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Prioritizing Together

Critical Capabilities

How should Russia’s war against Ukraine affect ­European procurement priorities? What lessons should Europeans draw from the Ukrainian battlefield in terms of defense innovation? Which critical dependencies and vulnerabilities does Europe’s defense sector face and how can they be addressed?

Key Points

  1. Russia’s war against Ukraine has led to a convergence of threat perceptions across Europe, tilting the balance from crisis management toward territorial defense and rendering the old dilemma between the two less salient.

  2. Heavy weapon systems, such as main battle tanks and artillery, have demonstrated their continued relevance in Ukraine. As they remain the backbone of any force engaged in territorial defense, they require further investment from European states.

  3. Increasingly cheap ISR drones and loitering munitions have proven to be game changers in Ukraine. EU member states must prepare for the further proliferation of these systems and address the respective vulnerabilities of current air-defense systems.

  4. Better data connectivity is key for Europe’s armed forces to unlock the full potential of other technological systems. This requires more innovation spending, including on appropriate hardware systems such as low-Earth orbit satellite constellations.

  5. A precondition for the success of these defense investments is the reliability of EU member states’ supply of strategic raw materials and semiconductors required for military systems. Reshoring, friendshoring, diversification of suppliers, and recycling are necessary to mitigate risks.

European states must take tough decisions on what to prioritize. This is no easy task, given an array of security threats and vast capability gaps caused by years of defense underinvestment. When setting priorities, European states have traditionally faced a dilemma between crisis management and territorial defense, and between Europe’s neighbors to the East and the South. The Russian war on Ukraine has at least temporarily rendered this dilemma less salient. Member states have converged in their threat perceptions of Russia and collectively tilted toward territorial defense and Europe’s Eastern neighborhood. Meanwhile, the war has brought another dilemma to the fore. It has shown that Europeans have to prepare for old warfare, dominated by mass and attrition, while simultaneously getting ready for new warfare characterized by an increased use of cheap, unmanned systems and a greater reliance on data-connectivity. This will require staying on top of developments in warfare, increased innovation spending, as well as concerted action to face a broadening range of dependencies.

A New Dilemma on the Rise: Attrition Versus Innovation

Decisions about procurement inevitably require policymakers to wrestle with the essential question of what the future of war will look like. Currently, many look to the Russian war against Ukraine for answers. Yet, the lessons from Ukraine are ambiguous. On the one hand, many observers have been taken aback by how similar warfare in the 21st century is to that of the 20th century: attrition warfare has returned; questions of ammunition production and getting tanks to the front line are central; and the old adage that “mass has a quality of its own” rings true again. Traditional warfighting capabilities, such as large quantities of armored fighting vehicles and artillery, are essential for territorial defense and reclaiming territory, and show the continued importance of kinetic force.[1] Despite the important role new technologies have played in Ukraine, they merely enhance the effectiveness of traditional core territorial defense capabilities. As UK Chief of the General Staff General Sir Patrick Sanders put it, “you can’t cyber your way across a river.”[2]

Among the new technologies, unmanned aerial systems have been the most visible ones in the war. These have appeared in many forms: small, commercial drones used for ISR purposes, larger military-grade armed drones, and loitering munitions (“kamikaze drones”) used for devastating one-time strikes. Although the role of armed drones has decreased as the conflict has progressed, small ISR drones and loitering munitions have remained highly relevant.[3] ISR drones are used extensively for tactical reconnaissance on the frontlines, while both sides deploy loitering munitions.[4]

This unmanned aerial revolution is not so much a matter of groundbreaking new technologies, however. Drones and loitering munitions have existed for years. The revolutionary element is the extremely low production cost, enabling their use in great quantities and rendering them expendable. An Iranian-made Shahed-136 loitering munition, used extensively by Russia to attack Ukrainian cities, costs between 20.000 and 50.000 US dollars.[5] Commercial ISR drones can cost as little as 2.000 US dollars.[6] This allows drone usage in large quantities in this war. For example, Ukraine alone loses approximately 10.000 drones per month while reliable numbers for Russian losses are hard to come by.[7]  “Cheap and expendable” seems to be the new motto of drone warfare.

This development has consequences for the future of air defense, as the missiles used by missile-based air-defense systems, for example, Iris-T, are significantly more expensive than the loitering munitions they shoot down (Figure 3.1).[8] In addition, missile-based air-defense systems, which can usually only carry a limited number of missiles, are vulnerable to overwhelming swarms of cheap armed drones or loitering munitions.[9] In contrast, the German Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, which uses 35mm canons rather than guided missiles, has been more effective than expected in countering Russian loitering munitions and, to a lesser extent, cruise missiles. Phased-out by the German military in 2012 and donated to Ukraine in 2022, it has emerged as an effective and comparatively cheap air-defense system against loitering munitions.[10] In the first week of 2023 alone, Ukraine shot down around 80 air vehicles in the Kyiv area, with many of the successes attributed to Gepard systems.[11]

With new layers of technology, we still have to remember the mass. There is no point of having one fancy weapon if someone else has 10.000 un-fancy weapons.[12]

Kersti Kaljulaid•former President of the Republic of Estonia, Munich Security Conference, February 16, 2023

Cost per unit of Shahed-136 loitering munitions and selected air-defense missiles, 2022, USD

The important role of drones in Ukraine hinges on another key innovation characterizing this war: data connectivity.[13] Ukraine’s ISR drones have high military impact because the images they gather can swiftly be communicated to other relevant units.[14] Commanders or artillery units can use these images for targeting purposes as well as post-strike damage assessments. Software systems enable military units or even Ukrainian civilian observers to quickly upload intelligence from a variety of data sources, such as satellite imagery, cell phone, or drone videos. These systems provide data to soldiers, for example, in the form of interactive battlefield maps, which enhances their situational awareness and enables faster targeting of enemy forces. Moreover, artificial intelligence (AI) can facilitate the processing of gathered data, for example, by identifying vehicle types or suggesting priorities for targeting.

In terms of hardware, this data connectivity is made possible by the Starlink satellite-based communications system currently provided by SpaceX, a US-based private company.[15] This points to another key development in this war: an increasing dependence on commercial actors and their technologies. With such dependence come new vulnerabilities, as states’ military capabilities might be severely compromised if private actors decided to withdraw their support. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk threatened to do as much when he announced the suspension of Ukraine’s free access to Starlink in October 2022, although he reversed this decision a few days later under public pressure.[16] Losing access to Starlink would have had disastrous consequences for Ukraine as it would have severely curtailed the data connectivity of its armed forces.

Europe must get its act together. [...] Now is the time to work together on joint development and smart procurement to have not only more but also better capabilities. [...] That will make us better partners in the Alliance.[17]

Kajsa Ollongren•Dutch Defense Minister, Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, July 14, 2022

Lessons From Ukraine: Implications for European Procurement and Spending

Selected priorities identified by the EU’s May 2022 Defence Investment Gaps Analysis

To guarantee Europe’s security now and in the future, European policymakers as well as defense planners in EU and NATO should heed the lessons from Ukraine. The defense investment gaps analysis, released by the European Commission and the EDA three months into the war, offers valuable insights (Box 3.1). But this analysis could only ever reflect early lessons of the war. Based on the above, three priorities for capability development and procurement stand out.  

First, EU member states should keep investing in classical core capabilities for territorial defense, such as armored fighting vehicles and artillery. Without these systems, territorial defense is hardly possible. At the very least, member states should replenish them enough to make up for the systems donated to Ukraine. The EDA’s 2022 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) Report as well as the defense investment gaps analysis underline this assessment, arguing that the return of high-intensity warfare to Europe requires the expansion of EU member states’ inventory of main battle tanks and artillery.[18]

Second, EU member states should take note of the innovations brought about by Russia’s war against Ukraine. The increased relevance of drones and loitering munitions has consequences for air defense which they must take into account. Russia will likely continue to use cheap, expendable loitering munitions to attack Ukraine. This means EU member states should anticipate Ukraine’s demand for air defense missiles to remain high. It is essential that Ukraine’s European allies can meet the embattled country’s needs. Although air-defense missiles are more complex and costly than artillery shells, the EU’s Ammunition Initiative set up to provide Ukraine with sufficient artillery ammunition could serve as a blueprint for a system that ensures Ukraine’s supply of air-defense ammunition (Chapter 4). In the long term, EU member states will have to find a more sustainable solution for the problems expendable drones and loitering munitions pose for missile-based air defense. The vulnerabilities of such defensive systems will only increase once the AI technology to deploy swarms of autonomously interacting drones matures.[19] EU member states should prepare for this, either by investing in drone capabilities themselves, investing in air-defense capabilities that can efficiently neutralize (autonomous) drones and loitering munitions, or by regulating the proliferation of these systems.

The defense investment gaps analysis partly recognizes this, by emphasizing the importance of investing in drone capabilities and mentioning the Eurodrone as a promising project.[20] This drone will, however, not be delivered until 2029 and the French Senate already criticized it for being too heavy and expensive.[21] It does not seem to be a great example of the cheap and expandable aerial systems that play such a large role in in the current war in Ukraine. This raises the question whether EU member states should prioritize investments in much cheaper systems, such as smaller ISR drones, when it comes to drone capabilities. Some member states have already come to this conclusion: in May 2023, the Czech Republic cancelled the procurement of three larger Israeli Heron 1 drones and announced it would acquire two hundred smaller ISR drones instead.[22]

Regarding air defense, the defense investment gap analysis does mention the need for anti-drone systems, but prioritizes the procurement of mid-range air- and missile-defense systems.[23] The 2022 CARD Report, while not mentioning anti-drone capabilities, stresses the importance of “high-end” air-defense systems.[24] If this is to mean guided-missile-based systems, investing in such systems alone will not suffice. Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated that guided-missile-based air defense, which is also the focus of Germany’s European Sky Shield Initiative,[25] is vulnerable to large quantities of unmanned aerial systems. To safeguard their air-defense capabilities in the future, EU member states will have to address this vulnerability.


Third, EU member states should invest in better data connectivity of their armed forces. In Ukraine, it is the factor that allows other innovations to reach their full potential. The defense investment gaps analysis therefore recommends investing in an “ultra-secured” European connectivity program.[26] At the same time, however, EU member states should reduce the current dependency on private actors regarding satellite networks in low-Earth orbit which are necessary for extensive data connectivity.[27] In fact, the EU is already taking steps to address this dependency and seeking to develop an EU low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellation to enable secure connectivity for EU member states. A 2022 Commission initiative called Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS2, not to be confused with the IRIS-T guided missile) proposes to launch up to 170 LEO satellites between 2025 and 2027 and is currently awaiting approval from the European Parliament.[28] This requires a large investment and could enhance the defense capabilities of all EU member states. The EU is thus well-positioned to take on this initiative, thereby providing a European public good, which brings space-based, secure communications to European governments and businesses. Additionally, apart from hardware, there is a software component worth exploring: Open-architecture software that allows kits to ”plug and play”[29] could help in overcoming fragmentation and address difficulties in interoperability.

The latter points presuppose significant investment in defense innovation. Despite a steady rise in EU defense ministries’ research & technology (R&T) budgets, most are still too low to keep up with the changing face of war witnessed in Ukraine. In total, EU member states spent 3.6 billion euros, or 1.7 percent of their total defense expenditure, on defense R&T in 2021 (Figure 3.2).[30] While this constitutes a new record high, it still falls short of the EU goal of spending two percent of total defense expenditure on R&T. Moreover, there are vast discrepancies between member states. Only two of them spent significantly more than 1.7 percent, thereby pulling up the average. The European Defence Agency concludes that: “For European defense to be at the cutting edge of preparing for future conflicts and capabilities, a larger number of member states would need to increase R&T spending at a faster rate than their total defense expenditure.”[31]

Defense research and technology spending, 2011–2021, percent of total EU defense spending

Falling behind on defense innovation entails security risks for EU member states. They could miss out on key emerging and disruptive innovations, resulting in a relative loss of military strength. In addition, a widening transatlantic defense innovation gap could complicate interoperability with technologically more advanced US forces. A report published by Boston Consulting Group and the Munich Security Conference in 2023 highlighted a widening defense innovation readiness gap. Surveying 59 defense ministries, as well as EU and NATO, showed that 78 percent of ministries of defense consider their pace of innovation as insufficient.[32]

The EU and NATO have both taken initiatives to stimulate defense innovation. Within the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), the European Commission is identifying ideas, technologies, and solutions that require support to reach their full potential. EUDIS provides practical support by building a network of relevant defense innovation partners as well as funding: It should provide up to two billion euros for defense innovation through 2027. This includes 1.46 billion euros from the European Defence Fund (EDF), ninety million in co-funding from member states, and at least four hundred million from other public and private sources.[33] The EU has also established a Hub for EU Defence Innovation (HEDI) within the EDA as a deliverable of its 2022 Strategic Compass.[34] HEDI is envisioned as a platform to increase and better coordinate member state cooperation on defense innovation. Meanwhile, NATO has launched its own initiative to promote defense innovation: the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). DIANA also aims to offer both practical support and funding. The practical support consists, among other things, of granting projects access to deep-tech test centers in NATO countries.[35]

While both initiatives are important for advancing innovation and integration of Emerging and Developing Technologies (EDTs) into defense, there is a lack of synchronization between the EU and NATO in this area. Critics have lamented duplication, as both organizations have developed their own slightly differing lists with priority areas for innovation. The EU’s list includes “advanced manufacturing, advanced materials, life-science technologies, micro/nano-electronics and photonics, artificial intelligence and security and connectivity.”[36] NATO has in turn suggested focusing on “artificial intelligence, data, autonomy, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, hypersonic technologies, space, novel materials and manufacturing, and energy and propulsion.” In addition, a lack of interoperability and differences in transatlantic approaches on how to use new technologies could make true policy change and innovation difficult.[37]

Securing the Source: Raw Materials and Dependencies

A precondition for strengthening European armies is that Europe can source the necessary raw materials. But as in green technologies, Europe is dangerously dependent on others. For almost all military assets, including tanks, fighter aircraft, ammunition, and submarines, the EU faces a very high supply risk with regard to certain components needed to build a military force, such as aluminum, natural graphite,  and a high risk regarding beryllium, chromium, and copper.[38] This becomes especially apparent when looking at supply chains of drones. Drones require a wide range of critical and strategic raw materials. Europe’s drone production is vulnerable to several bottlenecks regarding raw materials, components, and assembly (Figure 3.3). Europe is particularly dependent on China, which enjoys a strong industrial position in every step of the drone-making process. While China is by far the largest supplier of raw materials, African and Latin American countries have notable capacities, with each continent supplying 11 percent of all needed materials. In later steps of the drone production process, including the manufacturing of components and subsystems, the situation looks somewhat better, as either European countries themselves or their partner nations such as the US and Japan have relevant capacities.

Overview of producing countries in the drone supply chain, 2023, percent

The EU does recognize this vulnerability and has identified 34 raw materials as critical, some of which have additionally been designated as strategic raw materials.[39] The main supplier of these materials is often China. To address these dependencies, the EU proposed the Critical Raw Materials Act in 2023. It sets out a range of goals to re-shore some extraction and processing capacities back to the EU to reduce dependencies and enhance diversification.[40] These are ambitious goals that will take time to implement. Until then, the production of military capabilities in Europe remains vulnerable to supply chain shocks.

In addition to raw materials, the EU faces a huge vulnerability in the field of semiconductors. Microchips are necessary for almost all technological devices, including weapons systems and drones. Yet, the semiconductor market is one of a kind: it is fundamentally dependent on only a few companies with unique capabilities. Great power competition between the US and China as well as concerns about a potential escalation of the conflict in Taiwan heighten the issue of reliable supply chains in this field. 

Annalena Baerbock

We are never again going to make ourselves existentially dependent on a country that does not share our values. Complete economic dependency rooted in the principle of hope makes us susceptible to political blackmail. Now that we know better, we must not repeat this mistake.[41]

Annalena Baerbock•German Foreign Minister, Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 14, 2022

The EU has reacted to these developments by introducing the European Chips Act to advance European competitiveness. It seeks to mobilize 43 billion euros in public and private investment by 2030 to boost Europe’s technological capabilities and increase supply chain security.[42] By doing so, the EU is joining other players in heavily subsidizing chip manufacturing. China aims to spend 150 billion US dollars in the coming decade, whereas the US plans to spend 52 billion US dollars over the next five years.[43] Taken together, the EU, US, Japanese, and Chinese plans would amount to “721 billion USD or 0.9% of global GDP.”[44] While the EU is right to take urgent action in bolstering its competitiveness in the chip field, critics have warned that this type of industrial action could lead to inefficiencies, such as overcapacity.[45]

All in all, both the Critical Raw Materials Act and the European Chips Act are important steps in addressing the EU’s dependency on other actors, especially China, for producing key components of weapons manufacturing. Yet, securing supply chains in critical raw materials and semiconductors in the long term will remain a challenge for European countries with limited budgets, especially as reshoring production to Europe disrupts markets and may lead to higher production costs for already expensive military equipment and its components. 

Conclusion: A Steep Learning Curve

The return of large-scale war to the European continent has shifted priorities. It has, at least temporarily, resolved the old dilemma between crisis management and territorial defense in favor of the latter. At the same time, it has highlighted a new dilemma, namely the need to prepare for both traditional and new warfare at the same time. Europeans should use the lessons from Ukraine to jointly set priorities for future defense investment. They will need to find the right balance of capabilities, especially between the firepower of a large mass of heavy weaponry and the sophistication of integrated, low-cost technology. The current focus on filling legacy gaps and restocking heavy equipment risks widening Europe’s defense innovation gap compared to other global players. Meanwhile, fresh thinking is needed for Europeans to join forces in providing European public goods. These include key enablers, such as the low-Earth orbit satellite constellation IRIS2, but also joint strategies to counter dependencies and vulnerabilities. Hence, the EU needs to intensify efforts to diversify suppliers and closely coordinate its policies with key allies like the US, for example, in the Trade and Technology Council. All this means that Europeans have to stay on top of developments in warfare.

Defense Sitters — Munich Security Report Special Edition

Nicole Koenig, Leonard Schütte, Natalie Knapp, Paula Köhler, Isabell Kump, and Jintro Pauly, “Defense Sitters: Transforming European Militaries in Times of War,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Special Edition of the Munich Security Report, June 2023, https://doi.org/10.47342/LIHA9331

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