have an interest in maintaining good relations with all major powers and have, in the past, pursued a strategy of “siding with the Americans while not upsetting the Russians.” Consequently, there were differing views on the policies states should pursue vis-à-vis Russia, ranging from calls for increased diplomatic engagement to support for a more robust approach that includes military aid for Ukraine and tougher sanctions on Russia.

At the same time, there was broad agreement on the need to defend international law, particularly the UN Charter. Speakers from both the Middle East and Europe argued that failing to do so will lead to more conflicts and atrocities, making the world less safe for all. The issue of double standards arose, with several participants stating that actors can only credibly stand up for international law when they do so consistently rather than only when it is politically convenient. They explicitly mentioned Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip as a case in point, stressing that the inadequate European response to civilian suffering represents a major obstacle for Middle Eastern states when it comes to supporting Ukraine.

The discussion showed that Europe and the Middle East still have significant work to do in trying to better understand each other’s grievances. Nevertheless, there was widespread agreement on the potential for enhanced cross-regional cooperation, including on post-war reconstruction in Gaza and Ukraine and on defense-technological matters.

Addressing global and regional economic prospects, they shared concerns about the impact of US tariffs. In addition to the direct costs, speakers described economic uncertainty as “the highest tariff” for growth and investment. However, they also highlighted that the US policy shift on trade could create the momentum needed to deepen partnerships beyond the US. The general sentiment was that there is strong potential for deeper economic ties between Europe and the Middle East, in terms of both trade and investment. Four areas were repeatedly mentioned: clean energy and hydrogen, critical minerals, logistics, and AI.

With regard to energy, discussions centered on the question of how to best align energy security, affordability, and sustainability. Participants highlighted the role of the Middle East in both the old, hydrocarbon-dominant energy landscape and the emerging new one. They also stressed the manifold opportunities for deeper energy cooperation within the region and between the Middle East and Europe. Examples included the development of interconnected cross-border power systems and hydrogen markets. Speakers from the Gulf sketched out their clean energy and clean tech ambitions as part of their economic diversification strategies. The need for such ambitions was also evident in discussions on climate change at the MLM. As temperatures in the Middle East are rising twice as fast as the global average, climate change is impacting water scarcity and food insecurity, fueling social unrest within and between countries. There was agreement that stronger regional cooperation, for example, on water resource management, is crucial. Yet political tensions and increasingly dominant unilateral approaches are hindering joint solutions – to the detriment of affected populations. For some, this reflects a broader erosion of shared norms and governance of public goods in a fragmenting international order.

On critical minerals, speakers from the region, particularly the Gulf countries, emphasized their ambition to establish a stronger footprint, presenting themselves as an alternative partner to the currently dominant China. Regarding logistics, they cited the planned India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor as an example of the potential for deepening connectivity. According to one speaker, the corridor aims to go far beyond transport and communication links, providing the foundation for stronger cross-continental economic cooperation.

The significant investments in AI by several countries in the region were also a topic of discussion. The Middle East, it was argued, is well positioned to play a larger role in the global AI industry due to its significant energy reserves, which could be used to power AI data centers. At the same time, the challenge posed by the local desert climate for centers that require constant cooling was also cited, with possible technical solutions being considered. Overall, participants from Europe and the Middle East expressed interest in increasing cooperation on AI. Some viewed deeper cooperation as a way of forming a joint counterweight to the global tech poles of China and the US. Yet, challenges, in the form of differing regulatory approaches and legal data-localization requirements, which might rule out storing European data in data centers in the Middle East, were identified. Granting such data centers a legal status akin to a foreign embassy came up in discussions as a possible innovative solution.

The MLM took place in the Maraya, the largest mirrored building in the world. Viewed from the outside, it almost disappears into its surroundings, like a desert mirage. The building also reflects the spirit of the discussions. With the 20-point plan and the initial regional response to it, there now seems to be momentum for advancing peace in the region. Given that many of the region’s other security challenges – the conflicts in the Red Sea region, the persistent risk of Iranian nuclear proliferation, and the fragile political transitions in Syria and Lebanon – are linked in various ways to the war in Gaza, a diplomatic breakthrough there might have positive effects on these areas as well. However, it remains to be seen whether the momentum can be sustained, or whether spoilers will narrow or even close windows of opportunities, turning optimism into a mirage. Israel and Hamas agreeing to the initial phase of the US plan on October 8, 2025, is a promising start, but much work remains for mediators as they seek to implement this phase and advance the plan to its next stage. The discussions in AlUla highlighted that momentum is not enough. Decisive collective action is needed to move from a peace plan to implementation, from the vision of a regional security architecture for the Red Sea to robust de-escalation mechanisms, from the acknowledgment of respective grievances to effective solidarity, and from the identification of economic opportunities to mutual gains. These issues will continue to be addressed by the MECG and at the upcoming Munich Security Conference in February 2026.