Lula Land

In 2022, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, commonly known as Lula, heralded the start of his third presidency by declaring that “Brazil is back.”^[1] This came after his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, had almost completely withdrawn Brazil from the international stage.^[2] Bolsonaro had described the World Health Organization and environmental protection as national security threats and proposed withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on climate change.^[3] After a narrow victory, Lula returned Brazil to its traditional foreign policy course of strong multilateral engagement.^[4] For Brazil’s G20 presidency last year, as well as its role as host of this year’s BRICS Summit and the UN Climate Conference COP30 in Belém, Lula announced that Brazil would act as a bridge between the so-called Global South and Global North.^[5] However, multilateral engagement does not equate to unwavering support for the system as it is. Brazil has been skeptical of the current global order, seeing it as a manifestation of global inequality.^[6]

Under Lula, Brazil has promoted a vision of a global order that is based on the concept of “cooperative multipolarity,” originally coined by former Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota.^[7] Based on international law, the universality of human rights, and the rejection of the use of force, the concept highlights the importance of more inclusive global governance mechanisms for stability and security.^[8] Brazil views the greater distribution of power among countries as an opportunity to rebalance outdated power structures and give countries of the Global South a stronger say in international decision-making (Figure 1.4). Accordingly, it put global governance reform at the top of the agenda of last year’s G20 presidency, along with other priorities of the Global South, such as poverty reduction and food security.

In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2024, Lula criticized the lack of permanent seats for Latin America and Africa on the UN Security Council (UNSC), calling it an “unacceptable echo of domination from the colonial past.”^[9] Brazil proposed reforms to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, including making the composition of senior management more regionally representative.^[10] It also suggested boosting the banks’ lending practices by rechanneling Special Drawing Rights to multilateral development banks to unlock resources for vulnerable countries to help them deal with the climate crisis.^[11] In addition, Brazil used its G20 presidency to initiate discussions on a two-percent tax on the world’s super-rich to raise funds to help poorer countries deal with climate change impacts.

Brazil’s vision of multipolarity is not anti-Western but rather critical of Western domination.^[12] The country has repeatedly condemned unilateral actions by Western states.^[13] This included sanctions that have not been approved by the UNSC, notably those imposed by the US and the EU on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine.^[14] Brazil also rejects the framing of a global struggle between democracies and autocracies, adopted by the Biden administration, among others.^[15] Emphasizing the principle of non-interference, Brazil is eager to cooperate with a variety of countries, regardless of their form of government. As a founding member of BRICS, it seeks to promote the group as a platform that amplifies the influence of the Global South in the international system and deepens economic relations among its members.^[16] Lula has, for instance, supported the creation of a common currency to facilitate trade and investment among the BRICS nations and has described the group’s New Development Bank as an alternative to the Western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions.^[17] Even so, Brazil rejects the Chinese and Russian framing of BRICS as an anti-Western club.^[18] Despite being critical of the West and the current order, Brasília actively engages in formats and organizations that it deems Western-centric.^[19] For instance, it applied for membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2017. If Brazil were to join, it would be the only country to simultaneously be a member of BRICS, the G20, and the OECD.

Non-alignment also shapes Brazil’s relations with China and the US. While China has become Brazil’s largest trading partner and second-largest investor, the US remains its largest direct investor and second-largest trading partner (Figure 8.1).^[29] Since choosing sides could result in economic losses, Brazil seeks to maintain good relations with both. However, its positioning between the great powers is also subject to domestic controversy. Lula’s government was, for instance, divided on the decision not to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with some members viewing it as an opportunity to attract investment and others warning of negative effects on relations with the US and the EU.^[30] More generally, voters of right-wing parties, including Bolsonaro’s, seem to be much more in favor of alignment with the US than voters of left-wing parties, including Lula’s, who prefer a more balanced stance toward the great powers.^[31] Trump’s re-election could put this balancing act to the test. His threat to impose a 100 percent tariff on the BRICS countries if they were to create an alternative currency suggests that Brazil’s strategy may come under pressure.^[32]

With its vision of cooperative multipolarity, its strategy of non-alignment, and its strong ties to both Western and non-Western institutions, Brazil is well positioned to act as a bridge between the Global South and Global North. During its recent G20 presidency, it successfully put concerns of the Global South on the agenda. However, amid rising geopolitical tensions and Trump’s second term, it will be increasingly difficult for Brazil to act as a global agenda-setter and maintain its strategy of non-alignment. Its G20 priorities, including more ambitious climate action and the proposed wealth tax, will be even harder to implement. Initiatives within BRICS and cooperation with China could come under pressure as the Chinese-US rivalry intensifies. Internal polarization could also increase ahead of the 2026 elections, with Bolsonaro having expressed hope that Trump’s return to the White House could help his own comeback.^[49] Brazil’s vision of cooperative multipolarity may thus clash with the reality of a more uncooperative geopolitical context and polarization at home.