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The Fate of Good Hope

South Africa

What are South Africa’s key foreign policy tenets, and what is its vision for the international order? How does Pretoria aim to contribute to translating that vision into practice? What enables and constrains South Africa’s foreign policy? How do internal and external developments influence its regional and global stature?

Keypoints

  1. Given South Africa’s regional political and economic weight and its unique soft power derived from its history of democratic transition, Pretoria has long been perceived as the “natural leader” of the African continent and an international moral authority.

  2. This status has, however, declined. As anti-Westernism has risen under Mandela’s successors and overshadowed South Africa’s commitment to international law and human rights, the country’s international stature and potential as a bridge-builder between the Global North and South have dwindled.

  3. South Africa’s loss of hard and soft power, coupled with a contested regional position and a fragile domestic situation, has further constrained its international leadership role.

  4. Economic pragmatism and a more centrist coalition might provide an opening for a more moderate South African foreign policy. Yet to revive Pretoria’s international position, the African National Congress will need to reassess long-held foreign policy beliefs and recommit to its declared principles of democracy, international law, human rights, and multilateralism.

In 2024, 30 years after the end of apartheid, South Africa experienced a “second transition.”[1] Following years of political disillusion and economic decay in the country, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its absolute majority in parliament, forcing it to form a coalition government for the first time. As this Government of National Unity succeeded in aligning parties across political and ethnic lines and keeping radical parties out, the country hopes for a new dawn. Pretoria continues to aspire to an international leadership role. Given South Africa’s regional political and economic weight, coupled with unique soft power derived from its history of democratic transition and reconciliation, Pretoria has long been perceived as Africa’s “natural leader” and international moral exemplar.[2] Over the past decades, however, this status has dwindled: material and soft power have declined, an inconsistent track record on human rights and the implementation of international law has undermined South Africa’s “moral high ground,” and growing anti-Westernism has weakened its role as a bridge-builder between countries of the so-called Global South and Global North.[3] 

Between Transformation and Revisionism: South Africa’s Vision for the International Order

South Africa’s foreign policy guidelines over the past three decades reflect its strong commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, international law, and multilateralism as an “external corollary” of its history of democratic transition and struggle against apartheid. [4] Yet they also illustrate the second foreign policy tenet that goes back to the ANC’s history as a liberation movement: a deep-seated distrust of the West, particularly the US.[5]

Pretoria’s stance on global institutions, meandering between reform and rejection, mirrors the two pillars. South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism and the UN as its “centerpiece” has remained at the core of its foreign policy declarations.[6] And its involvement within global bodies has been substantial, for example, it has been a non-elected member of the UN Security Council three times in under 15 years and is currently pursuing a genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.[7] Pretoria has consistently coupled engagement with demands for reform. For South Africa, the “unrepresentative and biased nature” of global institutions perpetuates structural inequalities and allows the West to use them for its own priorities “at the expense of the developing world.”[8] Experiences over the past decades have strengthened this perception: Pretoria has denounced Western promises of global governance reforms as “empty,”[9] the vaccine distribution during Covid-19 as “vaccine apartheid,”[10] and the application of international law such as in Iraq, Libya, or currently in Gaza as selective.[11]

[T]he international community cannot proclaim the importance of international law and the importance of the UN Charter in some situations and not in others as if the rule of law only applies to a select few.[12]

Naledi Pandor•then–South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, BRICS dialogue with developing countries, June 11, 2024

The public’s views on multipolarity reflect the wide criticism of the current international order (Figure 1.4). Frustrations about Western policies and more pronounced anti-Western sentiments of President Nelson Mandela’s successors have triggered South Africa’s shift from engagement within global institutions to bodies outside them – and partners outside the West.[13] In the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC), South Africa’s stance has shifted from ardent support to near exit. Under President Jacob Zuma, the country’s withdrawal from the ICC was only halted by the South African High Court. Zuma’s successor, President Cyril Ramaphosa, only refrained from further withdrawal attempts after a back-and-forth.[14] In contrast to South Africa’s former success as a bridge-builder between countries of the Global North and South and a driver of joint global policies, under Ramaphosa, Pretoria has continued Zuma’s tilt toward non-Western powers, BRICS in particular.[15] While South Africa asserts that it sees BRICS not as “anti-West” but as a “development platform,”[16] this is difficult to sustain as Beijing and Moscow increasingly use the format for revisionist aims.[17] Pretoria’s homage to BRICS as a body that “embraces progressive ideals and seeks […] a more inclusive, equitable, and development-oriented world” seems hollow in light of the revisionist geopolitical and coercive economic approaches of members such as China, Russia, or Iran.[18] For some observers, South Africa’s focus on BRICS illustrates that in its choice of partners, opposition to the West takes precedence over democracy, international law, and human rights.[19]

South Africa’s policy of active non-alignment is not reactive but an affirmative agenda. It is not about being neutral or abstaining from world affairs, but putting forward a unifying agenda through dialogue to achieve peace […].[20]

Ronald Lamola•South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, parliamentary budget vote debate, July 11, 2024

South Africa’s trade relations with selected countries/regions

South Africa’s stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine also illustrates its skew toward anti-Westernism. Rhetorically, Pretoria asserts its position of “active non-alignment,” declaring its refusal to “align with any of the global powers” while pointing to its historic commitment to the principles of the UN Charter and dialogue and negotiations.[21] Its actual policies, however, reveal a persistent sense of loyalty toward Russia due to the Soviet Union’s support of the ANC’s anti-apartheid struggle and a “peculiar interpretation of non-alignment as anti-Western.”[22] South Africa echoes Moscow’s narrative of the invasion, portraying the war as a contest between Russia and the West and a reaction to US provocation.[23] Its joint naval exercise with Russia during the war’s first anniversary is difficult not to interpret as siding with Moscow.

In addition to the ANC’s political orientation, economic interests have driven South Africa’s shift to emerging powers – BRICS and China in particular.[24] However, as a small, open economy with historically close ties with the West, economic pragmatism has also moderated Pretoria’s stance toward Europe and the US. Europe has remained South Africa’s most important trading partner (Figure 9.1), and in recent years, the US has accounted for its fastest-growing export market.[25] A US Congress bill that calls for a review of South African–US relations due to Pretoria’s foreign policies has put South Africa’s preferential access to the US market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) into question. While the Biden administration renewed Pretoria’s access to the program in December, under President Trump, the future of AGOA is uncertain, and trade relations might from now on be tied to how countries align with US geopolitical interests, particularly vis-à-vis China.[26] Eager to preserve its access to the US market, Pretoria has been trying to soften tensions with the US.[27]

South African officials have made a miscalculation by aligning themselves with Russia and China. […] My hope is that they choose otherwise.[28]

Jared Moskowitz•Member of the House of Representatives, US Congress, March 21, 2024

Power Shifts: Opportunities and Constraints for South Africa’s Foreign Policy

South Africa’s share of GDP of selected groups of countries

As anti-Westernism has increasingly overshadowed Pretoria’s commitment to international law and multilateralism, South Africa’s international stature as a bridge-builder and normative force has dwindled. Its decline in hard and soft power, coupled with its contested role on the continent and domestic democratic discontent and economic woes, have further constrained the country’s international position.

While being Africa’s leading economy, South Africa faces major economic challenges and a declining relative weight on the continent and globally. In 2024, South Africa is set to account for the largest nominal GDP among African countries, surpassing Egypt and Nigeria.[29] In 2023, it accounted for around 13 percent of Africa’s GDP and attracted 10 percent of the continent’s foreign direct investment (FDI).[30] In Southern Africa, Pretoria is the economic heavyweight with a share of GDP and FDI inflows of around 60 percent.[31] Yet, while still substantial, South Africa’s relative economic clout in Africa is declining. And compared to the world’s economic powers and its BRICS peers, its GDP is just a fraction – and is expected to further decrease (Figure 9.2). 

South Africa has significant economic strengths, such as a rich endowment with critical minerals central for clean energy and digital technologies. It accounts, for example, for around 70 percent of global platinum and around 40 percent of manganese and chromium production.[32] Yet South Africa suffers from economic woes, including electricity shortages, deficient infrastructure, and endemic corruption.[33] In contrast to other middle-income countries, growth has been anemic since the global financial crisis in 2008.[34] South Africa’s unemployment rate of around 30 percent is among the world’s highest, more than one out of five people live in extreme poverty, and inequality is at staggering levels.[35] 

The economy’s brittle state significantly limits Pretoria’s resources for diplomacy and the military – the foreign and defense ministers have both recently announced new budget cuts despite already-strained resources and defense spending at a mere 0.7 percent of GDP in 2023.[36] While Pretoria retains the largest defense budget in sub-Saharan Africa, its share of regional spending has dropped from 27 percent in 2011 to 14.5 percent in 2023.[37] Two decades of underfunding have left their mark, leading to a stark contrast between the government’s ambition to play a pivotal role in regional peacekeeping and the limitations of its forces.[38] In South Africa’s current deployments in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, the troops are “floundering.”[39]

Demographics fuel Pretoria’s declining weight. South Africa’s population of 64 million is the continent’s sixth largest, but just about half the size of Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s and less than a third of Nigeria’s. By 2040, Nigeria’s population will exceed South Africa’s by more than a factor of four due to higher growth rates.[40]
 

South Africans’ views on the state of democracy, corruption, and overall direction of the country

Declining material power challenges South Africa’s regional and international position. Even more significant is Pretoria’s loss of its once formidable soft power. Xenophobic violence against other African nationals has eroded its standing on the continent,[41] spurring the perception among some that South Africa “remains a state apart,” considering itself more advanced than its African peers.[42] Pretoria’s trade and economic policies, seen by some as favoring national rather than regional interests, or its push for the chairmanship of the African Union in 2012 against established procedures added to persistent suspicions about its hegemonic aspirations in Africa.[43] South Africa’s moral authority further declined in light of its “instinctive” solidarity with and defense of states under Western pressure, even when these states were charged with gross human rights violations.[44] Examples include Pretoria’s reactions to crises such as in Zimbabwe and Darfur.[45] The rampant corruption and populist style of government under the Zuma presidency have added to Pretoria’s eroding authority.[46] 

Domestically, the public’s disillusion about corruption has been a major driver in the steep decline in satisfaction with democracy.[47] Approval of the country’s direction hit a low point before the 2024 elections, with a mere 13 percent indicating that they see their country on the right track (Figure 9.3).[48] Persistent inequality, with race as a key factor, has further fueled democratic disengagement and rising polarization.[49] Economic decline, corrosion of democratic institutions, and rising populism along ethnic lines have fed into a downward spiral.[50]

We are citizens of one country and yet we occupy different worlds, separated by high walls and great distances.[51]

Cyril Ramaphosa•South African President, presidential inauguration, June 19, 2024

On to the Middle Ground?

The outcome of the 2024 general election initially raised fears that South Africa would continue down that road of populism and economic decline.[52] Voter turnout was at a record low; staunchly populist parties came in third and fourth, accounting for around a quarter of votes.[53] With the formation of the Government of National Unity, fears turned into hope.[54] While frictions among and within coalition parties will persist, the first months of the term have run relatively smoothly, improving the country’s prospects.[55] Economic pragmatism and a more centrist cabinet could help bring about a more “middle-of-the-road foreign policy.”[56] However, to revive South Africa’s international stature and potential as a regional and international bridge-builder, the ANC will need to reflect on its long-held foreign policy beliefs and recommit to reform rather than revisionism. South Africa’s G20 presidency this year provides an opportunity to make the country’s domestic “second transition” also a moment of transition for its foreign policy.

Multipolarization – Munich Security Report 2025

Bibliographical Information: Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, and Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623.

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Chapter 9 – South Africa: The Fate of Good Hope

Julia Hammelehle, “South Africa: The Fate of Good Hope,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 111—117, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-9.

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  1. [1] Monica Mark in Gideon Rachman, “Can South Africa’s National Unity Government Succeed?,” The Financial Times Podcast, June 20, 2024, The Rachman Review, perma.cc/T99Z-K7BT.
  2. [2] See, for example, James Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Role Since Apartheid, Abingdon: Routledge, 2018, 9.
  3. [3] David Pilling, “South Africa’s Russia Stance Shows It Has Lost the Moral High Ground,” Financial Times, February 23, 2023.
  4. [4] Deon Geldenhuys, “The Weak Domestic Base of South Africa’s Good Global Citizenship,” South African Journal of International Affairs 22:4 (2015), 411–428, doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1123648, 411.
  5. [5] On South Africa’s foreign policy principles, see, for example, the strategic plans of the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, the 2011 White Paper, or the 2023 National Interest Document. See South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, “Strategic Plans of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation,” Pretoria: South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, n.a., perma.cc/N4HT-NUMG; South African Government, “Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu: White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” Pretoria: South African Government, May 13, 2011, perma.cc/4JHK-TEGG; South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, “Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and Its Advancement in a Global Environment,” Pretoria: South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2023, perma.cc/DP86-M2YG.
  6. [6] Cyril Ramaphosa, “President Cyril Ramaphosa: 79th Session of the UN General Assembly,” New York: UN General Assembly, September 24, 2024, perma.cc/3NHT-SP96.
  7. [7] Steven Friedman, “South Africa’s Quest to Retake the Moral High Ground,” Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2024.
  8. [8] See, for example, South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, “Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and Its Advancement in a Global Environment,” 20–21.
  9. [9] Ronald Lamola, “Address by Minister Ronald Lamola, During the Thucydides Trap – Challenges and Opportunities for Africa, Held at the MISTRA Head Office on 11 October 2024,” Johannesburg: Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, October 11, 2024, perma.cc/XCE5-5T7K.
  10. [10] Cyril Ramaphosa, “Cyril Ramaphosa Says the World Must End Vaccine Apartheid,” The Economist, November 8, 2021.
  11. [11]  See, for example, Ramaphosa, “President Cyril Ramaphosa: 79th Session of the UN General Assembly.”
  12. [12] Naledi Pandor, “Statement by Minister Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa at the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries,” Nizhny Novgorod, June 11, 2024, perma.cc/AD48-K4D4.
  13. [13] Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 40.
  14. [14] John Eligon, “South Africa’s Shifting Stance on a Sensitive Question: Quit the I.C.C.?,” The New York Times, August 26, 2023.
  15. [15] See, for example, Christopher Williams and Mihaela Papa, “Rethinking ‘Alliances’: The Case of South Africa as a Rising Power,” African Security 13:4 (2020), 325–352, doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2020.1871796, 340. On Pretoria’s former key role as a bridge-builder between countries of the Global North and South, see, for example, Dan Krause, Südliche Demokratien und der Streit über die Internationale Ordnung: Analyse der Positionen Indiens und Südafrikas zur Responsibility to Protect, Opladen/Berlin/Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2024, doi.org/10.3224/84742740, 280–281. Also see Chris Alden and Garth Le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Ambiguity?,” Review of African Political Economy 31:100 (2004), 283–297, doi.org/10.1080/0305624042000262293, 292.
  16. [16] See, for example, Foreign Minister Lamola in Emsie Ferreira, “South Africa Is Eager to Facilitate Russia-Ukraine Peace Talks, Says Minister Lamola,” The Mail & Guardian, November 7, 2024.
  17. [17] Alexander Gabuev and Alexander Stuenkel, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2024.
  18. [18]  Naledi Pandor, “Statement by Minister Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa at the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries,” Nizhny Novgorod, perma.cc/AD48-K4D4.
  19. [19] Priyal Singh, “Wheels Come Off South Africa’s Hollow Version of Non-Alignment,” Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, May 22, 2023, perma.cc/8XC6-CF5Q. Also see Michelle Gavin in Council of Councils, “The BRICS Summit 2023: Seeking an Alternate World Order?,” New York: Council of Councils, Global Memo, August 31, 2023, perma.cc/3XFX-42H8.
  20. [20] Ronald Lamola, “Budget Vote Speech ‘A Foreign Policy Agenda to Address the Needs of our People’,” Pretoria: South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, July 11, 2024, perma.cc/3MQU-34XD.
  21. [21] See, for example, The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, “Presidency Asserts Responsibility and Stance on South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” press release, October 27, 2024,  https://perma.cc/ CR6B -FNHS. On South Africa’s historic approach of quiet diplomacy see Alexander Beresford, “A Responsibility to Protect Africa From the West? South Africa and the NATO  Intervention in Libya,” International Politics 52:3 (2015), 288–304,  https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2015.11, 294–300.
  22. [22] On South Africa’s anti-imperial nostalgia see, for example, Thom Loyd, “The Politics of Anti-Imperial Nostalgia: South Africa’s Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Slavic Review 83:1 (2024), 15–23, doi.org/10.1017/slr.2024.318. On Pretoria’s perspective on non-alignment see Janis van der Westhuizen, “Ukraine, the 2023 BRICS Summit and South Africa’s Non-Alignment Crisis,” Contemporary Security Policy (2024), 1–15, 3. On its historic non-alignment position and siding with the Soviet Union see Andre Fourie, “Non-Alignment as a Foreign Policy Orientation  of the African National Congress,” Politikon 19:2 (1992), 81–98, doi.org/10.1080/02589349208704969, 96.
  23. [23] van der Westhuizen, “Ukraine, the 2023 BRICS Summit and South Africa’s Non-Alignment Crisis,” 5. Also see, for example, Ronald Lamola, interviewed by Ravi Agrawal, September 26, 2024, Foreign Policy, perma.cc/726A-BRFW.
  24. [24] Williams and Papa, “Rethinking ‘Alliances’: The Case of South Africa as a Rising Power,” 338–339.
  25. [25] Gracelin Baskaran and Yash Ramkolowan, “South Africa’s Reliance on Preferential Access to the US Market and the Potential Impact of an AGOA Exit,” Washington, DC: Brookings, November 2023, perma.cc/PV33-LMCY, 4.
  26. [26] Ronak Gopaldas, “Agoa, Agoing, Agoner? Risks of US Trade Policy for Africa,” Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, September 19, 2024, perma.cc/R28M-8GGF. Also see Peter Fabricius, “Uncertain Future: How a Trump Presidency Could Reshape South Africa’s Economic Landscape,” Daily Maverick, November 9, 2024.
  27. [27] Peter Fabricius, “Donald Trump’s Second Presidency Starting Shortly Presents a Major Challenge to SA,” Daily Maverick, January 12, 2024.
  28. [28] Congressman John James, “Reps. James, Moskowitz Bill on South African Relationship Passes Through Committee,” press release, March 21, 2024, perma.cc/2VNA-EDH9.
  29. [29] IMF, “GDP, Current Prices: Billions of U.S. Dollars,” Washington, DC:  IMF, 2024, perma.cc/NR4T-SJ6G.
  30. [30] On GDP see IMF, “GDP, Current Prices: Billions of U.S. Dollars,” Washington, DC: IMF, 2024, perma.cc/88W6-W6ZU. On FDI see UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2024: Investment Facilitation and Digital Government,” New York: UNCTAD, 2024, perma.cc/NAQ4-LAB6, 157.
  31. [31] On GDP see IMF, “GDP, Current Prices.” On FDI see UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2024,” 157. Southern Africa includes Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Note that South Africa is also among the top sources of intra-African FDI. See Prachi Agarwal et al., “Exploring Data on Foreign Direct Investment to Support Implementation of the AfCFTA Protocol on Investment,” London: ODI, ODI Data analysis, September 2024, perma.cc/Q8DQ-QL2R, 44–45.
  32. [32] For platinum, see US Geological Survey, “Platinum-Group Metals Statistics and Information,” Reston: US Geological Survey, January 2024, perma.cc/EZ2M-LAJM. For manganese, see US Geological Survey, “Manganese Statistics and Information,” Reston: US Geological Survey, January 2024, perma​.cc/6VP6-X995. For chromium, see US Geological Survey, “Chromium Statistics and Information,” Reston: US Geological Survey, January 2024, perma.cc/DY3N-WE3H. Figures for the three minerals apply to 2023 and are estimates. 
  33. [33] Arkebe Oqubay, Fiona Tregenna, and Imraan Valodia (eds.),  The Oxford Handbook of the South African Economy, Oxford University Press, 2021, v.
  34. [34] World Bank Group, “Unlocking South Africa’s Potential: Leveraging Trade for Inclusive Growth and Resilience,” Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2024, perma.cc/8KKL-LQCN, 1.
  35. [35]  On South Africa’s unemployment rates in global comparison see ILO, “Unemployment Rate (%) - Annual: ILOSTAT Data Explorer,” Geneva: ILO, 2024, perma.cc/DC9H-YDUF. For the most recent figures for South Africa see Statistics South Africa, “Quarterly Labour Force Survey,” Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, n.a., perma.cc/7U7W-TE4Q. On poverty levels see World Bank Group, “Macro Poverty Outlook for South Africa: October 2024,” Washington, DC: World Bank Group, October 1, 2024, perma.cc/7RT9-AZVN. Note that the figures for the lower middle- and upper-middle-income poverty lines are considerably higher at 41.1 and 62.6 percent, respectively. 
  36. [36] SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm: SIPRI, 2024, perma.cc/L95P-U96T.
  37. [37] Bastian Giegerich et al., The Military Balance 2024, London: IISS, 2024, 458. Note that South Africa’s share of the African continent’s expenditures has also markedly declined. Algeria’s military expenditures are more than six times higher, Morocco’s nearly two times; Nigeria and Egypt are about on par. See SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.”
  38. [38]  See, for example, Theo Neethling, “The SANDF After 30 Years: Walking the Tightrope Between External and Internal Operations on a Shoestring Budget,” The Strategic Review for Southern Africa 46:1 (2024), 10–37, doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v46i1.4975, 24–25.
  39. [39] Why South Africa’s Army Is Floundering in Congo,” The Economist, August 8, 2024
  40. [40] UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision: Total Population by Sex,” New York: UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2024, perma.cc/GZN4​-8VKQ.
  41. [41] Olusola Ogunnubi and Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao, “South Africa’s Emerging ‛Soft Power’ Influence in Africa and its Impending Limitations: Will the Giant Be Able to Weather the Storm?” African Security 9:4 (2016), 299–319, doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2016.1242978, 309.
  42. [42] Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 52–55; 129–130. Also see, for example, Jean-Paul Marthoz, “The Challenges and Ambiguities of South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, NOREF Report, September 2012, perma.cc/ALB6-LNRP, 8.
  43. [43] Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 51–52; 58–60. Also see Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa in the Company of Giants: The Search for Leadership in a Transforming Global Order,” International Affairs 89:1 (2013), 111–129, doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12007, 123–124.
  44. [44] Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 30–32. Also see, for example, Michael Gerson, “The Despot’s Democracy,” The Washington Post, May 28, 2008.
  45. [45] Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 30–31. On Darfur as an example of the tensions between South Africa’s commitment to human rights on the one hand and anti-imperialism and Pan-Africanism on the other see Laurie Nathan, “Interests, Ideas and Ideology: South Africa’s Policy on Darfur,” African Affairs 110:438 (2011), 55–74, doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adq058. On these tensions and the divergent expectations of South Africa’s international partners also see Karen Smith, “South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: From Champion to Sceptic,” International Relations 30:3 (2016), 391–405, doi.org/10.1177/0047117816659596, 392.
  46. [46] See for example Daniel D. Bradlow, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, and AnaSofia Bizos, “Lessons Learned and the Path Forward,” in: Daniel D. Bradlow/Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds.), Values, Interests and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2020, 253–273, 255. 
  47. [47] Afrobarometer, “African Insights 2024: Democracy at Risk – the People’s Perspective,” Accra: Afrobarometer, 2024, perma.cc/26QP-Y3QN, 27.
  48. [48] Afrobarometer, “Unemployment, Unreliable Electricity Supply, and Corruption Are South Africans’ Top Concerns, Afrobarometer Pre-Election Telephone Survey Shows,” Pretoria: Afrobarometer, May 23, 2024, perma.cc/2D3J-E2F7, 1.
  49. [49] On race as a key factor in inequality in South Africa see Aroop Chatterjee, Léo Czajka, and Amory Gethin, “Wealth Inequality in South Africa, 1993–2017,” The World Bank Economic Review 36:1 (2022), 19–36, doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhab012, 22–23; 30; 40; 56. Also see Simone Schotte, Rocco Zizzamia, and Murray Leibbrandt, “Social Stratification, Life Chances and Vulnerability to Poverty in South Africa,” Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town, Working Paper 208, August 2017, perma.cc/ZRL6-EW9X.
  50. [50] Brian Levy et al., “South Africa: When Strong Institutions and Massive Inequalities Collide,” Washington, DC/Cape Town: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town, March 2021, perma.cc/5YKG-DM9Q, 7, 41, 59. On revived colored nationalism in South Africa, also see William Shoki, “The Story of South Africa No Longer Makes Sense,” The New York Times, May 28, 2024.
  51. [51] Cyril Ramaphosa, “Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the Occasion of the Presidential Inauguration,” Pretoria: Government of South Africa, June 19, 2024, perma.cc/8M93-3UH8.
  52. [52] “South Africa Stands on the Brink of Salvation—or Catastrophe,” The Economist, June 1, 2024.
  53. [53] Electoral Commission of South Africa, “Results Dashboard: 2024 National and Provincial Elections,” Centurion: Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2024, perma.cc/PYN3​-UVCS.
  54. [54] “A Remarkable New Era Begins in South Africa,” The Economist, June 14, 2024.
  55. [55] John McDermott, “South Africa’s Coalition Government Needs to Deliver,” The Economist, November 20, 2024.
  56. [56] Priyal Singh, “How Will SA’s New Coalition Government Steer Foreign Policy?,” Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, July 2, 2024, perma.cc/92M3-ULM5.