Zeitenwende in the Indo-Pacific?

The Indo-Pacific is home to 60 percent of the global population, generating 60 percent of global GDP.^[1] 90 percent of worldwide trade takes place by sea, a major part through the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, in some fields, the world is heavily dependent on countries in the Indo-Pacific. For example, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and China all play outsized roles in supply chains for different types of microchips, building blocks of practically all modern technology, like smartphones or computers.^[2] Taken together, any disruption in the region will have worldwide ripple effects on trade and supply chains.^[3] Yet, the region faces mounting challenges, aggravated by revisionist actors and increasing competition between the US and China.

A few days after the start of the war, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called Russia’s war against Ukraine a “watershed in the history of our continent.”^[4] Yet, the German term he used, “Zeitenwende,” has not only been applied to the European context to emphasize the beginning of a new geopolitical era. Indeed, also countries in the Indo-Pacific are finding themselves in the midst of a Zeitenwende of their own.

Japan has introduced a new national security strategy, pledged to increase its defense spending, overhauled export controls and plans to acquire counterstrike missiles, signaling its willingness to take on more leadership in the security realm.^[5] Furthermore, despite historic grievances, Japan and South Korea have fostered a rapprochement on security and economic issues.^[6] Against the backdrop of North Korean nuclear threats,^[7] South Korea itself has also been in the headlines as it signed a landmark nuclear weapons agreement with the US, involving Seoul more in nuclear planning options and allowing US nuclear submarines to resume visits to South Korean harbors for the first time in 30 years.^[8] Additionally, formats such as the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US, known as AUKUS, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the “Quad,” between Australia, India, Japan, and the US have opened new avenues for cooperation.^[9]

Given these developments, frank and open exchange about how to coordinate efforts, deepen existing partnerships, and forge new ones is crucial. Participants seized the opportunity provided by the MLM and discussed issues of deterrence, the strengths and weaknesses of the current international order, and how to get more buy-in for it. All discussions painted a nuanced picture of the region’s dynamics and external relationships, highlighting that US-China rivalry is not the only geopolitical frame through which to view the region. While debates were held under Chatham House rule, the MSC was given permission to cite individual comments.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida coined the phrase “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”^[10] It captures the sentiment among policymakers that Russia’s war against Ukraine represents a reckoning for the European continent, but that the strategic awakening cannot stop there. In this vein, participants at the MLM were quick to agree that security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific is increasingly connected. In all these discussions surrounding deterrence and learning the right lessons from Ukraine, China loomed large.

First, participants agreed that China watches the reactions of the transatlantic allies and their partners on the war in Ukraine closely. They also agreed that continued unity in supporting Ukraine and ensuring it can prevail against Russia militarily and economically are thus of utmost importance. What is at stake is not only safeguarding the lives of millions of people, but also deterring other countries from following suit and disregarding the international order by changing the status quo by force. Hence, deterrence needs to be high on the agenda in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. James William Paterson, a senator from Australia, warned that “the only thing more expensive than deterrence is the failure of deterrence.” During the MLM, it became clear that deterrence needs to focus on China, but that other revisionist actors in the region, such as North Korea, present a threat as well. At the same time, where possible, avenues of cooperation and trust-building between countries in the Indo-Pacific should be advanced to avoid arms races.

The discussion proceeded to revolve around the best format of security cooperation that would allow transatlantic allies and partners to work together. Some participants preferred a NATO-like defense organization for the Indo-Pacific while others highlighted the benefits of mini- and multilateral groupings. Especially newer arrangements such as the Quad or AUKUS were heralded as useful to coordinate security matters in the Indo-Pacific and ­beyond more closely, with some participants calling for their expansion. Additionally, some mentioned the crucial role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the region and wished for a stronger role of the organization. Regardless of the format, however, several participants mentioned that the most important task for the transatlantic alliance and its partners will be to come up with sustainable forms of burden-sharing to strengthen security in the region and defend the rules-based international order.

Third, despite the perceived risk of aggression by China, the discussions among participants reflected the emerging trend to avoid speaking of “decoupling” from China, but to call for “de-risking” supply chains and decreasing dependencies in areas critical to national security.^[11] However, some participants warned that China might unilaterally decide to decouple its economy – and is already doing so in some areas. This concern was especially prevalent in the realm of technology, where the US and China have been engaging in particularly fierce competition. The dual-use character of many key emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, means that the country that prevails in the ongoing competition will have significant military and strategic advantages. Although one would expect democracies to band together, different regulatory approaches stand in the way of even closer cooperation between the US and Europe on technology.

However, the intensified rivalry between the US and China makes it more and more difficult for Europeans not to side with the US. The perceived need to choose a side has also become more salient on the global level. Countries who refuse to do so find themselves under scrutiny. 

The Russian war against Ukraine triggered a broader debate about the group of so-called “fence-sitters.”^[12] The term entered the debate after numerous countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East declined to openly side with Ukraine after the Russian invasion, for example by abstaining from votes in the United Nations General Assembly.^[13] Since then, the debate about fence-sitters has broadened into the question of how these countries, many of them in the “Global South,” position themselves in a great-power competition between the US, China, and to some extent Russia. Instead of fence-sitters, The Economist has grouped the 25 biggest economies that did not condemn the war in Ukraine or wish to remain outside of the great power competition together as the “Transactional 25 (T25).” According to The Economist, they are characterized as “pragmatic,” “opportunistic,” and considered to think that “Western leaders are hypocrites.” Additionally, they have a multipolar trade pattern, and their joint share of global GDP is already at 18 percent in 2023.^[14] This shows that many terms (“fence-sitting,” “transactional,” “non-aligned,” “hedging,” “single issue alignment”) are thrown into the debate. Yet, what all of them are hinting at is that major changes in the international order are under way and many countries are not willing to simply side with one great power. One participant reminded the discussants that these countries aim for “strategic autonomy, not being a camp follower.” 

Especially the point of presenting a more inclusive, positive narrative that highlights the benefits and attractiveness of the liberal international order was raised by several participants throughout the event. Yet, the question around which central concept this new narrative should revolve led to diverging views. Some pointed to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as baseline documents that all countries agreed to. Especially since these documents were drawn up in consultative fashion, some participants believe in their inclusiveness.

Others argued that the term “rules-based international order” rings hollow, going so far as suggesting to “bury it once and for all” as it is unclear which rules the term refers to and who decides on exceptions. Some participants reminded others that China was pursuing a rules-based order as well, just not one the transatlantic allies and its partners are supporting.