A Perfect Polar Storm

Over the past decade, the contestation of the liberal international order has increased, challenging the EU’s vision for the world. Today, these pressures are coming to a head, culminating in a triple crisis for the EU: Russia’s war against Ukraine has destroyed Europe’s cooperative security architecture; the increasing weaponization of economic interdependencies is threatening the EU’s economic model; and the European model of liberal democracy faces unprecedented internal and external contestation. Donald Trump’s re-election could intensify these crises and revive the debate about whether the EU needs to become, in the words of the French President Emmanuel Macron, a “third pole” with greater autonomy.^[1]
 

Russia’s war against Ukraine has destroyed Europe’s cooperative security architecture, testing “the norm against territorial conquest […] in the most threatening and vivid way since the end of World War II.”^[11] Europeans have responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by delivering weapons and significantly increasing defense spending. The number of European states that are both in the EU and NATO and meet NATO’s two-percent target for defense spending has risen from four in 2021 to an estimated 16 in 2024.^[12] Yet these increases remain insufficient, given Ukraine’s needs and warnings that Russia could expand its war effort into NATO territory within five to eight years.^[13] Putin’s regime is already issuing nuclear threats and launching aggressive hybrid attacks on European countries, including election interference, as recently seen in Moldova, Georgia, and Romania. A Russian victory over Ukraine would embolden Moscow to intensify these attacks and pursue its imperial ambitions across the post-Soviet space.
 

Compounding the crisis, the new US administration has signaled a potential reduction in security assistance to the continent, forcing Europe to assume a greater share of the burden of deterring Russia and supporting Ukraine. During the presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly suggested reducing aid to Ukraine and claimed he could end the war within 24 hours, raising concerns that Kyiv might be pressured into negotiating from a position of weakness.^[15] In January, however, he said that he hoped the war would be over “long before six months.”^[16] Furthermore, he has made continued US membership in NATO contingent on European nations paying their “fair share,” going as far as to demand they spend five percent of GDP on defense.^[17] EU member states thus face a triple challenge. First, they have to raise defense spending amid fiscal constraints and increasing domestic backlash. Second, they must overcome the perennial fragmentation of their defense industrial base and significantly deepen cooperation both among themselves and with non-EU European Allies, notably Norway and the UK.^[18] Third, they should concretize the promised “ironclad security guarantees” for Ukraine established in the recent joint declaration by multiple European foreign ministers,^[19] either by charting a realistic path toward NATO membership or through robust bilateral arrangements.
 

Following Trump’s electoral victory, pressures on the EU’s economic model could escalate. If implemented, Trump’s plans to impose both universal tariffs of ten percent and unilateral tariffs of 60 percent on Chinese goods could lead to trade wars with significant repercussions for European economies. As the US is the EU’s top trade partner, a trade war between them would not only cause considerable welfare losses;^[24] the US tariffs against China would also divert Chinese goods to the European market, thus intensifying existing tensions over Beijing’s market-distorting practices of flooding the European market with cheap, heavily subsidized exports.^[25] Economists therefore warn of a “second China shock” that could destroy “Europe’s core industries.”^[26] In a worst-case scenario, these trade wars could lead to the breakdown of the WTO, with welfare losses for the EU far exceeding those arising from bilateral trade disputes.^[27] Amid these challenges, it is imperative that the EU diversifies its trade relations and forges new partnerships with countries of the so-called Global South, though the difficulties in concluding the trade agreement with Mercosur serve as a stark reminder that the EU will, at times, have to make painful concessions.^[28]
 

Divisions between and within member states are further complicating joint decision-making, often resulting in lowest-common-denominator compromises. Unlike trade policy, where qualified majority voting applies, foreign and security policy decisions require unanimity. Hungary’s months-long blockade of funds to partially reimburse weapon deliveries to Ukraine is a case in point.^[33] Looking ahead, these divisions could stifle ambitions to create major new funding instruments aimed at arresting the EU’s economic and military decline. Compounding the challenge, the new US administration could exacerbate internal divisions. Analysts anticipate that the second Trump presidency will embolden illiberal and populist movements in Europe, normalizing and amplifying their rhetoric and policy positions.^[34] President Trump’s preference for bilateral and transactional diplomacy could also prevent a unified stance toward the US, as European states vie for preferential reations.^[35]

Europe is facing the most challenging geopolitical situation since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s raging war threatens to destroy both Ukraine and the European security order, while geoeconomic tensions and structural economic weaknesses are jeopardizing Europe’s prosperity. Meanwhile, internal polarization is undermining the EU’s credibility and capacity to act. These pressures are set to intensify with the new US administration, which may reduce its security commitment to Europe, launch trade wars, and embolden populist movements that deepen Europe’s internal divisions. The EU and its member states have responded by increasing defense spending and devising economic security strategies. Yet this will not suffice to protect the pillars of the liberal order, especially as the US grows increasingly unwilling to shoulder an unequal burden.^[37] The extent to which the Trump administration follows through on its announcements will determine whether the EU must recalibrate its relationship with the US or go as far as to emancipate itself from Washington to become a more autonomous pole. Either way, to arrest its decline and reclaim influence, the EU must reinvent itself. This is a herculean task, but if the EU is really made in crisis, this is the time to prove it.