Partnerships Deserted

In the Sahel region, a coup belt stretches from west to east, threatening to stifle any positive prospects for the region and jeopardizing longstanding partnerships. On its eastern edge, a deadly power struggle more than one year after the coup holds Sudan in a chokehold, leaving over half of the population in humanitarian need.^[1] But the epicenter of the most recent coups has been the West African Sahel, where seven coups have taken place in the last four years.^[2] Particularly Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have been caught in a mutually reinforcing spiral of coups, a rising number of terrorist attacks, a lack of economic prospects for the young populations, and weak democratic processes. 

In July 2023, the world saw a repeat in Niger of what had happened earlier in Mali and Burkina Faso, when a faction of the Nigerien military led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani deposed President Mohamed Bazoum. While the various coup leaders in the Sahel cited the main reason for their takeovers to be the inability of the then-governments to deal with insecurity, each coup was the result of a combination of factors. Power struggles and unstable relations between the respective governments and militaries played a major role everywhere.^[3] The recent coup in Niger was also facilitated by public discontent with the government.^[4] And although the recent frequency of coups is striking, all countries affected have a history of coups.

The consequences of the recent coup in Niger are particularly severe. ​​The military junta’s inability to curb terrorism in the country, evidenced by a 40 percent spike in violence by jihadist groups in the first month after the coup, threatens to further destabilize the entire Sahel and the neighboring Gulf of Guinea.^[5] Moreover, since Niger was the last “anchor of stability”^[6] for external powers after relations with Burkina Faso and Mali had already broken down, the coup calls into question the future of European and US efforts to promote development, democracy, and good governance and fight terrorism in the region. Russia is taking advantage of this turmoil, offering itself as an alternative partner to Sahel countries.^[7]

Since 2012, when the dispute between the then-government and ethnic Tuaregs in northern Mali escalated into a separatist insurgency, the UN, the EU, the US, and Mali’s former colonial power, France, gradually increased their assistance to the Sahel region.^[8] Key objectives were to support the region’s fight against terrorism, especially through US forces and the French Operation Barkhane, and their progress on development, democracy, and good governance. Since 2014, the EU has spent 8 billion euros on security and humanitarian assistance to Sahel states, while the US has allocated more than 5.5 billion US dollars to economic and security assistance.^[9] 

Despite investing significant resources, Europe, the US, and MINUSMA, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, established in 2013 by the UN Security Council, have failed to improve the situation of the populations in the Sahel. State presence is still close to nonexistent in northern Mali and half of Burkina Faso, and institutions remain too weak to address the root causes of insecurity.^[10] One reason is that external actors have focused too much on providing security relative to fostering development, protecting human rights, and strengthening governance mechanisms.^[11] The EU has been unable to live up to its Integrated Strategy in the Sahel, which sought to better balance humanitarian, development, and military assistance.^[12]

Moreover, in Mali and elsewhere in the region, Europe and the US were faced with difficult partners for getting reforms underway. The Malian government, also under former president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, had been reluctant to tackle corruption and implement the 2015 Algiers peace agreement.^[13] Signed by the Malian government and armed groups from northern Mali, the accord obliged the government to reform the state, including the military, and to integrate former insurgents into state institutions.^[14] However, the Keïta administration – and later, the military juntas – showed little appetite for reform.^[15] They were largely unable to provide security for their own population, outsourcing it to MINUSMA, France, and the US.^[16]

Despite benefiting from the presence of MINUSMA, the Malian authorities that seized power after the coups hindered the UN mission of protecting civilians and supporting the implementation of the peace accord. Among other things, they impeded peacekeepers from investigating human rights abuses.^[17] In 2023, the Malian authorities called for an end to MINUSMA, arguing that it had become “highly detrimental to peace, reconciliation, and national cohesion.”^[18] Yet according to UN reports, the junta quit cooperating because of the damning human rights reports MINUSMA had issued against it.^[19]

As in Burkina Faso and Mali, the Nigerien military junta has used its seizure of power to challenge the country’s partnerships with external actors. Resentment that years of cooperation had not borne fruit in terms of improved security and economic prospects for the populations may well have played a role in these decisions. In addition, as the governments have become more authoritarian, they have grown more wary of European and US support, which is often linked to demands for economic and political reforms.

Careful not to legitimize coups, Europe and the US face a dilemma over how to continue working with the Sahel countries. They are divided between imposing costs for coups and pragmatically working with the juntas. Right after the coup in Niger, the EU and the US joined ECOWAS in its strong condemnation and suspended technical and military assistance.^[25] While the EU has agreed on a sanctions framework against the Nigerien regime, the US has adopted a more conciliatory tone toward the junta, hoping for a quick return to civilian rule.^[26] Washington has still cut its development and military assistance to Niger, including a suspension of 442 million US dollars in trade and agriculture assistance – a blow to one of the world’s poorest countries.^[27]

At the same time, the EU has seen the junta dismantle key pillars of its partnership. Five months after the coup, the new leaders ended security and military collaboration with the EU, dismissing the EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) and the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM), which the EU had already suspended after the coup.^[28] This came just days after the junta overturned a law aimed at curbing migration to Europe.^[29] Europe now fears that this could lead to a rise in migration movements, as Niger is a key transit country for many refugees and migrants.^[30]

With Mali and Burkina Faso, the EU is withholding security cooperation until its conditions are met.^[31] Brussels demands a clear commitment to a return to civilian rule and, in the case of Mali, an end to cooperation with the Russian Wagner Group. In Mali, the EU suspended all operational activities of EUCAP Sahel Mali and the EU Training Mission.^[32] With little chance of them resuming anytime soon, countries such as Germany have shifted their focus to development cooperation.^[33] However, they are trying to bypass the junta, focusing instead on local partners and companies and assistance through UN agencies.^[34]

Europe and the US now fear that in Niger, they will see a repeat of what happened in Mali.^[39] Since 2021, the Wagner Group has replaced French forces in operating with the Malian military against armed groups.^[40] By targeting civilians, the mercenaries have shored up societal grievances and are thus creating an environment conducive to terrorist recruitment.^[41] If the Nigerien and Burkinabe juntas were to start working with the Wagner Group, this might well strengthen the grip of jihadists in the region.^[42]

As a result, the prospects for peace in the region are diminishing. Despite the official intent of the three juntas to restore stability, each successful coup since 2020 has been followed by greater violence (Figure 5.1). In the 18 months after the first coup in Burkina Faso in 2022, the number of civilians killed by jihadists rose by 165 percent compared to the equivalent period before the coup.^[43] Niger, too, has witnessed growing violence.^[44] These developments do not bode well for a return to civilian rule. Concerns are growing that the Malian and Burkinabe juntas seek to retain power, which would cement the authoritarian drift in the region.^[45]

As Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger risk plunging into greater insecurity, Europe and the US face a dilemma over the future of their Sahel policies. Withdrawing altogether would leave a void likely to be filled by malicious actors, which would further destabilize the region. But it is unclear whether staying will help boost prosperity and security in the region. It could even be seen as legitimizing the coups. What is certain is that if Europe and the US are to remain in the region, their strategies need recalibrating.