Multipolarization

The notion of “multipolarity,” though far from new, has become the buzzword of the day. Judging from political speeches and strategy papers, we are witnessing the emergence of a new multipolar order – or are already living in it.^[1] As a simplified version of this narrative has it, the bipolar era of the Cold War gave way to a unipolar post–Cold War period, defined by US global hegemony. Now, we find ourselves at the dawn of an increasingly multipolar era.^[2] Yet there are widely differing interpretations of what “multipolarity” might mean. And what leaders’ references to “multipolarity” lack in conceptual clarity, they surely deliver in terms of emotionality. These appeals to multipolarity have been variously characterized as expressions of hope for global change, as “part of a power play” meant to court countries in the so-called Global South, or even as evidence of “intellectual avoidance” by those who prefer to ignore the dynamics of ramped-up bloc confrontation.^[3] At its core, the debate over “multipolarity” reflects different views 
on the present and future international order. While there are many reasons to question whether the world is indeed already multipolar or will ever truly become so, today’s world is – in more than one sense – shaped by “multipolarization.”

On the one hand, “multipolarization” describes an ongoing power shift toward a world where a greater number of actors are vying for influence. On the other hand, it also captures the international and domestic polarization that comes with increasingly incompatible visions for the international order, making it ever more difficult for actors to agree on common solutions to shared global problems. 

The first dimension of “multipolarization” captures the widely perceived trend toward “multipolarity.” In its most basic definition, “polarity” refers to the number of great powers in the international system. In a unipolar system, there is just one great power without any other rival powers. A bipolar system has two great powers, and a multipolar system has more than two powers, usually at least four or five.^[5] These definitions may make it seem easy to classify the present system, yet even scholars of polarity struggle to interpret the current global order. There is no agreement on whether the world today is uni-, bi-, multi-, or even nonpolar. Nor is there consensus on which actors could be considered the relevant “poles” in the contemporary or future international order, as there are disputes on the definition of a great power and on the necessary threshold to qualify for that status.^[6]

For some analysts, the world remains unipolar. While few still think of the United States as an all-powerful “hyperpower,” defined by former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine as “a country that is dominant or predominant in all spheres,”^[7] these analysts maintain that the global power shifts are less dramatic than often believed. Drawing on various key metrics, members of this school of thought argue that the US will remain the sole superpower: “The world is neither bipolar nor multipolar, and it is not about to become either.”^[8]

Some dimensions of the international system indeed continue to look very unipolar. According to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the US still accounts for almost 40 percent of nominal global defense spending – with China, the second-largest spender, not even accounting for half of US military expenditure (Figure 1.1).^[9] In contrast to all its potential competitors, the US has a truly global network of allies and partners and manages at least 128 overseas military bases in more than 50 countries around the world.^[10] Likewise, the military-technological superiority of the United States and the rapid advancements in the complexity of military technology mean that China and other potential challengers have a harder time catching up than rising powers in previous eras did.^[11] And while Donald Trump’s election may signal the end of the Pax Americana and bring about a redefinition of the US’s global role as the guardian of the international order, nothing suggests that Washington will give up its “top-dog” position in the near future. Indeed, the Trump administration may increase investment in defense and try to push back against China’s continuous rise (Chapter 3).

Other sectors beyond the military also continue to be characterized by what could be described as a unipolar distribution of power. For instance, economists speak of a “unipolar currency world,” with the US dollar as the dominant global currency.^[12] Central banks around the world still rely on the US dollar as the key reserve currency (Figure 1.1).^[13] The dollar also remains the most widely used currency for trade and other international transactions. While the BRICS countries have announced their intention to create a BRICS currency to reduce global dependence on the US dollar, the path to financial multipolarity, or “de-dollarization,” seems steep and long and is certain to provoke pushback from the US. Even the BRICS Development Bank still operates mainly in US dollars.^[14] From the perspective of the “unipolar” school, these and other examples show that those who argue that the world is already multipolar focus too much “on potential rather than realized power.”^[15]

The same is true for other challengers today. Several indicators suggest that China and the US are playing in a different league than the other G7 and BRICS states (Figure 1.1). And while China trails the United States in nominal GDP and GDP per capita, it is already the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. Likewise, its military spending is second only to the United States’, and US analysts have been watching China’s military modernization efforts with increasing concern.^[24] As a result of “the most dramatic military buildup since World War II,”^[25] some analysts conclude that “in some areas, [China] has already matched or surpassed America.”^[26] While Russia is still the only nuclear superpower on a par with the US, China seems to be on track to become its second “nuclear peer.”^[27] According to Lind’s metrics, all the other states lack either the economic or military capabilities to join the great-power ranks. While Germany and Japan can be considered latent great powers due to their economic strength, their respective grand strategies render them unlikely to make the necessary military investments to clear the great-power threshold. Despite its nuclear arsenal, Russia is “a regional power with significant national capabilities” but not a great power, either. Finally, although India’s continued rise could shift the system to multipolarity in the future, it clearly remains below the threshold for now.^[28] At present, India has about a third of China’s defense spending and less than a quarter of its nominal GDP. And while Brazil exhibits some characteristics of a great power, South Africa falls short in almost all dimensions (Figure 1.1). 

For another group of scholars, such rather restrictive criteria are misleading, obscuring the emergence of a multipolar world. They either accept a lower threshold for achieving great-power status or doubt that a state needs to be a great power in all dimensions to be considered a “pole.” From this point of view, a multipolar world does not mean that there have to be several powers with roughly equal capabilities, “it just requires that significant power is concentrated in more than two states.”^[29] Based on this broader definition, states such as Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, or Russia can clearly be considered “important global powers.”^[30] Compared to most other states, the G7 and the BRICS – which, with the exception of Russia, are covered by the Munich Security Index – stand out in several dimensions, even if not in all of them.^[31] Nowhere is “multipolarization” more advanced than in the economic realm, as several emerging economies have seen impressive growth. In terms of purchasing power parity, the members of the BRICS already surpassed the G7 in 2018. Following the enlargement of the bloc in 2024, which saw the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, BRICS nations account for about 40 percent of global trade and 40 percent of crude oil production and exports.^[32]
 

Others point out that the unprecedented degree of interdependence, “characterized by a global web of supply chains of a complexity and density never seen before,” means that the threshold is even lower: “Any state that controls an important international resource or plays a significant international role in some domain cannot be dismissed as a bit player.”^[34] As a result, states that would usually not be considered “poles” can play outsized roles in world politics. For instance, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey may not be “great powers” but are certainly power brokers in and sometimes beyond their regional environment.^[35]

Finally, some scholars do not think that the world is moving toward either bi- or multipolarity. Rather, they argue that the diffusion of power means that today’s club of great powers wields much less influence than those of the past. Today’s great powers are less likely to form a distinct group, and their “ability to settle order questions among themselves and formalize relations of dominance over the rest of the system is less now than in 1815, 1918, and 1948.”^[36] In that sense, talk of multipolarity may mask a trend toward “nonpolarity,” in which the reach of the great-power club is more limited than before, as power is more widely distributed, comes in various forms, and cannot be easily translated from one domain to another.^[37]
 

The “multipolarization” we are witnessing also points to a trend toward ideological multipolarity. This dimension of polarity does not refer to the material distribution of power but to the relations between the poles based on the ideas they promote. Just as international systems can be polarized in terms of power, they can also be polarized ideologically.^[40] Indeed, whether the emerging order will be marked by ideological unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, or nonpolarity may have even more dramatic consequences for the world than polarities of power.

What the “unipolar moment” was to the distribution of power, the “liberal moment” was to the realm of ideas.^[41] Following the oft-quoted “end of history,” Western interpretations of democracy and market economy seemed set to conquer the world.^[42] But this ideational unipolarity is gone. While liberal ideas remain attractive to people around the world, they have become increasingly contested – both from within and without.^[43]

In the heartlands of the liberal international order, most liberal democracies have witnessed the rise of illiberal forces at home. In some, this backlash has amounted to an illiberal “counter-revolution.”^[44] To a certain degree, this domestic polarization may even be seen as the result of rising multipolarity, as considerable parts of the public in Western democracies are worried about their relative decline (Figure 1.12). According to proponents of this point of view, the liberal international order has given unfair benefits to rising powers, most notably China and the “globalist” elites at home.^[45] Most importantly, the coalition supporting Donald Trump is at least partly motivated by the perception that the US is bearing the lion’s share of the global burden while others are taking advantage of it (Chapter 2). 

But the predominance of liberal ideas has also been challenged by the “return of authoritarian great powers,”^[46] which have promoted alternative ideas and often also offered support to governments resisting liberal reforms. For the past 15 years, a “wave of autocratization” has shifted the global ideological balance of power. In 2023, 42 countries were moving towards autocracy, while only 18 countries were transitioning toward democracy. Seventy-one percent of the global population lived in autocratic countries, up from 48 percent in 2013.^[47] There is no denying the fact anymore that, in most parts of the world, liberal democracy is under pressure or even in retreat.

For some, liberal hegemony has been replaced by open competition between democracies and autocracies, with the world increasingly being divided into two geopolitical camps based on political regime type.^[48] The 2022 US National Security Strategy speaks of a “contest to write the rules of the road” with China, Russia, and other states that pursue an illiberal model of international order.^[49] Those convinced of a worsening clash between a liberal-democratic vision for the international order and a vision geared at “a world safe for autocracy”^[50] can not just point to Putin’s all-out war against Ukraine, which is entering its fourth year. They can also refer to the increasingly close cooperation between autocratic revisionists in pursuit of their global illiberal agendas. In this regard, the so-called “axis of upheaval,” consisting of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, has attracted particular attention.^[51] Russia has been aided in sustaining its war of aggression in Ukraine by drones from Iran, troops from North Korea, and, as NATO recently suggested, weapons components shipped from China.^[52] From this perspective, the global responses to Russia’s war of aggression have served as a catalyst for the emergence and consolidation of what some have called the “Global West” and “Global East.”^[53] Moreover, in various policy fields, among them human rights, global infrastructure, and development cooperation, there is a clear democracy–autocracy cleavage in the competing governance visions.^[54] This development is also reflected in the pervasive democracy-autocracy fault line perceived by people in many parts of the world.^[55]

Others point out that the democracy-autocracy dichotomy oversimplifies today’s messy marketplace of order models. From this point of view, there are too many international dynamics that do not fit with a democracy-autocracy binary.57^[57] A case in point is cooperation within the framework of the BRICS, which includes both democratic and autocratic members. So, too, is the fact that many countries in the Global South – variously called the non-aligned or the “hedging middle”^[58] – refuse to see the world through the prism of rigid blocs and avoid taking sides in the growing systemic competition.^[59] Seeking to maximize their policy space, these countries are neither willing to adopt the Western democracy-versus-autocracy framing nor to be enlisted in a China- or Russia-led anti-Western coalition. Moreover, skeptics have reason to question whether the consolidation of geopolitical blocs will survive the rise of illiberal populists in liberal democracies, who often demonstrate close ideological affinities with autocratic foreign governments. Rather, polarization and an illiberal-nationalist backlash could undermine the idea of a cohesive West and reinvigorate debates about “Westlessness.”^[60] All this suggests that “a neat, two-bloc world looks unlikely.”^[61]

This perceived implausibility of a two-bloc world is driving the rise of the narrative of an emerging multipolar order. In ideological terms, many argue, the future order may be much messier. We may be living in a world where multiple orders co-exist or compete and where little is left of near-universal rules, principles, and patterns of cooperation. In such a “multi-order”^[62] or “multiplex”^[63] world, the liberal order may not necessarily disappear. But its reach will increasingly be restricted to the West, or what is left of it.^[64] What is emerging, then, is a new system “characterized by plurality of power and identity,”^[65] where several major poles pursue their own visions of order, with unique sets of rules, values, and institutions. In this world of multiple orders, Russia, which has long seen itself as a “civilizational” pole,^[66] is working towards a Russian-led Eurasian order, as outlined in the new security treaties Moscow proposed to the US and NATO in late 2021. China, for its part, is establishing a Beijing-led order in East Asia and may be trying to expand it further to align with the geography of its Belt and Road Initiative.^[67] This era of increasing political “diversity” may also see the emergence of other (regional) “poles” whose order models prove attractive to different degrees. But, all told, peaceful coexistence between the different orders is rather unlikely, given that it is far from clear whether the major ordering poles can agree on at least some rules, principles, and structures of cooperation to manage inter-order relations. 
 

In sum, just as we can observe a trend toward a multipolarity of power, we can see a similar trend in ideological terms. What used to be the global standard in the post–Cold War era, namely Western political and economic liberalism, is increasingly contested again. But instead of being replaced by one clear-cut alternative, it seems to be eroding from within while simultaneously giving way to multiple contestations. 

Moreover, some hope that the move from US-led unipolarity to multipolarity will strengthen international law by reducing Western states’ ability to selectively apply the rules and principles of the order.^[76] For those who subscribe to this view, multipolarity should constrain “hegemonic power, which, unrestrained, represents a threat to international rules and norms.”^[77]

Last but not least, the optimistic reading expects a multipolar order to exhibit greater tolerance towards the world’s cultural and political diversity. The celebration of “massive diversity,”^[78] which is especially prevalent in Chinese and Russian accounts of multipolarity, chimes well with postcolonial instincts directed against Western ideas in many parts of the world.^[79]

For those with a less optimistic reading, a multipolar order promises to be “a recipe for chaos.”^[80] Perhaps most importantly, there are good reasons to believe that the two aspects of “multipolarization” – the rise of new centers of power and the growing ideological polarization of the international system – will increase the risk of great-power war.^[81] Rather than leading to a stable balance of power, the rise of new and ideologically diverse power centers may trigger new arms races, both nuclear and conventional, with the potential for crises and escalation.^[82] While the world’s leading powers have not fought a major war against each other for almost 80 years – a remarkable but exceptional period in world history – scholars warn that too many people are taking this achievement for granted.^[83]
 

Furthermore, a multipolar world may also undermine universal rules and norms. As the former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell has argued, “when the number of participants in a game increases, the natural response should be to strengthen the rules governing the game.”^[93] But rather than strengthening international law, multipolarization may well move us away from an order that does have standards, even if they are sometimes implemented inconsistently, and towards an order without any standards at all.^[94] Evidence of this can be found in the revisionist approach to international rules adopted by some of the new poles of influence and the lack of pushback against this norm contestation from others. Moreover, the presence of more great powers may mean even more actors claiming special rights for themselves – or different legal systems shaped by the respective regional hegemons. Under the guise of promoting multipolarity, China and Russia increasingly seem to be seeking to “partition the world into spheres of regional unipolarity.”^[95]

Last but not least, while multipolarity may well bring greater respect for cultural diversity, it may simultaneously be accompanied by efforts to curb universal norms meant to constrain governments’ behavior and protect the individual. Legal scholars have already warned about an emerging “authoritarian international law.”^[96] If the pessimists are right, the “age of impunity,”^[97] in which human rights violations and other crimes go too often unpunished, is here to stay.

Recent trends suggest that the negative effects of greater multipolarity are prevailing as divides between major powers grow. For instance, global defense spending has hit a new record, and new arms races are looming.^[98] At the same time, in Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine, among others, attempts at conflict resolution are failing or have not even begun; and a confrontational climate summit in Azerbaijan is just one of many examples of increasingly deficient global problem-solving. Before our eyes, we are seeing the negative scenario of a more multipolar world materialize – a more conflictual world without shared rules and effective multilateral cooperation. Rather than generating more inclusive global benefits, it comes with fragmentation that is shrinking the proverbial global pie, potentially triggering “lose-lose” dynamics where everyone will be worse off in the long run.^[99]
 

It is far from clear what might initiate the process of “depolarization” that could set multipolarity on a positive track. Some believe that international organizational reform is key. This reasoning suggests that the divisions accompanying greater multipolarity could be mitigated if global governance structures became more inclusive of the new power centers by encouraging, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz put it, their “greater participation in and integration into the international order […] to keep multilateralism alive in a multipolar world.”^[101] Yet the suggestion that the integration of new poles alone will breed the type of consensus needed to create an order that works for the benefit of all is far from a foregone conclusion. Doubters need only look to the five major powers with permanent seats on the UN Security Council and their inability to agree on solutions to any of the major conflicts of today.

Reforms that mostly reflect changes in material power may thus not be sufficient. As some have suggested, ideological reforms of the international order may be needed to create a new working consensus among the major powers that also benefits the wider world. Put differently, they argue that for multipolarity to work, we might have to rethink some of the order’s rules and norms.^[102] This, however, begs the question of which rules must be preserved under any circumstances, which rules are particularly contested, and which principles could and might have to be adjusted.

Some liberal rules that have circumscribed national sovereignty or prescribed neoliberal economic practices have become a particular bone of contention.^[103] Some believe that scaling them back – at least in their more intrusive variants – will hardly be avoidable. This is not just because of pushback from the world’s growing number of autocrats, but also because of a widespread “mood of cultural decolonization” that emphasizes sovereignty over the spread of liberal ideas.^[104] Even governments that have long engaged in promoting democracy and accountability for human rights abuses seem to have stopped believing in the universal applicability of these ideas.^[105]

Meanwhile, the discourse of leaders from the Global South on international rules is often difficult to interpret. It is unclear whether they are demanding greater consistency in applying existing international rules or calling for new principles and rules.^[106] While leaders’ language is often vague in this regard, people in many parts of the world still see merit in existing international rules: In all countries surveyed for the Munich Security Conference in July 2024, absolute majorities think that the current international rules and principles represent the values and needs of most countries.^[107] And there is good reason to believe that the rules and principles laid down in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights still have merit in a multipolar world. After all, they were drafted to prevent the type of fragmentation that resulted in two world wars and the associated atrocities. While Russia and some like-minded states tried to block an agreement at the Summit of the Future,^[108] the fact that UN members eventually agreed on a meaningful document is clear evidence of a widespread commitment to rules-based multilateralism in the framework of the UN.^[109]

Any effort to reform the existing order in a way that reflects greater multipolarity but still serves the international community at large will depend on the major powers defining their own interests broadly and with a view to the long term – in a way that could also be called “enlightened.” Yet few of the old and new powers are doing so. And some of those who still define their interests more broadly, among them European states and Japan, are desperately clinging to the hope that the status quo can be maintained. As such, they risk becoming “the defenders of last resort for the world of yesterday.”^[110] And while the US might once have felt “a special responsibility to shape a liberal order that benefits the wider world,” critics fear that, under President Trump’s leadership, it might behave “in the same narrowly self-interested, frequently exploitive way as many great powers throughout history.”^[111] Russia’s foreign policy, which is primarily aimed at disruption, is the opposite of enlightened. Indeed, Moscow’s talk of “indivisible security” only serves as a smoke screen for its pursuit of a Russian sphere of influence.^[112] And although China would clearly like its vision for the international order – with its concepts of common security and common development that resonate in some parts of the world – to be perceived as seeking the common good, the order it pursues, just like Russia, is one of major power privilege and not of sovereign equality.^[113] Finally, major actors in the Global South seem less focused on averting the growing polarization of global politics and more on adapting to or exploiting it. The bridge-building between the Global North and the Global South that some of these states have officially committed themselves to would be a highly welcome remedy for polarization. But in many of these countries, the dominant approach in an increasingly fragmented global environment is to assert narrow interests, which often means glossing over the fact that smaller states do not have this opportunity.^[114]

 

What makes things worse is that, almost everywhere, the pursuit of enlightened foreign policies is being hampered by growing domestic polarization and the shrinking political leeway that accompanies it. Domestic polarization, in short, is playing a major role in preventing leaders from building the necessary global consensus. Worse yet, leaders may even have incentives to frustrate international agreement – simply because they “thrive […] in a Hobbesian, transactional, all-against-all world.”^[116] Put differently, polarization on the international level may help some leaders consolidate power at home. Global efforts to reduce dangerous divides between countries, preserve basic rules and norms, or create new ones, and efforts to coordinate responses to a wide range of global threats will thus not succeed if depolarization cannot be accomplished within countries. The quest to build a more peaceful, sustainable, and just order starts at home.